Controversies in Military Ethics & Security Policy
Suddenly Ready for War? German Pacifism in the “Zeitenwende”
Introduction
Russia’s war of aggression and annihilation against Ukraine in 2022 has destroyed the security order that has existed in Europe since the end of the Cold War. All affected political communities are faced with the question of how best to stop Russian aggression and restore peace in Europe. In what has been described as a “Zeitenwende” – a historical turning point or watershed moment – the German government is responding to the altered security situation with a drastic change of course in its defense policy: Germany is to become the strongest conventional military power in Europe and the Bundeswehr is to return to war-fighting capability.[1] The leadership of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) is also urging a shift in societal attitudes towards greater willingness to defend one’s country, and has already presented preliminary concepts for reintroducing military service to the public.[2] According to Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz and former Federal President Joachim Gauck, the change of course in defense policy is being accompanied by a “geistige Zeitenwende”, i.e. a fundamental turning point in people’s attitudes, which is expressed in a greater acceptance of the need for military strength.[3]
Proponents of pacifism have been expressing concerns over these developments, fearing a profound shift away from pacifism among the German population and a “bellicist re-education” of German society.[4] Meanwhile, the shift in prevailing societal attitudes is occurring more slowly than proponents of the Zeitenwende in defense policy would like to see.[5] In the discourse surrounding the appropriate response to Russian aggression, pacifism itself is increasingly being criticized. The current affairs journal Der Spiegel has provocatively asked whether “pacifism should be consigned to the dustbin of history”.[6] In addition to the exchange of rhetorical blows in the media between “warmongering bellicists” and “rogue pacifists”, the “right” way to deal with Russia’s aggression and Germany’s pacifism is the subject of a wider public debate, expressed in countless public letters, various manifestos and numerous petitions and demonstrations.[7]
However, hawks and doves in the “pacifism debate” share their basic assumptions about pacifism in the German population: first, prior to 2022, a majority of the German population was pacifist, and, second, the outbreak of the Ukraine war has prompted a reconsideration of these views. The initial assumption is based on the consensus reached by (military) sociological research, which posits that the German population is a post-heroic society whose strategic culture is defined by a fundamentally pacifist attitude.[8] The second assumption is based on the results of recent population surveys, which indicate that the majority of respondents approve of the Zeitenwende in defense policy. This paper examines these two assumptions using representative population surveys, which allow for an empirical measurement of pacifist attitudes in the German population over time.[9]The findings describe the extent and limits of the strategic cultural change in the German population and, at the same time, expose a number of false assumptions about Germans’ relationship to the military.
Pacifism as a personal attitude
The philosopher and political scientist Gertrud Brücher describes pacifism very succinctly as “thinking that interprets the proportionality of means to the detriment of war”.[10]In general, pacifism is defined as a “political and moral conviction that rejects the use of violence, especially military violence and wars as a means of enforcing interests, and only tolerates peaceful and non-violent activities”.[11]Many articles on the subject of pacifism identify the “rejection of war and military force as a means of settling political conflicts” as the conceptual core and “lowest common denominator”.[12]
This paper employs an empirical approach to assess pacifism as the cognitive dimension of personal attitudes among individuals (survey respondents). This data is evaluated in aggregated form to derive insights into the temporal evolution of pacifist attitudes within the German population. To this end, five indicators are used to empirically examine pacifism as a personal attitude: 1. Pacifism as a fundamental attitude towards foreign and security policy; 2. Pacifism as a rejection of the use of force by the military; 3. Pacifism as a fundamental rejection of the armed forces; 4. Pacifism as rejection of a “policy of rearmament”; 5. Pacifism as a rejection of personal military involvement.[13]
Pacifism as a fundamental attitude to foreign and security policy
Pacifism as a fundamental attitude towards foreign and security policy is defined not only by the rejection of military means, but above all by an exclusive preference for the use of non-military or civilian means. Pacifism is based not only on the conviction that military means of conflict resolution are ineffective and should therefore be rejected, but above all on the conviction that “non-violent means are the more effective means of establishing and maintaining peace”.[14] Accordingly, pacifism as a fundamental attitude towards foreign and security policy needs to be evaluated in terms of its stance towards the use of civilian means (approval) and its stance towards the use of military means (rejection) in foreign and security policy. This two-dimensional operationalization allows for a precise distinction to be made between pacifism and other fundamental foreign and security policy postures such as realism, isolationism, or militarism.[15]
Since 2016, the representative population survey conducted by the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) has included a comprehensive set of questions that records respondents’ attitudes towards the use of various civilian and military means in German foreign and security policy. Over the entire survey period, a majority of the German population supports the use of both civilian and military means in foreign and security policy, with the group of civilian means receiving higher approval ratings on average than the group of military means, i.e., there is a relative preference for the use of civilian means (see Table 1).
Table 1. Approval of the use of civilian and military means in foreign and security policy, 2016-2023
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Civilian means
61
60
56
62
64
64
65
64
Diplomatic negotiations
81
84
85
85
81
84
84
85
Arms control
-
-
-
73
73
71
70
71
Development cooperation
74
71
62
71
71
70
63
70
Economic sanctions
52
56
54
56
57
61
68
63
Acceptance of refugees
37
30
22
27
36
34
40
29
Military means
43
44
41
42
47
46
52
49
Training missions by the Bundeswehr
60
59
59
60
64
60
61
57
Stabilization missions by the Bundeswehr
56
56
54
56
61
57
58
56
Military measures to defend the NATO alliance
-
-
-
-
-
-
57
52
Combat missions by the Bundeswehr
31
34
27
27
33
34
38
34
Arms supplies to friendly states
25
27
24
26
30
33
48
44
Note: Figures in percent. Individual percentages have been rounded up. Question asked: “What means do you think Germany should use in its foreign and security policy?” The response categories “Strongly agree” and “Somewhat agree” were combined. Data basis: ZMSBw Population Survey 2016-2023.
A relative preference for non-violence can also be seen in the Bundeswehr’s mission options: training and stabilization missions are supported by an absolute majority, but not combat missions. Thus, the armed forces are not rejected in principle as an instrument of German foreign and security policy, but only the use of force by the Bundeswehr does not meet with majority approval. Nevertheless, it can be observed that, on average, the acceptance of refugees as a German foreign policy tool is viewed just as critically as combat missions, and that stabilization and training missions by the Bundeswehr sometimes receive a similar level of approval as economic sanctions. These comparisons highlight that not every civilian means receives more public approval than every military means.
Attitudes towards the use of civilian and military means are compared below in the form of comprehensive measures to show the proportion of pacifists in the German population over time. For this purpose, the attitudes towards civilian and military means (see Table 1) are each summarized in an index variable that is recoded to a value ranging from 0 (complete rejection) to 1 (complete approval), with a mean value of 0.5 corresponding to an ambivalent attitude. Based on their personal attitude towards the use of civilian and military means in foreign and security policy, respondents can be assigned to one of four attitude types, i.e. respondents are categorized according to their individual mean values on the two mean scales (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Attitude typology based on individual preferences for using civilian and military means in foreign and security policy
Note: Not all percentages add up to 100 percent. Missing values to make 100 percent correspond to the categories “Don’t know” and “No response”. Data source: ZMSBw Population Survey 2016-2023.
Fig. 2: Distribution of the four types of foreign and security policy attitudes in the German population, 2016-2023
Note: Figures in percent. Not all percentages add up to 100 percent, as individual values have been rounded. Agree: The “Strongly agree” and “Somewhat agree” percentages are combined; Disagree: The “Strongly disagree” and “Somewhat disagree” percentages are combined. The question was not asked in 2022. Data source: ZMSBw Population Survey 2021 and 2023.
An examination of the distribution of the four types of foreign and security policy attitudes in the German population from 2016 to 2023 shows that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine since 2022 has not led to a “shift away from pacifism” in the German population in two respects: Firstly, most Germans were not pacifists (but realists) even before the war in Ukraine, and the share of pacifists in the German population has declined only in the short term as a result of the outbreak of war (see Fig. 2). Further analyses reveal that political realism has even been the dominant “school of thought” in all socio-demographic and electoral groups in Germany – both before and after the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence of a “militarization of the mindset” of Germans, since the militarist group was already a minority before the war and has not grown since the outbreak of war. The same is true of the isolationist group. Thus, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has not yet led to a more profound transformation of the strategic culture of the German population.[16]
Pacifism as a rejection of the use of force by the military
The findings presented so far on the German population’s attitude towards the deployment of armed forces as a foreign and security policy tool are based on extremely abstract measuring instruments and do not yet yield any information on the acceptance or rejection of the use of armed force by the Bundeswehr. The high level of abstraction does not do justice to the purposeful nature and legitimacy of using armed force by the Bundeswehr. The use of military force by national armed forces is always purpose-related and never an end in itself, because it involves considerable risks for people and material. So, the question always arises: Fight to what end? For this reason, the ZMSBw survey also asked respondents about their attitudes towards the purposeful use of armed force.
As Figure 3 shows, the majority of citizens (55 to 87 percent) believe that the Bundeswehr should be allowed to use armed force as a last resort to fulfil its basic tasks – and indeed across the entire spectrum of tasks. Only a small proportion of the German population explicitly rejects the purposeful use of armed force as a last resort (3 to 19 percent). Other studies show that, on average, all socio-demographic groups and voter groups have a positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr’s purposeful use of armed force regardless of age, gender, income, educational level, migration background, etc.[17] Compared with 2021, public support for the Bundeswehr’s use of armed force has hardly changed (exception: counterterrorism -7 percentage points).
In addition to the finding that the majority of citizens have a fundamentally realistic attitude towards foreign and security policy, the high level of acceptance for the Bundeswehr’s purposeful use of armed force across the German population also calls into question the assumption that the majority of Germans are convinced pacifists. It is important to note, however, that the use of force is explicitly named as a “last resort”. It is therefore not legitimate to conclude from these findings that the majority of respondents generally regard the use of armed force as the “means of choice”. Such an interpretation also contradicts the findings that the German population has for many years exhibited a relative preference for the use of civilian means in foreign and security policy (see Table 1) and that the group of explicit militarists represents only a minority of the population (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 3: Attitudes towards the purposeful use of armed force by the Bundeswehr
Note: Figures in percent. The response categories “Very positive”, “Positive” and “Generally positive” as well as “Very negative”, “Negative” and “Generally negative” were combined in each case. Not all percentages add up to 100, as individual values have been rounded. Only partially comparable data was collected in the years 2000-2005, 2011 and 2014 (different rating scale/survey method). Data basis: ZMSBw Population Survey 2000-2023.
Pacifism as a fundamental rejection of the armed forces
The fundamental rejection of the armed forces is less a pacifist attitude than a particularly strong manifestation of an anti-militarist attitude that rejects not only militarism as a social phenomenon, but also the military as a societal institution. Such a rejection of the Bundeswehr is not discernible in the German population. On the contrary, the fundamentally positive attitude of citizens towards the Bundeswehr, which has existed for several decades, reached an all-time high in 2023 (see Fig. 4): almost nine out of ten respondents have a positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr (86 percent; +3 percentage points compared with 2022). Just as many respondents (87 percent) trust the Bundeswehr. Only 11 percent of citizens have a decidedly negative attitude towards the Bundeswehr and do not trust it. Since 2019, the proportion of the population with a positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr has increased by 10 percentage points, while the group of Bundeswehr critics has almost halved (2019: 20 percent; 2023: 11 percent). The stability of the German population’s fundamentally positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr is also evident over time. Irrespective of the security and defense policy situation, at least three quarters of citizens have had a positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr for the past quarter of a century (see Fig. 4). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has therefore not led to a Zeitenwende in the German population’s fundamentally positive attitude towards the Bundeswehr since 2022.
Fig. 4: Attitude towards the Bundeswehr 2000-2023
Note: Figures in percent. The response categories “Should be increased significantly” and “Should be slightly increased” were respectively combined. Question asked on defense spending: “What do you think? Should defense spending be increased, stay the same, or decreased in future?” Question asked on the size of the military: “What do you think? Should the number of soldiers in the Bundeswehr be increased, remain the same or reduced in future?” The question on defense spending was not asked in 2004 and 2011. The question on the number of soldiers was not asked in 2004, 2010 and 2011. Data source: ZMSBw Population Survey 2000-2023.
Pacifism as a rejection of a “policy of rearmament”
As a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a one-off “special fund” of 100 billion euros was made available to the Bundeswehr at short notice. Among the German population, support for strengthening the Bundeswehr financially and in terms of personnel has risen sharply since 2022 and has even reached an all-time high (see Fig. 5). However, it should not be forgotten that a (relative) majority of citizens have been calling for an increase in defense spending since 2015. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine therefore led to a sharp increase in support, but not to a Zeitenwende as many citizens had clearly already begun to rethink their position by 2014, i.e. in the first year of Russia’s overt military aggression against Ukraine.
Fig. 5: Approval of increases in defense spending and the number of soldiers in the Bundeswehr, 2000-2023
Note: Figures in percent. Not all percentages add up to 100, as individual values have been rounded. The question was only asked of respondents under the age of 50 (n = 1,060). Data basis: ZMSBw Population Survey 2021–2023.
In 2023, public support for increasing the Bundeswehr’s financial and personnel resources remains at the same level as in 2022: an absolute majority is in favor of further increasing the Bundeswehr’s financial (57 percent) and personnel (56 percent) resources (see Fig. 5). Only minorities of eight percent are respectively in favor of reducing defense spending and the number of Bundeswehr personnel, while 31 and 32 percent are respectively in favor of maintaining the same level. In all socio-demographic groups of the German population, an absolute majority is in favor of strengthening the Bundeswehr financially and in terms of military personnel.[18]
A large number of other surveys confirm the consistently high level of support for increasing German defense spending. According to the ZDF Politbarometer from February 2024, 72 percent of citizens are willing to spend more on the Bundeswehr, even if this requires savings in other areas. In the ARD Deutschlandtrend from March 2024, 74 percent of respondents said they thought an increase in defense spending was the right thing to do. And in a survey conducted by Forsa for Zeit Online in April 2024, 68 percent were in favor of higher defense spending.
Pacifism as a rejection of personal military involvement
Compulsory military service in Germany was suspended in 2011. However, compulsory military service could be reactivated should there be heightened tension or a state of defense in accordance with Article 12a of Germany’s Basic Law. In response to the changed security situation, the Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, unveiled detailed plans for a new military service model in mid-June 2024. If the majority of Germans were pacifists, one would expect the idea of a new compulsory military service model to be rejected by the majority of the population. But this is not the case. On the contrary: In 2023, 52 percent (+2 percentage points compared with 2022) believe the reintroduction of military service as part of a general compulsory community service is necessary, while 23 percent see no need for it and 23 percent are undecided.[19] A large proportion of citizens also believe that the reintroduction of military service would improve relations between the Bundeswehr and society (48 percent; +3 percentage points compared with 2022), help the Bundeswehr recruit personnel (62 percent; +2 percentage points) and strengthen the Bundeswehr’s ability to defend the country and NATO (58 percent; +1 percentage point).
With few exceptions, all socio-demographic and voter groups have a predominantly positive attitude towards the reintroduction of conscription.[20] A relative or absolute majority in all groups considers the reintroduction of conscription to be necessary (41 to 60 percent). In the group of young men and women (ages 16 to 29), 41 percent each are convinced that military service is necessary. In addition, a relative or absolute majority of all the groups surveyed expect the reintroduction of military service to have a positive effect on the Bundeswehr’s relations with society (38 to 61 percent), on the recruitment of Bundeswehr personnel (51 to 72 percent), and on the Bundeswehr’s ability to defend the country and its alliances (45 to 71 percent). Other surveys on the possible reintroduction of military conscription in Germany also indicate majority support: Ipsos (March 2023) = 61 percent; MDR asks (February/March 2023) = 70 percent; Civey (December 2023) = 63 percent; NDR asks (February 2024) = 66 percent; INSA (March 2024) = 52 percent; Yougov (June 2024) = 60 percent.
In addition to the discussion about a new military service model, the question of the potential offered by the military personnel reserve in Germany is also coming into focus. The considerable casualties suffered by the Ukrainian armed forces in their desperate defensive struggle against the Russian invading forces shows how important it is for the personnel strength of the armed forces to be able to rely on the great number of volunteer fighters among the population in a defensive situation. This is true to the maxim: The active troops begin the war, the reserves finish it. How large would this potential be in Germany?
A comparison of the last three years shows that the personal willingness of the German population to defend Germany through the use of weapons has increased slightly as a result of the war in Ukraine, but has declined again in 2023 (see Fig. 6). In 2023, 39 percent of respondents (-2 percentage points compared with 2022) say they would take up arms to defend Germany in the event of a military attack, while a majority of 55 percent (+3 percentage points) say they would not.[21] In all survey years, men’s personal willingness to defend Germany is significantly higher (52 to 59 percent) than that of women (11 to 22 percent). Specifically, an absolute majority of men would be willing to take up arms. In the age group comprising 20- to 40-year-old men, this proportion is 58 percent, which according to the census would correspond to a demographic potential of nearly 6 million. Even if only half of those surveyed were to actually enlist, this would offer enormous potential in relation to the Bundeswehr’s equipment, as it is currently unable to equip even its 180,000 active soldiers with a personal rifle. The Bundeswehr’s resilience would therefore be impaired less by a lack of personal defense readiness among the (male) German population than by an acute shortage of weapons (and ammunition).
Fig. 6: Personal defense readiness, 2021-2023
Conclusion
The results of representative population surveys show that there is no empirical evidence for the much-discussed rejection of pacifism among the German population as a result of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Firstly, even before the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, the majority of Germans were not pacifists, but realists. And secondly, the share of pacifists in the German population has decreased only in the short term. The fact that the majority of citizens are not pacifists is also shown by the fact that a majority supports a) the purposeful use of armed force by the Bundeswehr, b) an increase in defense spending, and c) a new compulsory military service model. An absolute majority of men can even imagine taking up arms to defend Germany in the event of a military attack. At the same time, concerns about a possible “militarization of the mindset” of citizens prove to be completely unfounded: only a small minority of the German population had an exclusive preference for the use of military means in German foreign and security policy before 2022, and this group even decreased after the outbreak of the war. No fundamental change in the strategic culture of the German population can be observed.
The finding that the majority of Germans had a realistic rather than a pacifist attitude even before the war in Ukraine calls into question the previous consensus in (military) sociological research on the “pacifist character of the Germans”. The new findings do not contradict the core results of older empirical studies, as the present evaluation also confirms that the majority of Germans have a relative preference for the use of civilian means in foreign and security policy – both before and after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. However, this relative preference for civilian means does not render the majority of Germans into absolute pacifists. After all, realists also support the use of civilian means, yet in contrast to pacifists they do not categorically rule out the use of military means. If pacifism is distinctly operationalized as an exclusive preference for the use of civilian means, it becomes clear that there are far fewer pacifists in the German population than previously assumed. In view of this, the findings of previous research on military sociology and security policy attitudes should not be dismissed as “false”. However, they are based on an inadequate operationalization and are clearly insufficient to provide a definitive account of the characteristics and distribution of a pacifist attitude in the German population. Accordingly, the established research consensus on “German pacifism” requires both a more accurate operationalization as well as a temporal update.
Since the majority of citizens are not pacifists but realists and support the current change of course in defense policy, further demands for a profound transformation in societal attitudes towards greater military preparedness seem unwarranted. Military historian Sönke Neitzel also shares this view. In his opinion, “[...] society is much more aware of the gravity of the situation than politicians think. [...] The population is prepared to fight and accept personal restrictions if it is explained to them why this is necessary”.[22] With the exception of the Minister of Defense and the Inspector General, however, no one who bears responsibility for Germany’s security and defense is currently doing so, which is why “there is a danger that the debate initiated by the Minister of Defense will once again fizzle out without consequences”.[23]
While this is actually threatening to happen, the debate about a “militarization of society” completely overlooks the obvious pragmatism of the vast majority of citizens. A closer empirical examination shows that the underlying assumptions are simply wrong. The majority were and are realists, who support the change of course in German defense policy because they see Russia as a threat to Germany’s security.[24] They demand no more and no less from politicians than that the federal government maintains armed forces for defense and thus upholds its part of the social contract. Accordingly, the public discussion about the practical form of Germany’s new defense policy should not be used as a false pretext to conduct a phantom debate about the “shift away from pacifism”.
[2] Pistorius, Boris (2023): Bericht aus Berlin. ARD, November 12, 2023. https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-1271796.html (accessed: October 10, 2024); Breuer, Carsten (2023): Geleitwort des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr. In: Handbuch Innere Führung. Koblenz, pp. 6–7.
[3] Gauck, Joachim (2023): Das ist ein Wandel, den hatte ich so nicht erwartet. In: Internationale Politik Special 3/2023, pp. 33–39; Scholz, Olaf (2022): The global Zeitenwende: How to avoid a new Cold War in a multipolar era. In: Foreign Affairs, 102 (1), pp. 22–38.
[5] By way of example: Masala, Carlo (2023): Ich halte unsere Gesellschaft für nicht besonders wehrhaft. In: Internationale Politik Special 4/2023, pp. 4–11.
[8] Leonhard, Nina (2016): Die postheroische Gesellschaft und ihr Militär. In: Junge, Matthias (ed.): Metaphern soziologischer Zeitdiagnosen. Wiesbaden, pp. 101–121; Kümmel, Gerhard and Leonhard, Nina (2005): Death, the Military and Society. In: Casualties and Civil-Military Relations in Germany. Strausberg; Münkler, Herfried (2008): Militärisches Totengedenken in der postheroischen Gesellschaft. In: Hettling, Manfred and Echternkamp, Jörg (eds.): Bedingt erinnerungsbereit: Soldatengedenken in der Bundesrepublik. Göttingen, pp. 22–30; Göler, Daniel (2010): Die strategische Kultur der Bundesrepublik: Eine Bestandsaufnahme normativer Vorstellungen über den Einsatz militärischer Mittel. In: Dörfler-Dierken, Angelika and Portugall, Gerd (eds.): Friedensethik und Sicherheitspolitik. Wiesbaden, pp. 185–199; Longhurst, Kerry (2004): Germany and the Use of Force. Manchester; Junk, Julian and Daase, Christopher (2012): Germany. In: Biehl, Heiko, Giegerich, Bastian and Jonas, Alexandra (eds.): Strategic Cultures in Europe. Wiesbaden, pp. 139–152; Seppo, Antti (2021): From Guilt to Responsibility and Beyond. The Evolution of German Strategic Culture after the End of the Cold War. Berlin; Endres, Fabian (2018): Öffentliche Meinung und strategische Kulturen: Außenpolitische Überzeugungen in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien. Wiesbaden; Graf, Timo (2019): Die Bundeswehr als Mittel deutscher Außenpolitik aus Sicht der Bevölkerung: “Brunnenbohrer” oder “Kampftruppe”? In: Hartmann, Uwe und von Rosen, Claus (ed.): Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2019. Berlin, pp. 80–100.
[9] This paper is based on the results of the annual population survey conducted by the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw). This survey is based on a random sample that is representative of the German-speaking resident population aged 16 and over. The data has been collected by an external, independent and professional survey institute. Unless otherwise stated, all survey results are based on the ZMSBw Population Survey. More information about the survey: Graf, Timo (2024), see endnote 17.
[10] Brücher, Gertrud (2008): Pazifismus als Diskurs (quote translated from German). Wiesbaden, p. 32.
[11] Schubert, Klaus and Klein, Martina (2020): Das Politiklexikon (quote translated from German). Bonn.
[12] Fuchs, Albert (2017): Zu böse für Frieden durch Frieden? In: Wissenschaft & Frieden, 1/2017, pp. 10–13, p. 10 (quotes translated from German).
[13] The attitude of the population towards Germany’s arms deliveries to Ukraine is not considered in this analysis due to a lack of available data on this aspect for the period prior to 2022. Consequently, it is not possible to answer the question as to whether there have been any changes in attitude since 2022. For further context, please refer to Table 1, which documents a notable increase in the approval of arms deliveries to friendly states since 2022.
[14] Brücher, Gertrud (2008), see endnote 10, p. 40 (translated from German).
[15] Political realism, one of the most prominent theories and “schools of thought” in international relations, does not categorically rule out the use of civilian or military means, because all means are initially value-free and are tested for their effectiveness depending on the situation: “The function of a means is to bring an end closer to realization, and this function can be poorly fulfilled if the means are regimented” (Brücher, Gertrud (2008), p. 40, translated from German). A realistic attitude can thus be defined as approval of the use of civilian and military means. This must be distinguished from a decidedly militaristic stance as an exclusive preference for the use of military means that explicitly rejects the use of civilian means. The last combination in the two-dimensional spectrum of preferences for means is the rejection of the use of civilian and military means in foreign and security policy, which is tantamount to a refusal of any active involvement in international relations and thus corresponds to the position of isolationism.
[16] Mader, Matthias and Schön, Harald (2023): (Noch) Keine Zeitenwende: Eine vorläufige Untersuchung der öffentlichen Meinung zur Außen- und Verteidigungspolitik nach Russlands Einmarsch in die Ukraine. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 64, pp. 525–547.
[17] Graf, Timo (2024): Was bleibt von der Zeitenwende in den Köpfen? Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2023. Potsdam, pp. 66-67.
[20] Graf, Timo (2024): see endnote 17, pp. 32–33.
[21] A survey conducted by Forsa in February 2024 came to similar conclusions: “Would you take up arms to defend Germany in the event of an attack?” Total: 38 percent in favor; 59 percent reject this idea. Men: 54 percent in favor; 44 percent reject this idea. Women: 23 percent in favor; 72 percent reject this idea. https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Nur-eine-Minderheit-waere-bereit-mit-der-Waffe-zu-kaempfen-article24784229.html (accessed: October 11, 2014).
[23] Seliger, Marco (2023), see endnote 22 (translated from German).
[24] Cf. Graf, Timo (2024): Zeitenwende in den Köpfen: Russlands Angriffskrieg verändert das verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbild. In: Die Politische Meinung No. 584, pp. 49–55; Graf, Timo, Steinbrecher, Markus and Biehl, Heiko (2024): From reluctance to reassurance: Explaining the shift in the Germans’ NATO alliance solidarity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In: Contemporary Security Policy, 45(2), pp. 298–330.
Dr. Timo Graf is a senior researcher in the Military Sociology Research Unit at the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw). He leads the annual population survey on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Defense. He researches and publishes on public opinion on foreign, security and defense policy issues, on civil-military relations in Germany, on alliance defense within NATO and on strategic cultures. He is a lecturer at the chair of Prof. Dr. Sönke Neitzel at the University of Potsdam and teaches in the context of political education in and outside the German Armed Forces.
