The Operational Plan for Germany – Building Block for a Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approach to Resilient Defence Readiness

Deterrence: The return of a neglected concept

The foundation of NATO in April 1949 laid the groundwork for an Alliance that, on a voluntary basis, rendered potential attacks against its member states risky enough to deter potential attackers in the first place. Following lessons learned during two world wars within the span of a century, the pacifist motivation of “no more war” and the deterrence-based principle “Si vis pacem para bellum” were equally important from the beginning. Now, 75 years have passed; adults in Europe at the time had experienced one or often even two world wars. Nevertheless – or because of this fact – the overall acceptance of these measures within democratic societies of Western Europe and the United States was overwhelming. There was no experience-based concept of achieving lasting peace without substantial military deterrence among societies at the time. The opposite was the case: A lack of military readiness to meet a potential threat had brought nations like Poland, France or the United Kingdom to the brink of ruin at the beginning of World War II. It was only the intervention of the United States with its overwhelming economic power that rendered the military defeat of the German aggressor feasible and ultimately paved the way for the peaceful and democratic reconstruction of Europe. In the following decades, as well, it was the concept of military deterrence that guaranteed peace in freedom for those who were fortunate enough to live on this side of the Iron Curtain. 

Today, members of this war generation are no longer among us. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, democratic societies in Europe have been all too eager to spend the considerable funds that had so far been invested in defence elsewhere. At the time, this would have been very reasonable. When I was a platoon leader in the armoured infantry in the early 1990s, I also had difficulties finding simple, convincing answers to the young conscripts’ questions about the meaning of our service. And indeed, there was a period during which training with the infantry fighting vehicle at the forward edge of the battle area may have seemed oldfashioned. Today’s problem, and the reason for this brief historical excursus, is that this attitude has spread through large parts of Europe over three decades of peace and has been accompanied by massive cuts to national security expenditure. Now, we are forced to respond to a recurrent threat while making sure that we do not neglect other legitimate social concerns and government tasks. The deployment of armed forces as a last resort is always associated with deprivation and burdens for one’s own side. The same applies to enabling forces to use credible deterrence to prevent potential adversaries from taking an incalculable risk. Personnel, equipment and training of a significant force necessitate the use of significant national resources. However, as soon as the release of these resources is discussed, the military directly competes with other government tasks in terms of funding. As a result, we are witnessing a potential polarisation between individuals who are convinced that strong deterrence is a necessary measure to secure our social system on the one hand and individuals who consider the creation of strong armed forces equal to a militarisation of society and unnecessary – or at least a waste of hard-earned tax revenue – on the other hand. This latter group has grown stronger over time, as the specific threat of the Warsaw Pact receded further into the past and the likelihood of an armed conflict on the European continent decreased.

But one thing is clear: A fundamental change in the security situation requires society as a whole to recognise this change and the associated threats. In a next step, this recognition develops into a political process to implement the relevant structural reforms. Only then can the military leadership begin implementing the necessary requirements – and only within the framework of the budgetary and security requirements of the German government. This realisation, however, does not develop overnight. We have spent the past three decades falsely assuming that a war on the European continent could be prevented by establishing at least partnerships among European states. The European Union as a visible constitutional framework, NATO and the United States as a strong partner were what ensured that this assumption remained largely true. Armed forces alone are only sustainable and able to act to a limited degree and subject to political requirements. This means that, in the current situation, all state institutions and all of society are called upon. We must all take a comprehensive approach to security to be prepared for scenarios we have considered outdated for decades. Responsible security and defence policy means at least considering the possibility of effective deterrence and preparing appropriately. This includes a wide range of measures, from the intensified supply of ammunition and fuel or the protection of defence-critical infrastructure under the conditions of a massive cyber attack to the protection of the population against conventional or nuclear attacks. For several years now, the Bundeswehr has been trying to do justice to this realisation by way of appropriate planning and the intelligent use of limited resources. In this context, the Bundeswehr Homeland Defence Command, established in October 2022, is an important component or a military result of the changed security situation. It is only logical that such a result has other consequences, which is why there have been and will be further structural changes – the formation of a Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operational Command being the most recent one. 

Coordinating total defence, creating resilience

Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine has highlighted the need for a swifter reorientation of our armed forces’ command and control structure to meet the requirements of national and collective defence. The new Defence Policy Guidelines, which Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius presented at the Bundeswehr Commanders’ Conference in November 2023, stipulated the Bundeswehr’s core task for the coming years: a clear orientation toward national and collective defence. These guidelines also laid the groundwork for an efficient and operational Bundeswehr of the future, also in terms of personnel, organisation, infrastructure, budget and finances, sustainability, armaments policy, and procurement. The document states: “We must be the backbone of deterrence and collective defence in Europe. Our citizens as well as our partners in Europe, North America and the rest of the world expect us to take on this responsibility.” It also stipulates a “national objective” for civil defence, which primarily states that the core task of national and collective defence can only be accomplished through a whole-of-society approach and within the scope of total defence. Simultaneously, it identified areas where civil defence must provide essential support to total defence. The document also stipulates the objective of civil defence from the perspective of the Ministry of Defence: “The overarching objective of civil defence is to provide supplies and support to the civilian population as well as to our own armed forces and allied armed forces in order to ensure their operational capability and freedom of manoeuvre sustainably and without restrictions in situations where they are needed.” The Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operational Command is responsible for Bundeswehr operations in terms of planning, command and control and coordination, also within Germany. Germany and the Bundeswehr must be prepared to respond to current threats in the context of territorial defence in times of peace, crisis and war. With this goal in mind, experts from all areas of the Bundeswehr developed the military element of a whole-of-government defence plan, the “Operational Plan for Germany” (OPLAN DEU), within the framework of a joint planning group with representatives from the German government, the Federal states and municipalities, emergency and rescue services, and business. This plan has become an essential building block for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to resilient defence readiness. “United. We defend. Germany.” is our goal and benchmark.

To this end, we are guided by the realisation that modern threats are connected and affect all levels of government and society, for example when third countries spread disinformation during a health crisis and deliberately stoke mistrust toward local or federal institutions. Disinformation can be controlled externally and internally, which makes it a problem in terms of foreign and security policy as well as society. Dependencies on complex supply chains reveal economic vulnerabilities. Natural disasters have implications for society and security policy. Connected crises may have had different triggers, but their serious effects are similar. In order to face these challenges, we require a strategy that also involves all of society. The increasing inseparability of internal and external security is specifically reflected in the fact that a key requirement for Germany to fulfil its role as a hub is functioning cooperation. German and allied forces will move within and through Germany in order to ultimately contribute to credible deterrence at NATO’s eastern flank and, in doing so, also contribute to external security. The uninhibited movement of forces and their security and freedom of movement are essential to this contribution – all matters that, on German territory, are the responsibility of national security authorities. And, since we are talking about deterrence, this is all below the threshold of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and before reaching a state of tension, defence or mutual defence. This constitutes a particular challenge, especially since Germany and its hub are already exposed to extensive hybrid threats today. In addition to disinformation campaigns and fake news aiming to work against our democracy and our society, these are primarily cyber attacks, spying activities and sabotage against our (defence-essential) infrastructure.

The recent years have also shown: In a federal system like Germany, central crisis management is no easy task. Different competences lie with the Federal government, the Federal states and the municipalities. For example, civil protection, meaning the protection of the population in the event of war, is a Federal task; disaster control, meaning the protection from major accidents such as natural disasters, on the other hand, is the responsibility of the Federal states. Volunteer organizations provide important services. Private companies are involved, for example, in the protection of critical infrastructure. In terms of the government, competences are shared among the Federal Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which requires a tremendous amount of coordination. As a rule, improved cooperation between the Federal government, the Federal states and the municipalities in the event of a disaster is urgently required. However, individual initiatives are not enough. In order to turn resilience into a functional defence policy instrument and benchmark for action in matters of domestic and foreign policy in times of complex crises, we must raise awareness for this concept throughout society. In this context, Germany can benefit from a common understanding of resilience, which can prepare society for all manner of risks. The German government has announced a new Security Strategy, which should define a security policy for society and create networks. This Security Strategy should merge civil defence and disaster control with the way we handle hybrid threats. But resilience should be defined even more broadly: not only as a reactive model that allows us to better cope with crises, but as a proactive contribution to a secure, cohesive society both internally and externally. The benefit of a strategy of resilience would then be threefold: It would better equip Germany to deal with new risks in terms of security policy or with other complex disasters, it would strengthen the preservation of a functioning democratic society and, at the same time, also promote interest in democratic security policy. 

Effective coordination of civil and military support

The Operational Plan for Germany, or “OPLAN DEU”, was developed as a result of this situation and is a secret, highly adaptive document that is constantly being developed further. The development of this plan is a core military contribution to defending Germany and to protecting our sovereignty and territorial integrity. It contributes to strengthening the resilience of the government and society against external threats and ensures that, if necessary, troops, including their equipment, can be transported through Germany within a few days. In this context, the “OPLAN” serves several purposes simultaneously: It coordinates civil-military interaction for mutual, whole-of-government support and maximises opportunities for civilian support in order to specifically lighten the burden on the Bundeswehr with regard to the protection of critical infrastructure through services provided by civilian institutions and the economy. This requires a common understanding and the motivation to shape overall defence to be sustainable. In the event of an emerging crisis, it is important to contribute to credible deterrence with speed and situational awareness. The specific structure of the Bundeswehr Homeland Defence Command with its 16 subordinate Bundeswehr regional territorial commands as points of contact for the governments of the Federal states has proven extremely effective in all territorial matters. The operational plan ensures a responsive and resilient defence readiness for Germany and details the protection of critical civilian infrastructure that is essential in terms of defence and vital. Host nation support should also be considered a whole-of-government task in this context. Military competence can support or complement civilian expertise where necessary and vice versa. During peacetime, the Bundeswehr supports civilian authorities within the framework of administrative assistance. Much in the same way, the Bundeswehr depends on the support of civilian authorities and the economy in states of tension and defence. In terms of measures regarding deterrence at NATO’s eastern flank, the latter is already the case during peacetime. In summary, the “OPLAN DEU” merges the central military elements of national and collective defence and the necessary civilian support services. The result must be feasible and provide the planning provisions to take purposeful action within the constitutional framework and following a political decision in the event of a crisis or conflict. To this end, the operational plan acts as a link between national and collective defence as well as between civil and military defence.

In addition to ensuring the initial deployment of German and allied armed forces out of and through Germany – which is what the term “hub” refers to – and covering the military element of overall defence, civil-military cooperation and coordination for mutual support is particularly important. This means nothing other than the coordination of military support for civil defence on the one hand and civilian support for military defence on the other. After many years of restraint with regard to planning, this constitutes an extremely demanding task considering the prospect of a potential war from without. In light of Russia’s ongoing military buildup, new doctrines and blatant threats against the West, we must immediately reestablish our own defence capability. A comparison with the civilian side at state government level – and, in the future, also at the Federal government and commercial civilian level – is absolutely essential to the operational implementation of a feasible Operational Plan for Germany.

On 23 May 2024, the Chief of Defence approved the “OPLAN DEU” in its first iteration and ordered its further development. As a result, we most recently developed our plans for the initial requirement in terms of military forces. A plan exercise is scheduled for the end of November 2024 – which will be past the editorial deadline for this article – and will serve as a stress test to train use of the interfaces between military and civilian activities and to define further fields of action for the revision. Building on this, it will be important to develop specific solutions within the framework of existing responsibilities, which will be established and binding in the shape of feasible plans. In this context and in accordance with the aspiration to replace as many assumptions as possible with facts and to render our mission statement more precise, we plan to submit the second iteration of the “OPLAN DEU” at the end of the first quarter of 2025. Previous planning with the Federal government and the Federal states facilitated the identification of initial corresponding challenges. A mutual understanding between the civilian and military sides is the key to meeting the challenges ahead. 

Our objective is to rely on civilian services to the greatest possible extent. Given the Bundeswehr's low personnel strength in relation to the overall population and especially considering the expectations NATO places on Germany in terms of serving as a hub and making a substantial contribution at the eastern flank, there really is no alternative. This applies both to the public civilian side (with higher and supreme federal authorities and authorities at the Federal state level) and to the commercial civilian side, which includes the procurement of services from the economy. This objective is no coincidence. It is a logical consequence of needing to fulfil our original mission: acting as the executive organ externally. All military personnel needed at home will not be available for deterrence at the eastern flank, regardless of whether this is an expected or existing requirement. Reliable planning of overall defence can only be achieved through secure access to national resources in times of peace, crises and war. In addition to public civilian services, we will have to rely on commercial civilian services to a considerable extent where the interministerial prioritisation and coordination of support services within Germany is concerned (for example communication, healthcare, energy). The resulting efforts and costs require whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. 

The Bundeswehr has already taken a considerable step by establishing the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operational Command to pool tasks for the military defence of our country. Given the security situation, this is not exceptional but only logical. The finite resources in terms of material and especially personnel must be utilised sustainably to serve the defence of our country and our Alliance. This requires not only the full commitment of servicemen and women, our civil servants and civilian personnel, but also the commitment of society as a whole. The mission stipulated in the “OPLAN DEU” is extremely ambitious. The most important insight must be that the task of protecting our country calls for a whole-of government and a whole-of-society approach. We must foster a more profound awareness that the effects of an existential threat always extend beyond the security forces of a state and also affect society as a whole and a broad awareness of the need for a whole-of-society approach to resilient defence readiness. This also applies to the necessary willingness to bear (financial) strains and certain restrictions in everyday life due to a considerable increase in military exercises in Germany. Peace, democracy and freedom do not come cheap and only credible deterrence is effective deterrence. Once this realisation has become commonplace, the effective protection of our country will be credible, sustainable and consistent.