Ready to Fight a War? Peace Ethics Reflections

I.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been semantically disguised as a special military operation for denazification and demilitarization. Yet it violates international law, and has shaken and dangerously weakened the foundations of peace in Europe. It reveals the limits of international law enforcement, and as a conflict for power between an authoritarian and a free democratic social order, it is an attempt to replace the strength of the law with the law of the strongest.

A one-sided, ideologically tinged understanding of Russia’s long history which does not stand up to a nuanced historical analysis as well as a perceived security threat from NATO have been put forward as justification. Then there are distorted ideas about the decline of Western values, which are used to legitimize the war in religious terms – as by Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. These distorted ideas are taken to radical extremes in an almost Manichean way – going even so far as to glorify the war as a battle of light against darkness. Such arguments seek to justify the war, but also to support an authoritarian and repressive political system. Probably the ultimate aim is also self-preservation and the maintenance of personal importance.

II.

“Just peace” is and remains the central paradigm of Catholic peace ethics. It regards peace as an ongoing task – a dynamic, continuous process of decreasing violence and increasing justice by means of law and dialog. Catholic peace ethics is therefore a principles-based process ethics. It is concerned with enabling peace and proactively focusing on causes, and not primarily with legitimizing violence and reactively focusing on symptoms. As an ethics of principles, it is guided by human dignity and human rights, as well as by classic social principles such as justice, solidarity and the common good – although these always need to be defined in the specific context. The war in Ukraine once again demonstrates the tension between non-violent action and the possibility of a legitimate use of force. This tension remains characteristic of Catholic peace ethics, and must not be resolved one-sidedly. It is a matter of showing that between simplistic opposites – radical pacifism on the one hand and bellicose militarism on the other – it is entirely possible to take a justified position between these two extremes.

III.

Those who give thought to the possibilities of legitimate force usually do so in the tradition or rather in the recurrent struggle over the doctrine of “just war”. In view of its potential role in legitimizing violence, as well as current developments in weapons technology and geopolitics, the notion of a “just war” is rightly problematized. But it has to be recognized that the traditional test criteria – namely just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, etc. – remain important as essential yardsticks in a contemporary peace ethics concerned with constant and critical moral reflection on the use of force. In addition to this normative ethics orientation, there is a complementary (but of course indispensable) virtue ethics dimension. I merely wish to point out its importance, as it is not possible to give a detailed presentation here. It is clear that the inner attitude in the use of military force is a key factor in peace ethics. For if hatred, revenge and the desire for retribution are the dominant forces among the actors involved, then purely from a practical point of view there is no prospect of peace and reconciliation. To give a Christian shape to peace ethics, it is crucial to always pursue the goal of overcoming violence, without necessarily having to advocate a strict and unconditional pacifism. Rather, in the pursuit of a just peace, it is necessary to outline possible ways out of war (ex bello). In light of current demands for a war(-fighting) or peace capability, it is also necessary to sharpen our definitions to understand how the terms fit into Christian peace ethics.

IV.

In current social and political discourse, we hear a lot about Kriegstauglichkeit or Kriegstüchtigkeit (“war-fighting capability”); in my view, the two terms are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, in contrast to the former, the German term Tüchtigkeit encompasses not only the suitability of a person or a thing for an activity, but also the intrinsic motivation to use it for this purpose. Seen in this way, any talk of Kriegstüchtigkeit in the sense of “readiness for war” must be met with caution from a Christian perspective. It would probably be more appropriate to use the term Kriegstauglichkeit (war-fighting capability or aptitude), as the goal of all efforts, including the use of armed force, must remain peace. However, Catholic peace ethics certainly recognizes the right of self-defense. As long as there is the danger of war and all possibilities of peaceful settlement have been exhausted, people are not denied the right to morally permissible defense.

However, military force must always be used with the right intention. It may sound paradoxical, but a soldier who acts justly and virtuously must want to bring about peace through their fighting. He or she must be “ready for peace”. In war, it is not unlikely that a situation will arise in which a soldier has to kill in order to bring about peace. And there is an undeniable tragedy associated with this. Because this sense of tragedy always accompanies the use of armed force, the question of proportionality always arises. And the principled answer to this question can vary depending on the situation.

Public talk about the need for Germany to achieve “war-fighting readiness” or “war-fighting capability” can also cause consternation. Although the difference described above must be taken into account, particularly with regard to peace ethics, both terms bluntly reveal how threatening the situation in Europe has become as a result of the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. In the following, for the reasons mentioned, I will use the term “war-fighting capability”, although this term too requires more precise definition and does not simply mean the accumulation of various weapons. In addition to building up capacities of matériel, it also involves building up personnel, infrastructure, organizational and operational capacities. And in democratic societies, it is also about social acceptance of the need to build up these necessary capacities.

If it is reduced to material armaments alone – without social discourse, without strong and trusting alliances, without a “moral compass” for political and military action and without far-reaching diplomatic efforts – “war-fighting capability” will not be a sustainable response to the challenges and threats arising after the so-called Zeitenwende (Germany’s defense policy shift or “sea change”).

Overly one-dimensional calls for “war-fighting readiness” also conflict to a certain extent with important basic principles of Christian peace ethics. Its model of “just peace” encompasses the prioritization of non-violent conflict resolution, prevention by addressing root causes, and efforts toward disarmament and arms control.

The imperative to protect human life precedes this basic pacifist orientation; at the same time, it suggests a special responsibility to stand up for the rights of victims of wars of aggression. The use of (armed) force is tied to strict criteria, and may only be ethically permitted as a last resort.

V.

Many times, I have seen how Christians attempt to gain perspective on this complex subject area by reference to the Sermon on the Mount, which they bring in as a normative authority. Please don’t misunderstand me here: This is right and important. But it also requires us to understand the guiding power of the Sermon on the Mount in today’s context, away from any false ideologization. Of course, the Sermon on the Mount seeks to teach and persuade. It aims to radicalize, provoke, and shake things up. Christians must not hastily dismiss its demands as unattainable ideals when faced with real-world challenges. At the same time, however, we must recognize that the meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, for which there are many models of interpretation, cannot be generalized and conclusively fixed for all time. Rather, it places responsibility onto the individual actor. Its insistence on seeking non-violent options wherever possible and bringing about peace calls us Christians, today more than ever, to precisely this responsibility. In an ethical assessment, however, it is important to clearly separate the levels of responsibility. Ukraine’s right of self-defense involves political, legal and moral issues that cannot be resolved simply by referring to the commandment to love one’s enemy. It would be wrong to derive from the Sermon on the Mount a fundamental prohibition of defense for an entire country in the event of a war of aggression. When these political dimensions are involved, a simplistic reading of the Sermon on the Mount would, in my view, quickly turn its content into the exact opposite. Rather, very personal questions arise here that can only be answered on a personal level. When it comes to one’s own personal ethical position, these answers can take the form of a rejection of all violence. But this must remain the result of a free and personal decision before God and one’s own conscience, including, if necessary, the readiness to die for this conviction. Such a stance cannot and must not be imposed politically or religiously – let alone from a safe and free country hundreds of miles away from the war.

How can we support Ukrainians who are really standing up to an aggressor? There are no simple and clear answers to this question that fit every situation. But it is certain that no other motive can justify the use of weapons than taking a firm stand against those who conquer other countries, murder people, break the law and trample on human dignity. Nevertheless, it remains necessary to consider all exhortatory words and deeds of a pacifism which, from a Christian perspective, essentially wishes to realize the options and opportunities to overcome enmity.

VI.

A pacifist position need not be advocated only in its radical form. The principle of non-violence can compete with the desire to protect people who will otherwise be at the mercy of massive injustice and brutal violence. The Sermon on the Mount does not prohibit self-defense, just as legitimate self-defense does not call into question the primary option for an ethos of non-violence in general. In awareness of this tension, Catholic peace ethics as a process ethics and ethics of principles remains an important compass that helps us make decisions. But it is not a ready-made template that can simply be applied to every new question and specific situation to arrive at a solution. Catholic peace ethics must therefore always be developed as an ethics of nuanced and context-sensitive analysis of the individual case, under conditions of uncertainty and limited knowledge, and in light of realistic present-day scenarios. This does not permit any hasty absolutizations or generalizations. The challenge for Christian peace ethics is to apply these guidelines in a way that is not rigid but sensitive to the context and reality of the present. By way of example, I would like to illustrate this with three topical issues that are currently the subject of controversial debate.

Arms production: Armaments are ethically ambivalent. Do they contribute to conflict containment, or do they exacerbate existing tensions? The question of which weapons should be produced is determined partly by adherence to arms limitation agreements, and partly by the (dis)proportionality of their use. The equipment and organization of the armed forces must be geared toward what is required for national and Alliance defense, but also for appropriate involvement in international crisis management.

Arms shipments: Supplying weapons entails a particular moral responsibility as these are exports of damaging and potentially deadly means of violence. At the same time, with the supply of armaments comes an ethical obligation: the exporting countries must do everything possible at the political and diplomatic levels to ensure that using the supplied weapons does not become necessary. Only as an emergency measure for self-defense in the face of extreme danger, in the sense of a proportionate exception, can their use be considered morally justifiable. The responsible use of exported weapons must be controlled via contractually agreed rules and the prohibition of unauthorized transfer to third parties.

Nuclear weapons: Barack Obama once announced a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, calling this “global zero”. Our real world seems far removed from this. For a long time, a provisional moral tolerance of nuclear deterrence was justified with reference to its stabilizing effect. However, this must be considered outdated, not least following Pope Francis’ statements on the subject. I can only reaffirm the ban on the use of nuclear weapons, as well as on their possession and the threat of their use. The focus must be on the dual objective of preventing access to nuclear weapons capability and reducing existing nuclear potential. At the same time, I am not naïve with regard to security policy, including the nuclear aspect. I can certainly see the enormous challenges that the European members of NATO would face if they were to lose the U.S. as their security guarantor. I do not regard it as a contradiction to speak out in favor of disarmament and against the use of force on the one hand, and on the other to acknowledge that basic material requirements must be met in order for a state to be able to defend itself and guarantee the security of its population.

VII.

It is always necessary to take into account the various interests of those involved in and affected by military operations and conflicts. Decisions concerning arms deliveries and interventions must be justified towards these persons in particular. This applies not only to the direct consequences of such actions. A comprehensive sense of responsibility also includes taking into account possible unintended consequences, which can arise either as a double effect or as secondary effects. The more complex the military situation, the more unpredictable the actual extent of these interdependencies. In such a context, the requirement for ethical judgment initially seems overwhelming. Many situations are polyvalent, with the result that there is no way of making decisions whose overall interdependencies are beneficial to all those involved and affected. Our primary obligation is to the action goal that we have identified as being good, even if this means accepting negative consequences. But this should not be understood as consequentialism. After all, the end does not justify all means. These considerations can serve as guidance that prevents us from being paralyzed by the complexity of the situation when making complex decisions. Alongside the tools for making judgments which peace ethics criteria and international law provide us with, it is still important to develop an inner compass. This is part and parcel of responsible decision-making. It should therefore come as no surprise that in the German armed forces, virtues are explicitly described as indispensable for effective task fulfillment in the context of Innere Führung (officially translated as “leadership development and civic education”), and therefore beyond a theological and ecclesiastical inner space. As mentioned above, however, the importance of virtues can only be briefly highlighted here.

VIII.

Christian peace ethics, as a science of reflection, can play an important role in the current world situation. In full awareness that – via a number of somewhat tense steps – the Judeo-Christian and classical philosophical traditions have been transformed into the idea of the secular and democratic constitutional state in the modern era, Christian reasoning strategies can be emphasized in the discourse without losing prophetic and critical distance from the state. We are currently seeing how extremely dangerous it is when a nationalist narrative, in which state and church instrumentalize each other, feeds the ideologically highly charged sense of mission of an autocrat like Vladimir Putin. Religious arguments are used to support an authoritarian and repressive political system and to enshrine a state-controlled system of faith and morals in law and in society. Civil liberties, however, require that the law emancipates itself from ideas of the good life. The normative project of modernity thus encompasses, above all, human rights and democracy, the separation of religion and politics, the rule of law, and legal certainty. The strength of the law replaces the law of the strongest. The global power struggles of the recent and very recent past in particular have shown the law of the strongest increasingly being used to legitimize an overriding of the fundamental principles of political order and values on which liberal democracy is based. From a Christian perspective, it should be noted that human dignity expresses an inalienable truth, understood theologically as the certainty that man is the image of God. The inviolable value of every individual has become the basis for our modern understanding of human rights. All people have a value that is innate. It cannot be surpassed nor exchanged. Autonomy, human dignity and human rights are woven together to form the normative fabric that supports our ideas of a truly human life. The Spanish philosopher Francisco de Vitoria is right when he contradicts the Roman playwright Plautus: “Man [...] is not a wolf to his fellow man, but a man!”^[1]