The EU as a Security and Military Actor in Uncertain Times: Caught in the Expectations-Capabilities Gap?

It has become a truism that Europe must take responsibility for its own security. Caught between the enduring Russian threat and American MAGA nationalism, including the associated tendencies toward retrenchment, Europe appears to have little alternative. Yet there is still no convincing answer to the pressing question of how this can be achieved. Three models are currently under discussion: (a) A leap in integration toward a common European security and defense policy, including a European army. (b) A strengthening of institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation among large and willing states through either a core group or a European Security Council. (c) A Europeanization of NATO’s intergovernmental structures, with the European members shouldering the lion’s share of the burden while the United States contributes, at most, certain core capabilities such as nuclear deterrence. This article focuses on the first model and only briefly discusses the other two. To provide a clearer understanding of the challenges involved, it begins by briefly outlining the threat environment, the EU’s modest record as a security actor, and the contributions the United States has thus far made to European defense – contributions that Europe would ultimately have to replace.

The point of departure

No one knows what form the Russian threat will take after the end of the war in Ukraine. Yet because all trust has been destroyed, and because Russia is unlikely to accept its de facto exclusion from Europe,^[1] the threat scenarios developed by Western intelligence services and observers are, of necessity, based on worst-case assumptions. According to these scenarios, Russia could be capable of launching an attack within eight to ten years after the end of the war.^[2] The key variable in these scenarios is Russia’s projected military capabilities. The most straightforward indicator of these capabilities is defense spending. According to calculations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the increase in Russian defense spending has now leveled off, with Russia currently devoting 7.3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense. Measured in exchange-rate terms, this corresponds to expenditure of 186.2 billion U.S. dollars. The five European states with the largest defense budgets – Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Poland – together spend 344.9 billion U.S. dollars. All European NATO member states now spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense. Financial resources in Europe, then, are amply available. Nevertheless, for two reasons this comparison gives no grounds for reassurance. First, Russia can purchase more military capability for each dollar spent than European states can. Calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity, Russian expenditure amounts to 523.6 billion U.S. dollars.^[3] To be sure, comparisons based on purchasing power parity are unreliable, and European states’ defense spending will continue to rise in the coming years. Second, however, Russia has another strategic advantage: it is a state with a single political will and a single chain of command. The EU, by contrast, consists of 27 small and medium-sized states with 27 separate political wills; moreover, its military and defense-industrial structures remain fragmented along national lines.

The EU is virtually omnipresent as a global actor on the world stage. As a regulatory and normative power, it sets standards. As a diplomatic power, it coordinates closely with strategic partners and other regional organizations. As a development and trade-policy power that also converts its economic weight into political influence through sanctions, export controls and other trade-policy instruments, it significantly shapes the range of options available to other states. Nevertheless, the EU is different from, and behaves differently from, states of comparable size. It is a world power sui generis and is best understood as a bureaucratic actor. Its internal institutional structures translate into a distinctive pattern of external behavior. Because decision-making procedures in the Common Foreign and Security Policy are consensus-based, and because security-policy bureaucracies have developed since the European Council’s Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU acts in a distinctively rule-oriented and path-dependent manner. By contrast, it lacks an institution that Max Weber had already identified as the true bearer of politics, namely  a leader who is capable of making swift and decisive decisions, who can prioritize objectives and deploy the instruments of power rapidly and with focus.^[4] For this reason, the EU is also described in the literature as an astrategic power.^[5] Compared with states, it has both advantages and disadvantages. It acts more slowly, but is also more predictable. It only exercises coercive power to a very limited extent, but is less likely to become entangled in risky adventures. In normal times, its advantages carry greater weight. In stormy times, it has a problem.

The implicit comparison with states is reflected in a long-diagnosed gap between expectations placed on the EU and its actual capabilities. This applies in particular to the EU as a security and defense actor. At the very beginning of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, Jacques Poos, then Luxembourg’s foreign minister and president of the Council, proclaimed that this was the hour of the EU, not that of the Americans. Thirty years later, its representatives promise that the EU will learn the language of power and develop into a geopolitical actor.

This stands in contrast to a rather modest record. The Helsinki Headline Goal adopted at the 1999 European Council summit in Helsinki envisaged the capacity to deploy a 60,000-strong force, but this capability was never even remotely achieved. The far more modest EU Battlegroups – two units of roughly 1,000 troops each – were never deployed, despite numerous opportunities to do so. The numerous CSDP missions, for which member states provide personnel on an ad hoc basis, also became progressively less robust over time. Most operations were civilian in nature; in recent years, the few military missions have served almost exclusively to train the armed forces of third countries. Observers also note that efficiency leaves much to be desired. This even applies to defense-industrial cooperation. Despite the numerous initiatives launched by the European Commission over recent decades, the complaint remains much the same today: fragmented defense markets generate substantial additional costs, which, according to a recent estimate by the European Parliamentary Research Service, amount to between 24 billion and 75 billion euros annually.^[6] Responsibility for this lies with the member states themselves: they insist on their sovereignty and take a broad view of the exemptions for military goods from internal market rules laid down in Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There are also concerns that the Commission’s 2025 program, dubbed “ReArm Europe” and designed to mobilize up to 800 billion euros for defense, will do little to break this pattern.

In the field of collective defense and within NATO, the United States has so far provided strategic leadership, cohesion and military capabilities. The United States acted as the hegemonic power, taking the interests of smaller members into account while setting the course that others generally followed willingly. The United States dominates the institutional architecture of NATO’s military wing. The United States also contributes public goods in the form of five brigades stationed in Europe, substantial reinforcement forces, core military capabilities such as satellite-based reconnaissance and, above all, nuclear deterrence. Replacing the material contributions of the United States alone would require substantial additional expenditure.^[7] The institutional role of the United States is even harder to replace. Models of European defense should therefore be assessed by the extent to which, and how effectively, they can replace the strategic leadership and military capabilities that the United States has so far provided in the face of the continuing threat.

The first model: a truly Common European Security and Defense Policy

The basic idea behind this model is straightforward: within a group of many small and medium-sized states, hegemonic leadership by a large state can best be replaced through deeper integration of military and defense-industrial structures. Such integration would not only enhance military interoperability and combat effectiveness but, through the resulting economies of scale, also improve defense-industrial efficiency. The EU Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, illustrates this basic idea with a hypothetical question: Would the United States be militarily stronger if it had 50 armies, 50 separate procurement systems and 50 defense industries? If the answer is no, then the implications for Europe are obvious.^[8]

Unsurprisingly, this model enjoys support above all among economists.^[9] Representatives of other disciplines, however, also regard crises as drivers of integration and believe that immense external pressure makes a leap in integration both necessary and possible. According to opinion polls, such a leap in integration would be welcomed by publics in many EU countries, not least in Germany. In Germany, an absolute majority supports the idea that security should in future be guaranteed by a European army. Even in Poland, 37 percent of respondents favor European solutions, while only 29 percent prefer the North Atlantic option and 24 percent the national option.^[10] In the political sphere, the debate over a European army gained momentum during the first Trump administration. Among its most prominent proponents were German political leaders such as Angela Merkel and, the then defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen.^[11] Since the first Trump administration, the European Commission has also promoted deeper defense cooperation under slogans such as “European sovereignty,” without specifying in concrete terms what a leap in integration in this area would entail. The proposal put forward by Andrius Kubilius to establish a standing European force of around 100,000 troops likewise remains vague on key questions.^[12]

There is a reason for this vagueness. Integrated military structures presuppose centralized military and political decision-making processes. However, such centralized decision-making structures could only be achieved at the cost of a significant transfer of sovereignty. A thought experiment quickly makes this clear. If decisions were made by a collective body such as the European Council in its current form, each member state could preserve its sovereignty thanks to the principle of consensus. At the same time, however, the common instrument would risk being paralyzed. To prevent integrated structures such as a European army from becoming structurally incapable of deployment, at a minimum majority voting would be required. Beyond that, substantial powers would also have to be delegated to a European actor, such as the president of the European Council. In short, as Kubilius’ hypothetical question suggests, close integration of military structures would have to go hand in hand with transforming the EU into a state-like entity. Such a trajectory, however, has become increasingly remote with successive rounds of enlargement. It is also open to normative objections. Transferring defense-policy powers to the EU could not be expected simply to shift loyalties from the national to the European level and thereby create the political and social foundations for a leap in integration. At best, the democratic quality of such an institutional structure would leave much to be desired. At worst, it could trigger protest and fragmentation. Rather than awakening a European demos, this path could lead the robust national demoi to see their right to self-determination as severely curtailed.

As long as the political communities of the member states remain the building blocks of the European polity, any restriction of their capacity for self-determination in the field of security and defense policy would therefore entail substantial costs. It is therefore unsurprising that states remain reluctant to abandon the consensus principle in any far-reaching way or to vest authority in supranational institutions. One example illustrates this point.

With the Strategic Compass adopted in March 2022, the member states sought to give new impetus to Europe’s faltering defense policy.^[13] At the center of the initiative was the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EURDC). This deployment force, comprising approximately 5,000 troops, is intended to ensure the EU’s military capacity to act in the future. Under a rotational arrangement, individual member states commit troops to the force for one year at a time. This integrative form of cooperation, however, shares the same fundamental flaw that prevented the deployment of the Battlegroups. It is far from certain that, in a crisis, the states currently contributing troops would see their national interests as sufficiently at stake to deploy their soldiers under EU command. Because doubts about this central initiative of the Strategic Compass evidently exist even among the heads of state or government, the document also provides for coalitions of the willing as a second, less sovereignty-constraining form of cooperation. The Strategic Compass cites Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union as the legal basis: under this provision, the Council, acting by consensus, would exercise overall authority over operations conducted by coalitions of the willing. In referring to coalitions of the willing, the Strategic Compass does little more than acknowledge what has in any case long been established state practice. Whether such coalitions would in fact accept the precautions imposed by Article 44 is, however, highly questionable.

Even the Commission now accepts the reservations surrounding integrated forms of cooperation in security policy. In a document accompanying the 2025 White Paper, it stated:

“Nothing in the White Paper nor in the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 relates to the foundation of an EU army. This is not an objective of the European Commission or of the Union more generally. […] Furthermore, all initiatives reflected in the Defence Package aim at strengthening national Armed Forces, improving their interoperability in line with NATO standards.”^[14]  

The second model: promoting cooperation through core groups

The basic idea behind the second model is equally straightforward: if effective cooperation is difficult in a large group of states with veto powers and heterogeneous interests, a differentiated membership structure could facilitate cooperation. If a small group of states with similar interests or a similar willingness to integrate were to take the lead and form a core group or a more exclusive club, it could generate sufficient pull or leadership capacity. Proposals for such a defense-focused core Europe can be found, for example, in the work of Wolfgang Ischinger and Herfried Münkler.^[15] The idea of a European Security Council points in a similar direction. Angela Merkel and the German government floated this proposal during the first Trump administration, though without formulating it in any detail and without it gaining resonance in Europe.^[16]

Proposals for a core Europe, a Europe of multiple speeds, or a Europe of concentric circles have a long history. One of the earliest proposals along these lines was put forward by Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers as early as 1994.^[17] Their failure to materialize in the field of foreign and security policy reflects underlying structural constraints. One variant of this model assumes that close and institutionalized cooperation among the major states could simulate the hegemonic leadership previously provided by the United States. The obstacles to this variant are obvious. First, the European countries excluded from such an exclusive club would be unlikely to accept a subordinate position. Second, and more importantly, the club of major states – which would have to include at least Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom and Italy – would itself bring together countries with markedly different interests, perspectives and strategic cultures. Wolfgang Ischinger is aware of this problem. He therefore proposes combining this variant of core Europe with a second variant. The second variant would make greater willingness to integrate the criterion for admission to the exclusive club. Combining the two variants would therefore require the larger states to accept a substantial renunciation of sovereign rights and to support the move to majority voting. It is unclear, however, why major states should be willing to renounce sovereignty in a smaller circle when they refuse to do so in the larger one.

The third model: functional cooperation

The third model accepts that responsibility for security and defense rests with the states and can only be delegated to a limited extent. Rather than creating new superstructures from the top down, it seeks to organize cooperation on an intergovernmental basis, making use of existing institutions such as NATO. Through two mechanisms it seeks to compensate, at least in part, for the leadership provided by American hegemony: (a) through joint military planning, exercises and command structures for collective-defense contingencies, and (b) through closer minilateral cooperation guided by a functional logic.

Real-world developments are, in fact, moving in this direction. Observers have identified an accelerated growth of bilateral and minilateral cooperation in the fields of security policy and the defense-industrial sector since 2022.^[18] Here, states with similar interests, perspectives and strategic cultures cooperate more closely with one another. In the field of security policy, examples range from the interlinking of the German and Dutch armies and the Franco-German Air Transport Squadron to looser arrangements such as the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), to which Poland has also moved closer since the change of government in Warsaw.^[19] This form of functional cooperation is particularly evident in the defense-industrial sector. The supply side is characterized by a highly dynamic increase in mergers and acquisitions among defense firms, driven by market forces. On the demand side, states with similar interests join forces to close capability gaps. The ongoing consolidation is thus complemented by state-negotiated forms of cooperation, such as the development of long-range precision weapons under the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA).^[20] Under this model, NATO would serve as the umbrella for this minilateral and functional cooperation, with its command structure increasingly shaped by European states. However, this model also entails risks. First, bottom-up minilateral defense cooperation could produce a proliferation of unrelated projects, preventing the expected economies of scale from materializing. Second, functional cooperation could produce asymmetric patterns in which the large EU member states build networks of smaller states around themselves while doing little to cooperate with other large states. Despite the favorable conditions for cooperation created by shared democratic systems and the single market, divisions within Europe could therefore deepen. 

The future of European defense

After the period of the East-West conflict, the unipolar moment – the era of American global hegemony – is also drawing to a close. Europe is becoming a testing ground for whether security and stability can be sustained over the long term even without the indispensable superpower. Two concepts appear less viable: the idea that American hegemony could be replaced either through integrative forms of cooperation culminating in a European army or through a core group of states. More likely, a Europeanized NATO will remain the umbrella under which functional cooperation continues to develop. Yet even under this model, key questions remain unresolved, including nuclear deterrence, the role of SACEUR and safeguards against the risks of a renationalization of security policy.