“Preservation of Peace”: The Logic of Deterrence and the Language of Military Capability

Introduction: War in Europe and the state of the German armed forces

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is in violation of international law, and the obvious attempt therein to overthrow the democratically elected government in Kiev represents a massive shake-up of the post-war order in Europe.^[3] As a result, the state of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) became a political issue, and a very serious “what if” question was raised: Would the Bundeswehr be able to respond to a similar attack on the NATO Alliance (for example in the Baltic states), or even be able to protect its own borders? Are the German armed forces “war-fighting-capable” (“kriegstüchtig”) when it comes to national and collective (alliance) defense? After a long period of focusing on its tasks as a peacekeeping army and deployments abroad, the Bundeswehr has been called back to the core task of national and alliance defense. On February 27, 2022 (three days after the Russian invasion on February 24), Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) issued a statement on behalf of the government in which he also addressed defense capability and the will to defend. He chose the term “Zeitenwende” (“turning point”, “watershed moment” or “new era”) to describe the new situation. He said it was necessary to “prevent Putin’s war from spilling over into other countries in Europe”, while also underlining: “That means that we will stand unconditionally by our collective defence obligation within NATO. […] President Putin should not underestimate our determination to defend every square meter of NATO territory together with our allies.” He repeatedly emphasized the resolution to defend: “We are absolutely serious about this. When we welcome a country into NATO, we commit to defending that country as a partner and ally. Just as we would defend ourselves.” He also confirmed that “the Bundeswehr needs new, strong capabilities.” The goal “is a performance-capable [leistungsfähig], cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr”.^[4] In making this statement, he was building on an existing tradition, as “performance capability” [Leistungsfähigkeit] is also a key term in the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. During the course of the war a similar but stronger term was then used, for example in the speech by the Inspector General of the German armed forces, General Carsten Breuer, on July 13, 2023 in Berlin:

“We must redefine national defence and alliance defence. In the long term, we must redefine the role and the tasks of the Bundeswehr in a multipolar world. In short, the Zeitenwende must be followed by yet another change, a change of mindset. All structures and all processes must serve the overarching objective of robustness and, when it comes to the armed forces, of war-fighting capability. In this process, we must achieve a high degree of flexibility and agility for the Bundeswehr of the future.”^[5]

These matters were also addressed in the public statements of the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD); for example, in his call on October 29, 2023 for the Bundeswehr to be “war-fighting-capable” [kriegstüchtig]: “We have to get used to the idea again that there could be a threat of war in Europe. And that means we have to become war-fighting-capable [“kriegstüchtig werden”], we have to be able to defend ourselves, and we must prepare the Bundeswehr and society accordingly.”^[6] In the Defence Policy Guidelines 2023 published by the German Federal Ministry of Defense in November 2023, the term Kriegstüchtigkeit (“war-fighting capability”) occupies a central position: “Our robustness depends on the war-fighting capability of the Bundeswehr.”^[7] The urgency of the new situation is also made very clear here: “The Bundeswehr is a core instrument of our robustness against military threats. As such, it must be war-fighting-capable in all areas.”^[8] With this, the doctrine of deterrence is also addressed: “Its deterrence and war-fighting capability as well as operational effectiveness are the basic requirements for a future-oriented, fully equipped Bundeswehr that is ready to deploy and fight on a sustainable basis at any time.”^[9] Among the elements of “a common concept of robustness”, “war-fighting capability as a guiding principle for action” is mentioned, and reference is made to the terminology of the military oath of service and Innere Führung (literally translated, “inner guidance”, the term used for civic education and leadership development in the German military):^[10] “Military personnel who are willing to bravely defend the rights and freedom of the German people and knowingly accept danger to life and limb in order to do so.^”[11] Although it might seem self-evident that “war-fighting capability” would be inherently linked to “armed forces” per se, or even understood as a necessary condition for the latter, there is a certain tension between the term and the paradigm of peace, one that has featured strongly in the German debates about defense since the 1950s. A striking example of this paradigm of peace is the statement “peace is the emergency” by Gustav Heinemann, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his inaugural speech on July 1, 1969. According to the Taschenbuch für Wehrfragen 1974/75, the soldier should “wish” that it never comes to war.^[12] It is possible to exaggerate this tension with the paradigm of peace, however, as the original use of the term Kriegstüchtigkeit (“war-fighting capability”) in the early days of the new German armed forces in the 1950s emerged from within this broader peace paradigm. In fact, it was used by the progressive representative of a modern, reform-oriented Bundeswehr striving for peace: Wolf Graf von Baudissin.

The German defense minister’s recent comments triggered a public debate which is still ongoing and is also related to the debate regarding German arms shipments to Ukraine. It is not possible to reconstruct this debate in detail here. In summary, however, it can be claimed that the “turning point” (Zeitenwende) has been understood in very different ways, as has the term “war-fighting capability” (Kriegstüchtigkeit).^[13] In the following, various dimensions of this complex issue are analyzed in historical context, and with particular regard to the use of the latter term in relation to the preservation of peace and in defense theory in general. Along with this, associated ethical tensions are also addressed from multiple perspectives. Important in this analysis are the theoretical approaches and thought processes of the leading thinker of the culture and leadership philosophy of the new German military (Innere Führung), Wolf Graf von Baudissin. He coined the term in its modern interpretation in relation to the new German armed forces of the post-war period.^[14]

During the planning of a “German contingent as part of a supranational armed force for the defense of Western Europe” in the early 1950s (which eventually became the Bundeswehr), and particularly in the theoretical design of the “inner structure”, Baudissin strongly advocated that military personnel should not only have an excellent mastery of the tasks of the military, but should also remain loyal citizens: “citizens in uniform”. This means that they were to serve, out of an inner conviction for liberal democracy and for the constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the new republic with its emphasis on the primacy of human dignity. For Baudissin, this concept of the new armed forces also meant that the free democratic basic order had to be experienced and practiced in different ways and situations in the internal life of the military. However, this liberal democratic reform should by no means result in a weakening of the military’s ability to perform at the highest standards. From today’s perspective, it is neither necessary nor useful to carry on the old debate between the “reformers” (like Baudissin) and “traditionalists” (like Heinz Karst), as if we were still living in the 1950s and 1960s. The self-positionings of that time, which were often thought of and consciously communicated as radical alternatives, should also be examined critically.^[15] Although it is necessary to understand this historical debate, it should be viewed with a historical distance. We live in a different world, and the current situation brings new dimensions and problems into play that the protagonists at the time could have neither known nor foreseen. In general, the beneficial elements of the tradition should be taken up and developed for the future, without falling back into an old camp mentality with entrenched lines of division

Etymology and semantic field

“Tüchtig” is an old term in German, which can also be found in other languages such as English. The 18th century Teutsch-englisches Lexicon offers the following translation: “Tüchtig, tauglich, bequem, qualifiziert oder geschickt seyn etwas zu verrichten, to be able, fit, good, able or qualified, for some business. Ein tüchtiger Mensch, an able man.”^[16] Although this somewhat outdated term is often used in an evaluative sense of “virtuous” (tugendhaft), it does not derive from Tugend (virtue). The term “Tugend” denotes primarily (but not exclusively) the classical cardinal virtues of wisdom, prudence, justice and fortitude, as well as the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Virtues are moral ideals regarding character traits; Tüchtigkeit, on the other hand, in purely formal terms is a high-level quality categorization in the realm of expediency and functionality (“for some business”). A specific independent quality is derived associatively from this high ranking, which is then understandably associated with virtuousness (Tugendhaftigkeit). The adjective tüchtig with its abstract -ti suffix actually comes from the everyday verb taugen (“to be suitable for something”). The term Tugend (Latin: virtus, excellence of character) actually comes from the same verb taugen – but in a different, mainly moral sense and with a different usage (being strongly associated with the scholastic Christian doctrines of virtue of the pre-modern period). Similar to ἀρετή (arete, excellence, virtue, e.g. Philippians 4:8, excellent or praiseworthy) and virtus (“literally manliness, i.e. everything that adorns and ennobles a man physically and mentally […] capability, fitness, excellence, virtue, the virtuous qualities, merits”^[17]), “tüchtig” is usually used when the quality of a function or ability is evaluated positively, in the sense of functional excellence – not in the first instance ideally “good” in the sense of an abstract metaphysical category of bonum, but rather in the world of expediency and usefulness, to be useful and good for a particular purpose or goal, corresponding to a superior level of fitness or suitability. However, “tüchtig” can also be “de-purposed” in its use, such as in the phrase “der tüchtige Mensch”; here it is completely generalized and detached from the realm of concrete expediency. In this usage, the term is used independently and descriptively in an ideal sense to describe a person’s virtuous excellence in a general sense. In antiquity, arete and virtus are often used in precisely this way, especially when describing the aristocratic ideals of the nobility, or in reference to the warrior or athlete. The English cognate of the adjective tüchtig is the archaic word “doughty”, although the semantic field in English is somewhat broader, and “proficient”, “capable”, “able” or similar words are commonly used to describe what is usually associated with “tüchtig” in German. In modern German, “Tüchtigkeit” can be defined in a wider sense as “special (cap)ability”, special “quality” or special suitability, but here again with a specific task, purpose or function in mind. Someone who is “tüchtig” (now in the functional sense) is therefore not only “suitable” for a task, but also particularly “skillful, experienced, industrious or good” at a particular task or ability.^[18]

However, the term “tüchtig” has a negative connotation in German for various reasons. One of these is that Charles Darwin’s central concept in evolutionary biology, “the survival of the fittest” (intended in the sense of the most well-adjusted to the external conditions) was translated as “der Tüchtigste überlebt”. This concept played a central role in eugenics, which disparaged human dignity, and in National Socialist ideology. Of course, those in the contemporary German defense community who use the terms Kriegstüchtigkeit or kriegstüchtig are not seeking in any way to follow in this tradition, and emphatically reject this ideology and the entire worldview of National Socialism. They use the term because they actually want to defend precisely what National Socialism destroyed and disregarded: freedom, democracy, human rights and human dignity.

“It goes without saying that no thinking person, least of all a soldier, can wish for war” (Heinz Karst).^[19] It is also understandable that the term Kriegstüchtigkeit (“war-fighting capability”) is controversial. The morality of the historically evolved and very special intellectual, enlightened tradition in which we stand and think wants peace. We want to eliminate war from our present and future. We do not want to hear about war and we do not want to talk about it – neither “just” nor “unjust” war.^[20] Many had hoped that conventional wars between large states were a thing of the past.^[21] Unfortunately, we must acknowledge honestly that the world is shaped not only by these very good wishes but also by old ideas of conquest and power. This paradox has been accurately described by Friedrich Merz:

“[…F]or a state, unconditional pacifism and non-violence is not a responsible position. Violence is a reality in the world, as are attempts to use violence to destroy peace projects and freedom projects – which fortunately are just as much a reality and which can make us believe in the good in people. […] We must not be naive. Peaceableness alone or even a policy of appeasement are the wrong approach toward a regime that is bent on military conquest, that demonstrably places imperial ambitions above human life and human dignity.”^[22]

Of course, it would have been possible to use a different term, such as “Verteidigungsfähigkeit” (“defense capability”) instead of “Kriegstüchtigkeit” (“war-fighting capability”). However, “defense capability” (a general term similar to the realm of political science) means something different than “war-fighting capability” (a purely military term). The moment an aggressor invades and partially or fully occupies the territory of another free country, the actions of the military (by order of the political leadership) in the country defending itself shift to active defensive warfare. These activities includes both defensive action (resistance) and offensive action to repel and expel the enemy. Defensive warfare does not seek to gain territory, but to liberate lost territory which, according to international law, belongs to the country defending itself. It is of course possible to use other terms, phrases and sentences to describe the desired – not only “good”, but “very good”, even “excellent” – mastery of this defensive and offensive task of any military. Yet the term “Kriegstüchtigkeit” encapsulates the concept very precisely, which is probably why Baudissin chose it. Use of this term does not change the fact that unjust military force and violence is an evil. Indeed, it is not the desire to wage war, but rather the logic of preventing war and the duty to protect life that makes military training in this skill ethically justifiable. Unfortunately, this is still necessary in our world today.

Analyzing the semantic field of the term “Kriegstüchtigkeit” in today’s discourse, one finds a variety of very different approaches to its use. These include the subjective dimension regarding inner attitude (“mindset”) and will, as well as the areas of knowledge and practice, questions of expertise, ability, strategy, tactics and organization. There are also interpersonal dimensions, such as personal and group dynamics, hierarchy and the internal structure of the armed forces, team spirit and cooperation or synergy. Objective dimensions have to be taken into account too, such as equipment, financing, procurement, logistics, deployment and supplies. Not least there are the dimensions of ethics, law and expediency, and questions of purpose: To what end? As an end in itself? From an ethical point of view, “Kriegstüchtigkeit” cannot be an end in itself and must be considered in a wider ethical context. The concept serves a higher ethical order, or a higher ethical principle, namely “war prevention”, conflict mitigation and containment, peacekeeping, border security, alliance loyalty, defense obligations under the constitution (Art. 87a of the Basic Law), protection and preservation of life, and so on. Ironically, the term can also be understood in terms of game theory and as a paradox. “Kriegstüchtigkeit” is a “game” of logic (“being able to fight in order not to fight)”. At the same time, it is a paradox: The preservation of peace (“keeping the peace”) requires strength, for the free democratic world has to live with increasingly powerful forces that are not only ambivalent toward human dignity, justice, international law, freedom of opinion, of speech and of the press, separation of powers and democracy, but that are also actively opposed to these principles and basic values of liberal democracy, or that actively contribute to their erosion. In the background and as one of the fundamental points of departure for the entire discussion about this matter is the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)

Art. 87a of the Basic Law – “The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense.”^[23]

As Heinrich Amadeus Wolff writes in his commentary on Article 87a of the Basic Law: “In systematic terms, defense first of all means repelling the military threat in a state of defense […]. If a state of defense is declared, the armed forces are meant to guarantee the external security of the Federal Republic of Germany and ensure its political freedom of action […].”^[24]The concept of defense includes “in addition to national defense in the conventional sense, also alliance (self-)defense within NATO as well as individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter […].”^[25] Ensuring the ability of the military to function comes into play here: “It is the responsibility of legislators and the other federal bodies responsible for defense to determine the individual measures necessary to ensure a functioning defense, according mainly to political considerations […].”^[26] In this context, the equipment, “functional capability”^[27] and operational suitability as well as the internal structure are also mentioned: “However, it is essential to organize the internal structure of the armed forces and provide them with personnel and equipment in such a way that they are able to perform the military tasks required by the constitution with well-trained personnel and equipment suitable for deployment […].”^[28] With reference to Article 24 of the Basic Law, Wolff points out that the Bundeswehr may also be deployed abroad. Art. 24 II provides “the constitutional basis for […] overseas deployments of the Bundeswehr that take place within and according to the rules of a system of mutual collective security of which the Federal Republic of Germany is a member. […] NATO and the UN are each such a system […].”^[29] “Approval of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is required” for the “actual deployment”.^[30]

As a parliamentary armed force – and as an armed force that was established in an existing democracy in the 1950s – the Bundeswehr has a particular commitment to the Basic Law, the German parliament (Bundestag) and the (ethnically diverse) German people represented in parliament. At the same time, the Bundeswehr is embedded in Europe and internationally (in the NATO defense alliance). As Theodor Blank wrote in his foreword to Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten: Gedanken und Planungen der Dienststelle Blank(Regarding the future German soldier: Thoughts and plans from the Office Blank) in 1955: “German armed forces, together with soldiers from the allied free world, will protect the peaceful social development of our people and their freedom as well as those of Europe.”^[31] Among other things, he also emphasized at the time that “a democratic military system can only become a reality if all citizens share responsibility for it, avow themselves to their soldiers, and place justice, freedom and the preservation of human dignity above all personal interests and desires.”^[32]

The Bundeswehr is committed to international humanitarian law and, above all, to human dignity. The population also demands protection by the Bundeswehr (here in the sense of a service) against external threats. This right is recognized in Art. 2 (2) of the Basic Law: “Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.” Internally, the police are tasked with protecting this right to the greatest possible extent. When there is an external threat, it is the task of the Bundeswehr, with the approval of the Bundestag, to protect the population and defend the rights of the German people, thus protecting the right to life and preserving the free democratic basic order as a whole. Thus the inner logic, the meaning and purpose of the Bundeswehr are inextricably linked to the ethical principles of the Basic Law and to a fundamental commitment to the preservation of the order of liberal democracy. This fabric of the institution, historically determined and imbued with ethical and legal principles, limits the scope of the term “Kriegstüchtigkeit”. The word and everything expressed with it cannot be understood in a vacuum; it must always be seen in the context of the ethical and legal provisions. It is understandable that the term causes unease, especially in view of the history of the Second World War and the destruction, brutality and inhumanity that accompanied it. At the same time, however, it must also be acknowledged that the Kriegstüchtigkeit currently being sought for the German armed forces serves a completely different purpose: namely defending the peace and liberal democracy that were established after the destruction of the Second World War.

Military language in a new democracy

In the 1950s, the term “kriegstüchtig” was occasionally used by members of the Bundestag Committee on Defense, e.g. by Georg Kliesing (CDU) in the critical debate on medical inspections (on November 30, 1954) in the discussion of a proposed code for military regulations.^[33] However, another term was used very often, which is not identical in meaning to “Kriegstüchtigkeit” but is related and actually subordinate: “schlagkräftig” (effective, powerful) or “Schlagkraft” (effectiveness, striking power). This term was used much more frequently and by many different members of the Bundestag Committee on Defense in the 1950s, for example by Franz-Josef Strauß (CDU/CSU) on September 5, 1952: “The second question was a military one: whether the effectiveness [Schlagkraft] of the units and the military planning might not be jeopardized in an emergency by the internal state of emergency in all states.”^[34] Usually, the concept was regarded as a basic condition, for example by Wilhelm Mellies (SPD) on October 3, 1952: “In summary, I would like to state my opinion quite clearly that this European Defence Community is not possible at all on this financial basis. This financial basis is so insecure that no army, never mind an effective army [eine schlagkräftige Armee], can be built on it.”^[35] One finds a similar use of the term by Theodor Blank on October 8, 1952:

“I take the view that the soldier, i.e. the military side, in this case the Ministry of Defense, would have to say what is needed from the point of view of its responsibility, and no doubt the experts, the military men – and I do not even regard this as morally reprehensible – make the demands from the point of view of being well equipped, being effective [schlagkräftig]. But that is not to say whether this can be put into practice.”^[36]

Baudissin also used the term in the Bundestag Committee on Defense, for example on July 14, 1953 in a speech on Innere Führung and specifically in a passage on the subject of supporting soldiers, i.e. the task of helping soldiers to “develop their potential”:^[37] “Support is certainly a very important field, and all the resources provided here are very important for the development of the personality and therefore for effectiveness [Schlagkraft].”^[38] He sees no contradiction between Innere Führung, the free development of the personality, and the ideal of an effective soldier.

We also find the term in the preamble of a draft version of a directive concerning the military discipline regulations for the then planned European Defence Community, which refers to the “effectiveness of the armed forces” [Schlagkraft der Streitkräfte].^[39] Heinz Karst also often used the term, for example on August 1, 1955: “The effectiveness [Schlagkraft] of an army today is largely dependent on the moral energies of democracy and of the state which it serves.”^[40]The Vice-President of the Bundestag (1953-65), Richard Jaeger, who also chaired the Bundestag Committee on Defense (1965-66), regarded “Schlagkraft” as an essential element of the new German armed forces, which in his view did not conflict with the integration of the armed forces into the democratic constitutional state:

“We have, for the first time, a democracy in Germany that functions astonishingly well given the short six-year period of its existence, and we must try to establish an army that is as good in terms of effectiveness [Schlagkraft] as German armies have ever been. Furthermore, we must bring this new Bundeswehr and the democratic state into a balanced relationship that has never existed before.”^[41]

“… living with conflicts” – the substructure of realism

In the 1950s, military capability and particularly “Kriegstüchtigkeit” were talked about in different contexts, but mainly in the discussion about deterrence strategy. Beneath this deterrence strategy lies an additional layer of intellectual reflection, which was often simply assumed in discussions at the time and not addressed at all. Yet this deeper layer is important for the deterrence strategy as well as for thoughts about the need to have a military that is “kriegstüchtig” (“war-fighting-capable”). It relates to a fundamental conception or perception of humanity and the world as conflictual (realism).^[42] One finds this idea in some places in Baudissin’s work, for example:

“I mean that all human life as social existence is inevitably influenced by conflicts with others and the environment. This applies to the individual, to small private and professional groups, and also to states and groups of states. Real and perceived interests clash everywhere. This fact cannot be denied, nor can it be made to go away through violent suppression or by demonizing the enemy. For better or worse, we will have to live with conflicts. Managing their resolution, however, has become more necessary than ever.”^[43]

This conception of the world and human existence might appear prima facie to be almost Manichean. Yet it actually stems from a realistic view of the world that is reflected in many religious traditions. In the Jewish and Christian tradition, for example, there is the idea of the “fall of man” – where humanity departs from the originally intended good state of peace (cf. Isaiah 2, Micah 4) and enters into a new state of conflict and mortality – the factual reality of life (Genesis 3). A realistic view of the world must reckon with the possibility of conflict and continual clashes of interests. From this web of ideas emerges the reflection on how to work towards peace and also prevent and minimize conflict in a conflict-ridden world. In turn, among other answers to this question, the deterrence strategy also becomes plausible

Paradox of peace: The deterrence strategy and the instrumental rationality of “war prevention”

The modern deterrence strategy of the West during the Cold War is completely unique in many respects from a historical perspective, especially in light of the technological developments of the 20th century, nuclear weapons and the particular ideological conflict between the East and the West. Nevertheless, there is a certain continuity between the deterrence strategy developed at that time and certain ideas regarding defense and military conflict in antiquity.^[44] The Roman war theoretician Publius Flavius Vegetius was the author of the well-known saying in military strategy: “If you want peace, prepare for war” (“qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum”). Many military strategists regard this quote as an ancient forerunner of the deterrence strategy of modern times. Antulio J. Echevarria II holds that Vegetius’s maxim is “based on a realist’s view of human nature.” The basic idea of the strategy claims that “to discourage aggression, we must appear strong enough to defeat an attack, or at least to make it too costly to be worthwhile.”^[45] Similar strategic recommendations can be found in Cicero, Livy and Publilius Syrus, who saw military strength as a necessary condition for peace.^[46]For a comparison with modern concepts of deterrence strategy during the Cold War, it must of course be remembered that the ways of thinking and the meanings of the terms were very different in antiquity. To begin with, the term peace in Latin – “pax” – is etymologically related to a pact or agreement, and in this context also presupposed the notion of Roman supremacy.^[47] In Roman antiquity, we do not find the modern pluralistic idea of a world with different political systems capable of coexistence or even cooperation; instead we find a clear notion of supremacy, one from which the “pax” naturally follows.^[48] Ancient literature often glorified warriors and wars. Viewed in the formal sense, however, war was supposed to be subject to rational considerations regarding the law and the basic security interests of the state (Cicero, De re publica, 3.23); moreover, the state of peace, εἰρήνη (eirene), pax and otium, was clearly preferred by many thinkers of antiquity – also as an ideal to aim for in the leadership of the state (Aristotle, Politics, 1333a, 1334a; Cicero, Pro Sestio 98; Cicero, De lege agraria 1.7.23).^[49] The givenness of war as a factual reality of human existence in the world was not really questioned in a fundamental sense in much of the literature of antiquity. The classical philologist Glenn W. Most actually maintains that it was not until the “advent of Christianity” that the practice of war in antiquity was fundamentally called into question.^[50] Even if the concepts of war and peace were understood differently in antiquity, one can certainly see a certain prehistory of the doctrine of deterrence in Roman antiquity. In Livy, the idea is very clearly stated: “Make but a show of war, and you shall have peace.”^[51] The doctrine of deterrence certainly did not arise in the 20th century, nor did the idea of the need for a weaker country to prepare for war against a greater power. A well-known example of the latter from modern times is found in Carl von Clausewitz, who stresses the need to prepare for war:

“War serves the purpose of the defence more than that of the aggressor. It is only aggression that calls forth defence, and war along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unsupposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defence, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.”^[52]

Of course, there is a clear discontinuity between these older traditions and the modern Bundeswehr, which is oriented toward peace and international cooperation in accordance with the preamble of the Basic Law. We also find a different starting point in the underlying logic. The call for a Bundeswehr with effective deterrence capabilities (i.e. “kriegstüchtig”) presumes the logic of peace. This is explicitly mentioned in the “Himmerod memorandum” of the military committee of experts on the “establishment of a German contingent as part of a supranational armed force for the defense of Western Europe” (Himmerod, October 9, 1950): “The stronger the security, the less incentive the Soviet Union has to pursue an aggressive policy and the more secure is the preservation of peace.”^[53] The 1955 publication Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten: Gedanken und Planungen der Dienststelle Blank also clearly advocates the doctrine of deterrence from the outset, naming it as the reason for establishing armed forces: “History teaches us that military weakness can also lead to war, because it virtually invites a disturber of the peace to attack.”^[54] Among many others at that time, and today, Baudissin viewed the deterrence strategy entirely from the perspective of maintaining peace: “The armed forces can make a significant contribution to strengthening and maintaining peace by using their military defensive strength to remove the temptation for the enemy to launch a risk-free attack […].”^[55] He emphasized that it is primarily a question of maintaining peace: “The primary military and political goal is to prevent war; the means are the globally deployed deterrent forces.”^[56] With regard to NATO, Baudissin stated: “According to its purpose and organizational principle, NATO must wait for aggression […].” Yet once this came, the “retaliatory power” (“Vergeltungspotential”), as Baudissin understood it at the time, must “be so great that it is lethal even as a second strike.”^[57] Paradoxically, for the sake of peace, one must be prepared (as Baudissin put it at that time in the language of mutually assured destruction, “MAD”) to “drag the aggressor with us into total destruction”.^[58] At that time, these ideas were undergoing a process of transformation as part of NATO’s defense strategy through the second half of the 20th century. At all stages of this development, however, the strategy was intended to serve peace and had nothing to do with warmongering: “[… I]f the task of the soldier used to be to win the battle, today he is supposed to prevent the war – which, incidentally, requires at least the same seriousness and proficiency [Tüchtigkeit] from him as before, but greater restraint in peacetime.”^[59] Baudissin also used the term “war prevention strategies” in this sense.^[60] All of this has to do with defending peace: “He who defends, protects reality; only the attacker needs ideologies. Our reality is an order that allows us to live for and in freedom, the rule of law and human dignity.”^[61]

We find a very similar concept with Heinz Karst, for example in the foreword to the third edition of his opus magnum: “Every citizen can only hope that freedom, justice and truthfulness will be better recognized as vital forces worth defending – and that the Bundeswehr will become so effective [schlagkräftig] that it can help policymakers to preserve peace, a peace in freedom!”^[62] Karst underlines the peaceful intentions of the new German armed forces: “Everything must be done to prevent a war.”^[63] Even if, in his view, the soldier should primarily be “trained / educated to fight” (and not “to die”), this demand too is based on the idea of peace: “The more determined, braver, and better trained for battle [the soldier] is, the more prospects policymakers have of reducing or settling tensions between peoples through peaceful negotiation.”^[64] These ideas were also taken up in the Handbuch Innere Führung (1957):

“Thus, the soldier’s task is first and foremost to provide protection in the face of a latent threat by having the greatest possible defensive war-fighting capability [ein Höchstmaß an abwehrbereiter Kriegstüchtigkeit]. The mere availability of useful soldiers helps policymakers to allow the internal order to grow undisturbed and consolidate, and to resolve external tensions by means other than war.”^[65]

The terminology in this passage in the Handbuch Innere Führung evidently relates back to Baudissin’s speech “The Image of the Future Soldier” which he gave on June 22, 1954 at the 14th session of the Bundestag Committee on Defense:

“With regard to war, [the citizen in uniform, psp] occupies a special position. For the citizen in uniform, war cannot be a field of longed-for probation, where manly virtues are first awakened and put into practice. Nor can war be a normal means of politics or its natural continuation, for war has now really long since surpassed our ideas and possibilities of exerting influence. It can now only be a matter of the ultimate defense of existence, and the soldier must help to prevent this war by having the greatest possible defensive war-fighting capability [durch einen Höchstgrad abwehrbereiter Kriegstüchtigkeit]. However, as a citizen, he should also constantly remind the politician that the soldier cannot or must not be the only means used in this conflict.”^[66]

Baudissin saw no conflict in the fact that, according to the principles of Innere Führung, people in military service should be simultaneously free in the development of their personality, conscientious citizens and fully-fledged soldiers “capable of fighting a war” [“kriegstüchtig”] in order to prevent one. He even considered deep affirmation of the liberal democratic order to be a prerequisite of war-fighting capability:

“Now, however, the difficult question arises as to how it can be achieved that soldiers who do not all put on the uniform as citizens now wear it as citizens, i.e. that they become war-fighting capable. I will confine myself to a few remarks, but I do consider them appropriate, as with them I am outlining the field of Innere Führung in general, the principles of which are being developed in my department. First of all, the military rules and regulations – which can no longer be anything other than a subset of our general laws and regulations – are very much involved in achieving this; i.e. they must be liberal.”^[67]

From today’s perspective, the entire thought process of these arguments could be described as a kind of instrumental rationality or consequentialist logic. In other words, it is not concerned with building up war-fighting capability or military power or effectiveness in and of itself, but with that which is achieved as a result: deterrence, and therefore actually the preservation of peace. Logically, the war-fighting capability, power and effectiveness of the armed forces are on the third level. The first level is actually the imperative to (1.) maintain peace, which is achieved through (2.) deterrence, which in turn is achieved through (3.) war-fighting capability or a powerful and effective military. Deterrence can of course be secured by other means, e.g. from the economic realm. These steps in the thought process – which one finds both implicitly and explicitly in different contexts during this period – also reflect the motive of maintaining peace as set out in the preamble to the Basic Law: “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe […].

The “fully-fledged soldier” anchored in a triadic self-image

The triadic concept of the soldierly self-image is the intellectual space in which the conception of war-fighting capability is tightly embedded, meaningfully interconnected and ethically limited. The concept is presented for example in the current Joint Service Regulation on Innere Führung which clarifies:

“A central element of Innere Führung is the model of the ‘citizen in uniform’. This model defines the ideal of what is expected of a soldier in the Bundeswehr: to be a free personality; to act as a responsible citizen; and to be ready for the mission.”^[68]

This triadic concept emerged from “Office Blank” and the 1953 directive on the “Regulation of ‘Innere Führung’”. As it stipulated: “All work in the field of ‘Innere Führung’ has the goal of creating and developing the type of modern soldier who is a free person, a good citizen, and a fully-fledged soldier at the same time.”^[69] Of course, qualitative excellence in the realm of military capability (“Kriegstüchtigkeit”) – being a “fully-fledged soldier” – is not the only goal that a soldier should strive for, even if it is undoubtedly a conditio sine qua non of every very good military. The self-image of the person serving in the military should not be reduced to this single dimension. According to Innere Führung, soldiers should be more than just “ready for mission”, and their various tasks involve more than just warfare. In certain situations, skills in intercultural, social, psychological, ethical and legal areas are required.^[70] At the same time, the entire military must adhere to the Basic Law and be able to guarantee external security proficiently. This includes that which is addressed in the current Joint Service Regulation:

“Military service, especially in leadership roles, places high demands on the personality. Military personnel find certainty for their actions in the principles of Innere Führung. After all, the military’s mission ultimately requires them to kill in combat, risking their own lives and the lives of their fellow soldiers.”^[71]

The military oath of service is also quoted in the same Joint Service Regulation:

“The legally defined duties of military personnel are derived from the requirements of military service. a. All military personnel have the basic duty ‘to serve loyally the Federal Republic of Germany and to courageously defend the rights and the liberty of the German people’ (Paragraph 7 of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act [Soldatengesetz, SG]). In the extreme case, this includes risking one’s life. The free democratic basic order secures rights and freedom. Therefore, military personnel must recognize this basic order and work to preserve it (Paragraph 8 SG).”^[72]

For a historical comparison, these aspects can also be found in the Handbuch Innere Führung (1957): “Combat demands boldness and willpower, prudence and perseverance, even in the greatest danger and to the point of giving one’s life. That is why bravery is the distinguishing virtue of the soldier. It is a combination of natural courage, which becomes reliable through experience, with an alert mind and an alert conscience.”^[73]The special psychological dimension was also discussed at that time: “The soldier must be resilient and vigorous, willing to make sacrifices, and hard on himself. He should think independently in the interests of the whole, and obey responsibly. Resolute action is the first requirement in war.”^[74] The ethical character of the military oath of service and the historical orientation toward good role models were also emphasized as highly important: “In order to imprint the ultimate consequences of the oath on our conscience, we should remember the men of July 20, 1944 […]. They sacrificed their lives for freedom, justice and human dignity. Those who take our oath of service and their duties seriously can look only with deep gratitude and admiration to these men as role models.”^[75]

The special task of the military requires precisely tailored training and comprehensive support. With regard to the internal structure of the new armed forces, it was already stated in the “Himmerod memorandum” (1950) that “something fundamentally new has to be created”, “without borrowing from the forms of the old Wehrmacht”.^[76]The entire concept of the future “German contingent” was to serve a higher ethical purpose: “The soldier of the German Contingent defends both freedom in the sense of self-determination and social justice. These values are indispensable to him.”^[77] The military’s higher system of values is expressly mentioned: “The whole as well as the individual must affirm the democratic form of government and way of life out of inner conviction.”^[78] For this reason, too, the need for training is discussed:

“The education [Erziehung] of soldiers in politics and ethics should be given the greatest attention from the outset as part of their general service training. It should not be limited to purely military aspects. By forming a European view of history, and with an introduction to the political, social and economic issues of the time, a decisive contribution can be made from within the troops and beyond the context of military service to the development of the committed citizen and European soldier. At the same time, this should provide the inner stability to resist undermining by undemocratic tendencies (Bolshevism and totalitarianism). Issues of international law should also be taught.”^[79]

In the early phase of establishing the new German armed forces, there is a repeated emphasis on the ideal citizen soldier: military excellence (“Kriegstüchtigkeit”,“Schlagkräftigkeit, etc.), individual freedom (independent and free development of the personality, “leading with assignment” [“Führen mit Auftrag”^[80]]), and the aspect regarding the thinking individual operating on his or her own inner ethical compass and sense of responsibility as a citizen (inner conviction with regard to democracy, freedom, the rule of law, the Basic Law, “citizen in uniform”, etc.). The various elements are seen as part of an integrated whole, and are understood as complementary and not contradictory. They are to be viewed not as an either/or dichotomy, but as mutually supportive principles that should be pursued in the internal workings of the organization and in education.

However, training, teaching and preparation also have their limits, as Baudissin noted: “Combat situations and combat motivations are extreme situations of human existence; they are governed by special laws; they cannot be rehearsed.”^[81] Nevertheless, ethical education is essential for cultivating a virtuous habit of moral steadfastness and bravery, as well as for sensitization to the art of making distinctions. Baudissin expresses this in the following context, in which he discusses the treatment of military adversaries:

“The constantly growing destructive power of modern weapons has long since exceeded any manageable dimension. It has also obscured the fact that killing people is neither the main task of the soldier, nor should it be; that the soldier’s task is rather to achieve a set objective and at the same time prevent military adversaries from achieving their objectives. In this, he may be forced to use force, but it should not exceed what is necessary to stymie the adversary. The first means to this end is to disarm the adversary, only a second is to incapacitate him physically, and killing him can be justified only as an extreme special case. Resolutely training soldiers to kill is to bestialize them, i.e. it destroys in them the order [Ordnung] they are supposed to protect. This is not to advocate being soft. The toughness that is often demanded today – that it must be equal to the toughness of our presumed enemy – cannot be the mercilessness of a ‘killer’. Rather, it is the spiritual and moral steadfastness that shoulders [the blame of] the killing of people if necessary, if it cannot be avoided, and which seeks to bear responsibility for this to oneself and before God.”^[82]

Baudissin argues that people serving in the military should not be taught to kill, but rather educated so that they are able to make careful distinctions and responsible decisions in the incremental, coordinated and appropriate use of force, and to be morally steadfast in awareness of the full breadth of their responsibility. In the Handbuch Innere Führung (1957) the spiritual dimensions are also discussed:

“But if the goal of all leadership and training is the soldier’s war-fighting capability [Kriegstüchtigkeit] – capability [Tüchtigkeit] in a hot war as well as in the Cold War – then we know, in view of what war means and what we ourselves have experienced, that the whole person with all his strengths is required. Technical skills alone are not enough. This fact, gained from the experience of war, stands at the beginning of the guiding principles (paragraph 2) and sets the goal for education: Moral, spiritual and psychological powers [Kräfte] determine the value of the soldier in peace and war, even more than technical ability.”^[83]

The moral, spiritual and psychological powers (forces, strengths, energies, etc.) mentioned here cannot be developed by means of a simple procedure. They can only unfold freely in a culture of affirmative, independent personality development. There is no doubt that religion, positive group dynamics, ethical sensitization, cultural experiences, knowledge of history and political education are all involved in this mysterious development. Also, for this reason, the spaces for subjective reflection in character guidance training and instruction in life skills (Lebenskundlicher Unterricht), the spiritual guidance of the military chaplaincy, and the further education and broadening of horizons in political, historical and ethical subject areas will continue to be of indispensable importance for the modern and effective Bundeswehr

On the development of military capability

An effective military force can only be achieved and maintained through many simultaneously running development processes, which always have to be adapted to new challenges and situations, and carefully managed by experienced and highly qualified people. According to Baudissin, freedom and personal responsibility are essential in this dynamic process. He highlights the ideal of the ethical individual who thinks for himself and acts independently:

“Innere Führung means realizing the principles for soldiers laid down in military laws and regulations and incorporated into the institutional rules in daily service and in soldiers’ shared existence freely and with personal responsibility, in order to create and maintain an effective force[eine schlagkräftige Truppe].The task of military training and leadership has always been the same: to establish an effective force with high combat morale for emergencies. However, the way in which this effectiveness [Schlagkraft] is achieved is subject to historical change, like all forms and ways of human shared existence.”^[84]

Here too, however, it is not a question of a capable military per se, but of a higher ethical goal or ideal: the “preservation of peace”:

“Leadership thus requires the navigation of difficult tensions: It is supposed to lead to war-fighting capability [Kriegstüchtigkeit], which consists of more than technical skill; but at the same time it should always keep the individual focused on the fact that the real goal can only be the preservation of peace. As divergent as these demands may be, the soldier can set himself no other or greater goal, and there seems to be no other way to achieve this goal.”^[85]

For Baudissin, the attunement of the soldierly self-image to peace in the inner affirmation of liberal democracy ultimately results in democratic armed forces being more effective: “Democrats may behave in an emphatically unheroic and pluralistic way in peacetime, but they are nevertheless remarkably efficient on the battlefield.”^[86

The imperative of peace

Democracies are more peaceful with one another for a variety of reasons, including economic ones (as Immanuel Kant also pointed out). The quest for a more peaceful world is an ongoing project that can only succeed if each generation internalizes the ethical truth of the axiomatic superiority of peace, and actively puts this into practice. Reason calls us to condemn “war as a legal process”(“Krieg als Rechtsgang”), as Kant aptly put it.^[87] However, we must remain “wise as serpents” (Matthew 10:16), even if we are actually “doves”. Even when states condemn “war as a legal process” and seek to maintain a permanent state of peace, the political orders of these states can always deteriorate; new forces can come to power that reject the peaceful intentions and legal order of the past. Unfortunately, our world today is still in a state in which we need a “capable”, “effective” and “proficient” Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr and any armed forces that are committed to human rights, the preservation of peace and liberal democracy are not a necessary evil. Rather, they perform a very important task that is good in itself: the defense of peace, protection of human life and the safeguarding of the external security of liberal democracy. Armed forces of this kind are also a positive stabilizing force within democracies in that they (like a cantus firmus from generation to generation) promote democracy and ethical and constitutional instruction at the educational level and also inculcate a whole range of positive virtues regarding individual life skills, social cohesion and working-world productivity from within their ranks.

The first Chancellor of the new Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, stated the proper task of the soldier quite convincingly in his foreword to the 1955 publication Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten: Gedanken und Planungen der Dienststelle Blank : His task is to “preserve the liberal order of life and peace”.^[88] While the exact terminology we use to describe a high quality performance capability in the military is very important, it is ultimately a secondary matter. The primary question is whether the military actually has this fundamental capability and skill.. Our focus should be on the specific capabilities, the necessary equipment and the internal structure and cultural, psychological, moral and political fabric of the military, in order to be able to perform the task in an emergency. Until world peace is achieved, logic in the realm of our current reality must take precedence. Undoubtedly, we can strive for, with Augustine, an ideal world of many small “regna” (kingdoms, states) that coexist peacefully with one another and reject any desire for expansion (De civ. dei, 4.15), or with Kant we can place our hope in a “treaty between nations” or “peoples” (“Vertrag der Völker”), a “league of peace” or “pacific federation” (foedus pacificum)” in which all wars can be ended forever through the voluntary commitment of the individual free states.^[89] The United Nations is an example of such an alliance for peace, as is NATO. In and with these organizations, with all pragmatism and with all other possible methods and channels, we must continue to work on the incomparably important universal peace project and never give up working on it. We must try to prevent every war, to stop existing wars and bring them to a state of just peace – as far as possible.^[90] In Augustine’s time, in Kant’s time and also today, however, we know that the pursuit of peace is often displaced by self-interest, and that the power of the stronger, hubris, and self-aggrandizement very often undermine international law and peace with those who are weaker.^[91] The world we live in today is a world in which autocratic powers are becoming stronger and more influential economically. China, Russia and their allies are apparently striving for an international order in which autocracy not only endures but slowly spreads, in which democracy is rolled back, peaceful neighbors are subjugated, human rights and basic freedoms such as freedom of the press and freedom of speech are extinguished, and questioning the state is prohibited. The basic principle still applies: If you want peace, you should prepare for peace. Yet at the same time, it must be presumed that these peace efforts, as good and right as they are, could be completely ignored. The conditio humana was accurately described by Seneca: “Man […] is not ashamed to revel in the blood of others, to wage war, and to entrust the waging of war to his sons, when even dumb beasts and wild beasts keep the peace with one another.”^[92] In the event of an attack, a capable military (Baudissin would say “kriegstüchtig” and “schlagkräftig”) must be well-trained and ready at all times for defense in accordance with the Basic Law and international humanitarian law, and in keeping with the principles, values and norms of Innere Führung. Of course, the peace that was painstakingly established following the destruction of the Second World War, an order of peace that is now going through a severe stress test, is not secured by a single national military alone. Even today, peace is best supported and preserved through a multi-pronged approach: by simultaneously striving for world peace and promoting liberal democracy with robust, internationally networked social market economies and an effective defense alliance.