Controversies in Military Ethics & Security Policy
Conscription, War-Capable Bundeswehr and Defensive Society in Times of Hybrid Warfare
Problem situation
In 2023, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius introduced the concepts of “war-fighting capability” and “defensive capability” into the political and public debate. In the current threat environment, these would have become necessary goals of forward-looking German security policy, which would from now on have to be aimed at developing a “comprehensive defence” capability. War-fighting capability refers to the Bundeswehr and defence capability to society. Discussions about reintroducing conscription had already begun several years earlier. The far right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) considered its suspension a serious mistake, the conservative parties and parts of the SPD were at least close to the idea of the military as the school of the nation, in which “the youth” should not only experience and train resilience, i.e. a certain discipline and resistance, but also an active, positive bond with “the nation”. At the same time, military service was positioned as an opportunity for the young generation to “give something back” to society.[1]Thus, the public discussion primarily revolved around traditional expectations of or associations with conscription.
In the course of this year, it gradually became clear that compulsory military service, suspended in 2011, would not be reactivated unaltered. This was confirmed on 6 November 2024 with the announcement of a cabinet decision by the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg). The so-called “New Military Service” is clearly influenced by the Scandinavian, especially the Swedish, approach.[2] It relies primarily on voluntariness. The Bundeswehr will send a questionnaire to all young people aged 18 and above with the request to fill it out and indicate, among other things, whether they are willing to do military service; if they accept, they will be invited to “muster” at a career centre of the Bundeswehr.
Unlike in Sweden, only men would be obliged to respond under threat of a fine. Women could submit the information voluntarily and, like men, volunteer for military service; the service will be paid and volunteers would be able to serve for six to 23 months. In an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Pistorius said: “‘This is our response to the changed threat situation in Europe’ [...]. Young men and women who turn 18 will again deal more often with security policy issues in the future and consider what contribution they could make to Germany’s security. ‘The Bundeswehr will do everything to ensure that they perceive the training as enriching their lives.’”[3] Opinion polls, however, show that military service is not necessary for such engagement.
Young people of Generation Z, i.e. those who will be affected by the new military service model, are increasingly concerned not only about war, but also about other security-related problems, especially the effects of climate change, inflation and intra-societal tensions. Even before the Ukraine war, a large majority, increasing with level of formal educational attainment, demonstrated interest in politics, very keen on participating in political processes and positively influencing society, as well as with differentiated ideas on how deficiencies in existing political structures and processes could be remedied in order to enable their own age group to be heard much better and to actively live democracy.[4]
This interest in getting involved has remained constant or even grown since then. According to the Shell Youth Study 2024 (compared to 2019), the same applies to fears of war in Europe (81 / 46%), poverty (67 / 52%), pollution (with a slight decrease: 64 / 71%), growing hostility between people (64 / 56%), social inequality (63%, no comparison), climate change (with a slight decrease: 63 / 65%), with immigration to Germany far behind (34 / 33%).[5]
There are strong indications here that young people are neither the narcissistic hedonists associated with the stereotype of “generation snowflake” nor too lazy to work, politically uninformed and not interested in contributing to society.[6] Politicians can and should build on young people’s willingness to exercise their self-determined agency for the common good if they want to put into practice the idea of service to society as part of a new resilient defensiveness of society and “comprehensive defence”. This willingness is already reflected in the rising number of applicants to the Bundeswehr. In 2023-24 it increased by 15 percent.[7]
It is therefore not necessary, as long as there is no emergency, to take an authoritarian approach and demand that young people “do their duty”. Voluntariness can and should be protected as far as possible. Instead of automatically suspecting “the youth of today” of decadence, a lament with a two-and-a-half-thousand-year tradition[8], it is important to take seriously the liberal democratic values of those called upon to serve voluntarily in the quest to meet key security threats in cooperation between government, society and the military.
Traditional ideas of military service stand in stark contrast to this. It is worth highlighting these briefly in the next section, because the collapse of Chancellor Scholz’s governing coalition and early elections at the beginning of 2025 will probably prevent the cabinet decision from becoming law in May 2025.[9] The modalities of a new military service law therefore depend on when and by which government it, a modified or a completely new resolution is submitted to the Bundestag. It cannot be ruled out that this will be preceded by a new fundamental discussion about the duration, form, and limits of state-tolerated voluntariness, or even the introduction of general conscription before the official declaration of an Article 5 alliance contingency or state of self-defence. Such “forced recruitment of citizens for temporary military service with little or no compensation”[10] would be a significant encroachment on civil liberties.
Traditional military service – associations and myths
In Europe, the modern idea of conscription is historically linked to the development of the “nation-state”, which emerged from the progressive decline of feudal orders, which had their own forms of transactional recruitment and unfree military labour. One of the constitutional effects of the French Revolution was that monarchical subjects became republican citizens. This went hand in hand with the concept of levée en masse. Male citizens of the fighting age of 18 to 25 were expected to strengthen the regular armed forces for a limited time in order to collectively defend the new nation against an external military threat. From then on, conscription was associated with a certain ideal of masculinity, the status of defender of the nation, and the rights and duties of citizenship.
Historically, this automatic link between individual solidarity with the national community and willingness to perform military service cannot be proven. Even during its formation in the 18th century, “Everywhere […] − whether in the societies of Western Europe in which state and nation were beginning to coincide, or in the hundreds of political and administrative units of Germany − men were alike in rejecting the ethical imperative of military service that was held out to them by party propagandists, army reformers, and political theorists.”.[11]
In the 19th century, too, the Prussian nobility and middle class were not very enthusiastic about the military reformers' proposal to introduce military service; the former even saw themselves endangered by egalitarian tendencies if such service were to be accompanied by restricting their privileged claims to the officer corps. After a temporary confluence of eagerness to serve in the military and nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century, Paret found that in the 1970s "[...] large segments of French and German society [appeared] unconvinced that the state is wholly identified with the nation and that its demands on the citizen for military service must always be morally right".[12] There is thus a tradition of critical debates on military service. Particularly in a liberal democracy, they have an important place in public discourse, especially when new ways of solving problems emerge from them.
Traditionally, military service is also linked to other concepts or expectations, such as education, the right to vote and socialisation into socially desirable norms of behaviour. There is, however, not necessarily evidence for the causal linkages, at least not in today’s European societies. The military and educational reforms of the 19th century also gave rise to the concept of the military as a school of the nation, which was accompanied by the development of a militarised ideal of masculinity with toxic characteristics.[13] Furthermore, rather than finding evidence that military service promotes attachment to society and “the nation”, a study published in 2024 examining several European countries showed that the opposite was the case.[14] Civil society also interprets the motivation for military service differently: in France, for example, as value-driven, but in Germany as transactional.[15] Finally, a study on the impact of military service on the criminal behaviour of Swedish conscripts found that it actually worsened after completing their service.[16]
There is evidence for the link of citizenship and suffrage with military service, but only men’s full civil rights were often associated with their military service. In an international dataset (from 1817 to the early 2000s), Ingesson et al., for example, found a clear correlation between conscription and the expansion of male suffrage during or immediately after a war;,especially in the newly unified Germany of 1871, all men received the right to vote at the age of 25 in return for universal conscription.
Women did not gain the right to vote until 1918 with the founding of the Weimar Republic.[17] The path of military service was closed to them, even in countries such as Great Britain, the USA, Australia and Canada, where from the early 20th century onwards they could voluntarily join the women’s auxiliary navy, air force and army services until they were integrated, in the case of Great Britain only in the 1990s. Even then, it took several decades before women were legally allowed to join all combat units. In practice, they still face discrimination, sexual harassment and worse, just like their colleagues in other countries such as Germany. This leads us to the topic of fairness in the practice of conscription.
Fairness in conscription
Claimed universality of conscription has been a myth since the 18th century. This is due on the one hand to competing demands on the available workforce and on the other hand to social injustice. States or governments acting on their behalf have always had an interest in weighing the expected benefits of a military surge capability against the costs to economy and other socially relevant areas of actual universal conscription. Official exemption from military service has therefore long been possible, for example, for certain occupational groups. The same has been and still is true today on health grounds.
The right to conscientious objection is enshrined in Article 4 (3) of the Basic Law: “No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.”[18] It is however unfair to take advantage of legitimate exemptions by illegitimate means, such as abusing one’s social capital to avoid compulsory service. The experience of Ukraine, where objection to military service is only lawful on grounds of religion, not conscience, has shown that conscription is avoided for these and other motivations, including honourable ones.[19]
Three further aspects of fairness in the practice of conscription are relevant today. Firstly, especially just before the suspension of conscription in 2011, injustice arose because significantly fewer conscripts were needed than were available. Secondly, outside of a declared emergency, only young people of certain age groups are obliged to perform military service. The new military service model, too, only applies to those born from 2007 onwards. Thirdly, women are exempt from the obligation to return the completed questionnaire. This has already led to lively debates around the topic of equality, but these usually miss a range of important aspects.
In July 2024, for example, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr called for an amendment to the Basic Law so that women could also be compulsorily drafted.[20] He justified this with the need to establish equal rights. The new military service model however already establishes equal rights. Like men women can volunteer for service. Neither they nor men are compelled to do so. Unlike men, women are only not obliged to return the completed questionnaire. Currently, the issue is thus not equal rights, but equal obligation. The latter could conceivably become a bone of contention if either there were a lack of volunteers for military service or if general conscription were introduced in the event of an Article 5 contingency or an official declaration of a self-defence situation.
It can be argued that women are already serving in the Bundeswehr. But they still face obstacles. Despite better career opportunities than in the past, a 2020 study could not rule out the existence of “glass ceilings”.[21] Women also still face sexual discrimination, harassment, and assault. In October 2024, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Eva Högl, criticized that “even after 20 years, sexual assaults and remarks are still an issue in the Bundeswehr” and that the adaptation of infrastructures is still inadequate.[22] In 2023, upon publication of her report for 2022, she highlighted that sexual assaults, 80 percent of them against women, as well as deficiencies in everyday “staple provisions”, such as sanitary facilities and equipment, raised the “question of appreciation”; the “chronic staff shortages” would thus be “difficult to remedy”.[23]
As long as this situation remains, these risks must be taken into consideration in decisions on the introduction of compulsory conscription for women in the name of equal rights. It was at least politically unwise to delay by three years the publication of the 2020 study “Bunt in der Bundeswehr” [Colourful. i.e. diverse, in the Bundeswehr], which could report progress on inclusion, but also recorded behaviour very much deserving of criticism and requiring improvement.[24]If more women are to join the Bundeswehr, then the organization must learn from its successes as well as admit problems, exercise reflected self-criticism and determinedly develop and implement improvements.
For example, one might investigate the extent to which women who have positively chosen the military profession maintain their motivation and resilience – through conscious preparation for the special challenges, including possible misogyny, or because they have a particularly well-suited personality. It is at least possible that women who are forced to serve but do not see themselves as conscientious objectors do not have the same motivation or resilience and might therefore potentially be more exposed to risks of bullying and sexual assault. In order to give the Bundeswehr the opportunity to prepare for female conscripts in the event of general conscription and at the same time improve now the integration of female soldiers, an amendment to the Basic Law could be tied to reforms.
If opinion polls are confirmed, such reforms would send positive signals, as the former show broad support for military service. Overall, an Ipsos survey in March 2023 showed that more respondents were in favour of rather than against the reintroduction of conscription (with the option of civilian service); however, the proportion of supporters increased with age group and fewer women than men supported gender equality; respondents were not asked to justify the latter.[25]
General conscription of women must also take into account that it is they, not men, who predominantly fulfil family responsibilities in society; one of the reasons the above-mentioned study identified for the less steep careers of female soldiers. If both parents are to be drafted into military service, then the state must take on or make provisions for caring responsibilities, whether they concern children or other dependants. Single parents could be exempted from conscription altogether. These necessary exemptions do not have to be obstacles to voluntary non-military service, as long as it is financially affordable for the person concerned.
In any case, many more citizens support a general civilian service to society, that is service extended beyond the military, than is sometimes suggested in the media. In June 2024, significant majorities were in favour of mandatory civilian service to society in either civilian or military sectors. In an Ipsos survey, almost three-quarters (73%) of Germans supported it. “Men (77%) are more likely to be in favour than women (69%), and among younger respondents (18−25 years), the proportion of supporters is lowest at 66 percent” − still a clear majority.[26] However, there is no reason why a general service to society should not be open to all age groups. On the contrary, there are good reasons for it. These will be highlighted in the next section.
Comprehensive defence against hybrid and kinetic hazards
The security problems of Germany and its allies are military in nature, but not exclusively, and the degree of urgency with which more effective solutions need to be developed and implemented varies little across the spectrum. However, one can imagine overlapping problem-solving approaches that have only partially or not at all been included in the debate. The following discussion aims to provide food for thought on how the accelerating “doom spiral” of some security policy discourses[27] might be slowed down or even reversed in particular areas.
The following discussion therefore deals with the question of how service in both military and civilian sectors can be designed in such a way that it preserves the fundamental freedoms of citizens as far as possible while simultaneously fostering the willingness of citizens to support and protect society and state demonstrated above. This will enable four important aims: (1) build military capacities and a surge capability, (2) counter hybrid threats not only defensively but also constructively, (3) be able to provide disaster relief, especially in light of the increasingly threatening effects of global heating, and (4) do so with a much higher level of fairness across demographic groups. These goals are all related to the current and evolving threat situation.
Temporary military service can be seen as a necessary precautionary measure in the event that Germany and its NATO partners have to defend themselves against an armed attack. There are at least three reasons for this. First, doubts about former and future US President Donald Trump’s loyalty to the alliance, familiar from his first term in office, at least call into question the reliability of NATO's collective defence arrangements. Second, his notorious demands that Europeans take care of their own security confront them with major challenges over realigning their military capabilities. Third, the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 shifted the perspective to realpolitik accompanied by a narrowing of the debate to violence as a means of resolving conflicts.
Germany’s defence capability requires fundamental improvement. At the same time it is, however, necessary to counteract an international escalation spiral and to support self-protection by means other than enhanced war-fighting capability. The wider global context is relevant here. Both liberal democracy and the liberal international order which emerged after the Second World War are under pressure from a great number of directions. This makes it more difficult and thus all the more important to avoid violent conflicts. In addition, it is increasingly evident how important a renaissance of lived democracy, as the preferred form of government in Germany and many of its neighbours, is for its long-term survival; here, internal and external threats overlap, as for example in the case of the internationally networked far right, which has grown significantly in the past decade.
The associated fissures and frictions in society are exploited and exacerbated through information operations run by various state and non-state actors, potentially acting on behalf of states. The same actors can also trigger life-threatening situations which fall under a targeted state’s responsibility to protect, for example by manipulating information and control systems of vital infrastructure. These can occur before and during a kinetic scenario. Natural disasters triggered or drastically intensified by global heating also threaten human security, an acute problem that is usually not mentioned in discourses on current security challenges.[28]
The requirements for a resilient society in this sense overlap with those for a defence-capable society, but also for a war-capable Bundeswehr. Should these various crises occur simultaneously the Bundeswehr would have to prioritize the military emergency and would therefore no longer be available to support disaster relief. The rapidly deteriorating climate situation alone demands an enhanced and accelerated build-up of the various elements of civil protection. In view of future challenges it is urgent. In a study of early 2024 the German Red Cross made the pressing need for action very clear.[29]For decades, volunteers have been greatly important for all these organizations to work effectively. These considerations alone demonstrate that, while military service plays an essential role, as does an increase in the reserve recruited in other ways, which cannot be discussed further here, service in civilian sectors is just as central to a defence-capable and, in the broadest sense, resilient society.
This complementarity is also reflected in strategic planning. In disaster and civil protection during an Article 5 contingency or officially declared case of self-defence it is reflected in the complementarity of the German Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters (2022) and the National Security Strategy (2023).[30] The effective implementation of the “Comprehensive Defence Framework Guidelines” (Rahmenrichtlinien für die Gesamtverteidigung – Gesamtverteidigungsrichtlinien – (RRGV)) with their focus on internal security and homeland security will rely heavily on effective civil-military cooperation.[31] The scenarios in the largely secret “Operations Plan Germany”, which has been available in the first version since Easter 2024 and which will come into force in 2025[32], demonstrate the actual requirements.
The plan is intended to ensure that in an Article 5 contingency Germany can effectively fulfil its function as a logistics hub and core area for the deployment and relocation of troops to NATO's eastern flank. a scenario Lieutenant General André Bodemann, Commander of the Bundeswehr Homeland and Defence Command, considers to be within the realms of possible within five to eight years. However, Germany, like its allies, were already experiencing daily hybrid attacks, with the Russian hybrid threat consisting of four categories: (1) disinformation, (2) cyber-attacks on the federal government and large companies, (3) various acts of espionage, and (4) acts of sabotage, e.g. on critical infrastructure, LNG terminals or railway lines (or their preparation, as explosives found along NATO pipelines and US bases suggest). These hybrid activities could increase both in the run-up to and in parallel with a kinetic war.
In all these areas, civilian and military organizations must work closely together. Many tasks can be taken over by reservists, but there will also be a need for organized and trained civilians. This will open up opportunities for specialists and experts with experience in a wide range of technology areas such as IT, medicine and energy or food supplies for the civilian population; but troops or volunteers in emergency services will also be dependent on civilian capacities. Building these up with organized volunteer work has been and will in future be highly relevant to society before and beyond a military crisis.
A time-limited general service to society, which has been under discussion for several years, can give volunteers of all ages the opportunity to get involved. This allows a greater degree of fairness in service to be achieved than possible even with the new military service model. Information and placement networks for voluntary services already exist.[33] The expansion and development of necessary structures, such as coordination, training of employees and necessary resources, will however require funding.[34] Giving citizens the opportunity to get involved in these organizations at all levels from small communities over administrative districts to regional and ultimately federal agencies, empowers each individual to constructively shape their lives, those of their fellow citizens and their communities and to contribute to their protection. This can translate into a positive experience of democracy.
This cooperation can connect, strengthen social structures and processes and thus promote the resilience that must be considered necessary in view of the increasing risk of crises, whether natural disasters, hybrid threats or military force. When discussed in the latter context, resilience usually has defensive connotations. However, it can also emerge as a kind of “by-product” of more constructive dynamics if the willingness of citizens to engage for the greater good of society is not played down in public discourses and civilian volunteers are adequately valued in public. Both counter the narrative of a divided society, whose tensions are manipulated and amplified from the outside, with a much more positive understanding of one's own society with its lived strengths than the following commentary puts it:
“The deeper reason for the misery is the mindset of a deeply civil society, in which hard conflicts of interest arise at all possible points and the willingness to look over the rim of one’s own spectacles decreases dramatically.”[35]This prejudgement of a “deeply civil society” (as if this were a flaw) portrays it not only as incapable and unwilling to defend its own values, but also as increasingly too foolish and narcissistic to see or want to see the looming dangers.
As this article has shown, the opposite is true. The Honorary President of the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, THW), Albrecht Broemme, confirms this when he states that “in contrast to some assertions [...] the willingness of the German population to help is remarkably high!”[36] and describes the “integrative power of [working in] disaster protection in general as a “wonderful story”, because volunteers with a background of migration have for some time been working in the THW with great success.
Final Consideration
The new military service model strikes the balance between defence requirements, avoiding alarmism and protecting civil liberties. This approach should not only be maintained for military service, unless the security situation worsens significantly, but can also be extended to civilian service to society. In view of the willingness of the German population to volunteer for both military and civilian service, as demonstrated in this article, but also considering the widespread fears of war, climate change and the “health” of democracy, it is reasonable to conclude that such an expansion will have significant resonance. This not only enables citizens to actively care for themselves and their social and political environment and to take responsibility. Exercising agency and control in this way can also reduce anxiety. In addition, it comes with much greater fairness in serving society than with models which are limited to the young generation.
Complementary services are also essential for tackling all threats to security in Germany and the region which NATO, European partners, and the respective German strategic approaches have identified. Traditional conscription models are not able to meet these challenges of today. Finally, it is well worth emphasising that new narratives, which give due credit to the highly valuable work of volunteers including those working in civilian organizations, and the social cohesion that results are powerful tools in combating actors who drive social division. This strengthens the foundations of society’s resilience against hybrid dangers.
[10] Ingesson, Tony et al. (2018): The martial origins of democracy: a global study of military conscription and suffrage extensions since the Napoleonic wars. In: Democratization 25:4, pp. 633-651, p. 634. [emphasis A. E.]
[11] Paret, Peter (1970): Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation. In: Military Affairs 34/1, pp. 2-6, p. 3. „At this point, at the end of the 18th century, Germany was not yet a unified, sovereign state.
[13] Frevert, Ute (2004): A Nation in Barracks. Conscription, Military Service and Civil Society in Modern Germany. London.
[14] Bove, Vincenzo et al. (2024): Military Culture and Institutional Trust: Evidence from Conscription Reforms in Europe. In: American Journal of Political Science 88/2, pp. 714-729.
[15] Krebs, Ronald R. et al. (2024): Citizenship Traditions and Cultures of Military Service: Patriotism and Paycheques in Five Democracies. In: Armed Forces & Society, pp. 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X241275635.
[16] Hjalmarsson, Randi und Lindquist, Matthew J. (2019): The causal Effect of Military Conscription on Crime. In: The Economic Journal 129 (August), pp. 2522–2562.
[17] Ingesson, Tony et al. (2018), see endnote 10, p. 642 f.
[21] Kümmel, Gerhard (2020): Truppenbild mit General (w)? Eine Untersuchung zur Chancengerechtigkeit in den Karrierewegen von Soldatinnen und Soldaten anhand berufsbiografischer Interviews. Forschungsbericht 125. Potsdam: Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences, p. 45.
[27] See e.g. episodes 88 and 89 of Sicherheitshalber – Der Podcast zur Sicherheitspolitik, September 9, 2024. https://sicherheitspod.de/.
[28] With the notable exception of the podcast Sicherheitshalber (see endnote 27); see episode 85, which provided inspiration for aspects of the following section: Gesamtverteidigung. September 7, 2024. https://sicherheitspod.de/.
[29] Das deutsche Gesundheitssystem auf bewaffnete Konflikte vorbereiten. Brennpunkt, No. 4/2024.
[33] Bundesamt für Familie und zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben [Federal Office for Family and Civil Society Tasks]: BFD − Der Bundesfreiwilligendienst https://www.bundesfreiwilligendienst.de/.
