“I believe the smarter approach is to respond with strategic patience”

According to estimates, the so-called Russian shadow fleet consists of several hundred or even over a thousand tankers – often older ones – which Russia uses to try to circumvent Western sanctions. Following several incidents of alleged sabotage and espionage in recent years, there has been increased discussion about the threat posed by this fleet. “Ethics and Armed Forces” spoke with a military analyst about this topic.

Commander Adrians, what exactly is meant by the Russian shadow fleet?

It is misleading to speak of a Russian “shadow fleet”. Even though the term has become established both here in Germany and internationally, one should not assume that it refers to an organized fleet of ships. Rather, the “shadow fleet” describes the phenomenon of maritime transport outside of established control mechanisms. In other words, it means the circumvention or disregard of certain insurance requirements or obligations to document cargo, for example. This kind of activity was already going on before Russia systematically began using tankers for oil exports that do not meet international safety and environmental standards, and whose ownership, registration and flag status are often – and likely deliberately – opaque.

This may all sound complicated, and it is! But it is not a new phenomenon. Until 2022, “shadow fleets” – also known as “gray fleets” or “dark fleets” – were mainly associated with countries in the Global South, such as Iran and Venezuela. In many European countries, however, the phenomenon received little attention.

But why is this fleet so important to Russia, politically and economically?

The reason that Russia is now relying heavily on alternative maritime transport is that this is the only way it can profitably export large quantities of oil. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western nations introduced a “Russian oil price cap” in December 2022.^[1] This means that if Russia wishes to sell and deliver oil at a price above this set threshold, Western companies are forbidden from offering or providing shipping, financing or insurance services.

The introduction of the price cap serves two purposes that may seem contradictory at first glance:

First, it is intended to weaken Russia so that it can no longer finance its war against Ukraine. Because the Russian economy lacks diversification, it is dependent on energy exports. Decades ago, Moscow made the strategic mistake of orienting its distribution infrastructure toward Europe. Since European countries have reduced their imports, Russia has increasingly had to redirect its exports to more distant markets. To do this, it needs tankers.

Second, we don’t want to destabilize the global oil market. This would happen if there were an embargo on Russian oil. With the price cap in place, Russia can continue to export it legally.

Because Western companies dominate the various maritime transport sectors, the assumption was that Russia depended on them and would therefore have to lower its prices in order to continue using their services. Moscow has since circumvented this measure by using technically substandard and often opaquely registered tankers – that is, vessels that operate outside of established control mechanisms. Calling them a “shadow fleet” is a nice metaphor, but it doesn’t capture the full picture. Instead, one should say that Russia has created an alternative maritime service network with which it circumvents the price cap.

Since when has the shadow fleet been perceived not only as a way of getting round sanctions but also as a security issue?

Since late 2024, there have been repeated incidents of damage to critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The vessels blamed for these incidents – or those actually responsible – are civilian and have ties to Russia. Consequently, the West has come to suspect that Russia is using them to carry out strategic sabotage. Not just random acts of vandalism, as it were, but actions designed to severely impair an adversary’s ability to act.

It is important to note, however, that not all civilian vessels with ties to Russia belong to the “shadow fleet” or should be counted as part of it. It is easy to use this term in debates because it has become familiar and immediately provides a context for understanding. But as I explained earlier, this is a complex phenomenon. That’s why I don’t like the term, and when I do use it – simply because it has become established – I always put it in quotation marks.

To what extent can the shadow fleet be understood as part of hybrid warfare?

I find such questions problematic because they suggest several assumptions that in my view are incorrect.

First, Russia’s “shadow fleet” should be understood as a phenomenon rather than a structured organization. Consequently, it cannot be viewed as a unified policy instrument; at most, individual vessels might serve that purpose. Even if a distinct pattern of activity emerges from these individual ships, it is more accurate to view it as a separate phenomenon. While this pattern may often intertwine with the “shadow fleet,” the two should not be equated.

Second, the term “hybrid warfare” is also problematic because it is inherently a Western concept. Applying it to Russian strategy constitutes a methodological error that can easily lead to flawed conclusions, as the term lacks the same meaning and significance in Russian military discourse as it does in the West. Today, virtually every Russian action – or even perceived action – directed at Western nations is reflexively labeled “hybrid”. But what does that actually mean?! Ultimately, relying on a foreign loanword that is uncommon in everyday German to explain such a multifaceted geopolitical phenomenon is a poor linguistic choice.

What can be said without bias is that Russian-linked civilian vessels have repeatedly served as platforms for activities designed to heighten Western security concerns. These incidents include signal jamming and drone deployments. Both the resulting psychological impact – specifically, Western unease – and the ambiguity surrounding Moscow’s operational attribution and strategic intent align with the goal of “information warfare”, as it is called in Russian military discourse. This has a technical and a psychological component. While – to the best of my knowledge – the maritime dimension of this strategy remains understudied, the term is far more precise than “hybrid warfare.” It better encapsulates the Russian doctrine, which is described as “controlled destabilization” or “organized chaos”.

What evidence exists of individual vessels engaging in espionage, sabotage, or reconnaissance – and where does speculation begin?

Often, the only thing that can be proven is that something unusual has taken place – that is, after damage has been discovered or after a drone’s overflight couldn’t be attributed to anyone. So we are frequently caught off guard. Taking action against this and identifying those responsible has always been difficult. As a result, the initiative and the advantage usually lie with those who successfully stage a surprise operation.

In many cases, therefore, it is impossible to state with certainty that Russia is behind a specific action. Plausibility and circumstantial evidence, however compelling, do not equal proof. Such concrete proof remains essential if an actor is to be held legally accountable, whether through diplomatic means or international law.

In cases of damage to critical underwater infrastructure, the vessels later implicated were identified due to anomalous navigational behavior – such as lingering at low speeds or maintaining specific courses – combined with clear links to Russia. Similarly, when drones are spotted over critical infrastructure such as airports, wind farms, or military bases, the focus of the question shifts to identifying which state or non-state actor possesses both the strategic interest and the capability to conduct such operations.

Why is the Baltic Sea in particular so sensitive for Russia and for NATO?

The Baltic Sea resembles a one-way street in a residential area: For most Baltic countries, the sea is their only connection to the oceans. Consequently, and because the vast majority of goods are transported by sea, maritime traffic is particularly heavy. Furthermore, the Baltic Sea separates the Scandinavian Peninsula from Central Europe and is relatively narrow compared to other marginal seas. Due to these geographical conditions, incidents such as disruptions to radio communications usually have an immediate impact on several Baltic countries.

Russia has always been at a disadvantage in the Baltic Sea region because it is located at the eastern end. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its coastline not only shrank but was also divided between the Kaliningrad exclave and the area around the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. This situation fuels the fear of encirclement and invasion that is deeply rooted in Russian security thinking.

Distrust of the West among Russian elites has grown since the turn of the millennium in the wake of so-called “color revolutions” in various countries as well as the Arab Spring. Within Russian political and military circles, these uprisings are rarely viewed as genuine expressions of popular sovereignty; instead, they are perceived as Western-orchestrated or at least Western-assisted operations. Consequently, a pervasive fear of losing domestic authority and geopolitical control has led Moscow to prioritize securing its immediate geographic periphery. In this context, experts often interpret the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the backing of separatists in the Donbas, and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine as manifestations of an escalatory security policy thinking which is rooted in a deep-seated mistrust of Western intentions. Within NATO, there was concern regarding potential Russian aggression against other neighboring nations like the Baltic States.

The Baltic Sea vividly illustrates the consequences of Russia’s changed security perception of itself and other countries. While the geographical realities of this enclosed sea inherently dictate regional cooperation, Moscow began modernizing its military capabilities in the Baltic Sea region as early as 2007 and has built defensive as well as offensive capabilities. Following the events of 2014 and 2022, Russia has no longer been viewed as a partner, forcing the other Baltic countries to prioritize deterrence and defense against Moscow. This dynamic has triggered a classic security dilemma. For the West, it has fostered greater unity, manifested in Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Conversely, Russia’s capacity to shape the Baltic maritime order has shrunk to mere provocations. The Kremlin knows that democratic societies shy away from escalation. The question is only how far Russia will go – after all, it remains dependent on free passage through the Baltic Sea. In my opinion, Russian provocations should always be interpreted in the context of information warfare which is aimed at creating societal unrest.

Since early 2025, NATO has responded with Operation Baltic Sentry. Is this operation primarily about surveillance, deterrence, protecting critical infrastructure or all of the above?

It is primarily about protecting critical underwater infrastructure.^[2] That is the main objective. To achieve it, surveillance is important – that is, establishing and maintaining situational awareness. This in turn creates a deterrent effect.

And has this already had an impact?

The frequency of serious incidents involving underwater infrastructure has decreased since the start of this “enhanced vigilance activity”, as it is called, but they have not completely stopped. Aside from that, I think it is still too early to draw any conclusions. We should just get used to the idea that surveillance and monitoring activities like “Baltic Sentry” will continue unless or until Russia changes its foreign policy.

Without going into the details of international law, what practical measures are available to European countries and NATO?

First and foremost, the goal is to achieve the most comprehensive situational awareness possible in order to detect anomalies quickly and respond in time. This is achieved through sensor fusion and information sharing. In international security discourse, this approach is referred to as “deterrence by attribution”. This means that adversarial forces who threaten our security can no longer assume they will remain one step ahead or that they have to fear immediate exposure.

Other options include stopping and inspecting suspicious tankers at sea. However, there are differing legal requirements and levels of political willingness among nations in this regard. In my view, this is not likely to change anytime soon. However, it may be an advantage when dealing with Russia. When countries act unilaterally, it becomes more difficult for Russian propaganda to condemn the entire West. Furthermore, unilateral actions do not preclude international cooperation.^[3] A recent example is the joint effort by France and the United Kingdom in intercepting and inspecting tankers. In such scenarios, one nation executes the physical operation while the other provides remote reconnaissance and surveillance support, remaining clear of direct involvement.

In your view, what are the biggest limitations: legal, political or military?

In my opinion, there is no political consensus, either in Germany or in the West, on what an acceptable and achievable end state in dealing with the Russian “shadow fleet” would actually look like. The question is, what exactly are we working toward? Earlier I mentioned the supposed dilemma regarding Russian oil. The price cap was a very good idea, but once again we underestimated Russia’s ingenuity. Whatever we do, the Kremlin will likely find a solution. In this back-and-forth, it all comes down to who is faster.

Are we seeing a shift in strategy among Western nations in how they deal with the “shadow fleet”? For example, toward more aggressive inspections or detentions of individual vessels, as recently observed?

In my view, the actions of countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium outside the Baltic Sea represent an expansion of their strategy. I do not yet see a complete strategic shift, that is, a significant change from their previous approach. Such things usually become clear only with the passage of time.

Concurrently, Russia is sending political and military signals of its intent to provide enhanced protection for its vessels. Recent indicators include stationing a destroyer off Fehmarn or deploying naval escorts. How do you interpret these maneuvers?

Russia is increasing its presence along the maritime route through the Baltic Sea in the form of warships, each of which has a specific area of responsibility within which it patrols. That is why you often see them off the coast of Fehmarn, for example. The underlying message is that Russia is prepared to assert its interests and, if necessary, defend them. On the face of it, that seems threatening. But it’s important to note that this places a particularly heavy strain on the Russian Navy and will wear it down over the long term. It means that warships have to go to the shipyard more often. But for a long time, the Russian shipbuilding industry has faced various difficulties, such as shortages of personnel and spare parts. This repeatedly results in warships remaining in dry dock or at the pier longer than originally planned, meaning they are not available for deployment. Russia already has to redeploy units from other fleets to the Baltic Sea to make up for the shortfalls. So it is only a matter of time before Russia will be unable to continue protecting tankers in this way. In addition, it is even less able to maintain such a presence outside the Baltic Sea because it lacks the necessary large warships and supply ships, not to mention overseas bases.

There have also been reports that Russia is placing private military contractors aboard its tankers. What do we know about this?

This issue has been discussed in expert circles for some time and, according to recent media reports,^[4] appears to have been on the rise since the beginning of this year. This is likely due to increased inspections both in the Baltic Sea and in other European maritime areas. These teams, which are typically small – consisting of fewer than ten people – would have two main tasks: on the one hand, to deter Western nations from conducting inspections through their presence and the fact that they carry arms; and on the other hand, to prevent the civilian crew from cooperating too readily and allowing themselves to be inspected. Whether this will impress Western nations remains to be seen in the coming months.

The Kremlin is likely to continue deploying security personnel aboard ships: First, this fuels the narrative spread by Russian politicians like Putin that Western inspections are illegal and constitute an act of piracy. Second, escorting by warships is no longer necessary for every tanker, since some can now, in theory, protect themselves. Third, equipping individual merchant ships with security personnel is sufficient to increase the West’s intelligence-gathering and decision-making burden. In this way, the Kremlin regains dominance over escalation for the time being. However, the question remains, as it often does, of how long Russia will continue to deploy security personnel on tankers and what countermeasures the West will take. In my view, successfully boarding one or two tankers with such personnel on board would be enough to embarrass Russia. This would also send a clear signal to buyers of Russian oil: namely, that they can no longer rely on deliveries via the “shadow fleet.”

Does this mark a shift away from plausible deniability toward a more overt state-backed protection strategy?

That is difficult to predict at the moment. Russia will probably seek further ways to protect the tankers, and test new methods, such as flying the Russian flag. But once again, it remains highly questionable whether such measures will effectively deter Western nations from conducting vessel inspections if there are legitimate doubts regarding the ships’ official flag status.

To what extent do these maritime and aerial encounters pose a risk of inadvertent escalation?

That is difficult to quantify. In my view, we must better distinguish between intent, miscalculations, and mistakes. However, even if not every incident is intentional, the impact can be exactly the same.

The response to such incidents depends on our political willingness to escalate. But we must be clear: If we do nothing, Russia will interpret this as weakness. And if we do too much, Russia will accuse us of aggression. Yet this dilemma should not make us lose our heads. Instead, we should exercise strategic patience. By this I mean long-term security planning that makes use of all instruments of state power – not just diplomatic or military ones, but both, plus others such as intelligence and financial means. It is important to strictly follow this path in order to grow stronger over time and not allow ourselves to be worn down by provocations or crises.

What constitutes prudent escalation management in difficult situations?

There is no one-size-fits-all answer. Decisions are highly contingent on the specific circumstances and are often made in a matter of minutes, if not seconds. It’s up to the military leaders to quickly evaluate their immediate situation and formulate a proportional response, making the standard of training and experience of personnel on the ground paramount.

In my view, there is a structural deficit in communication formats and channels capable of resolving any misunderstandings that could lead to a major escalation. During the Cold War, such mechanisms reportedly existed at the technical level, for instance through dedicated radio channels. While these channels remain in place, they have since become politicized – or more accurately, communication through them is often conducted in a highly political manner. This fundamentally undermines mutual trust, at least regarding maritime safety.

What does this mean for the crews of our own ships, who must observe, assess and endure such situations?

On the one hand, it means uncertainty. On the other, we should view every Russian provocation or mistake as a learning experience. Russia might step up its actions, but at the same time we are learning and improving. As long as we respond with strategic patience, it is difficult for Moscow to read our intentions. While this approach may seem overly passive to outsiders, I believe it is the smarter strategy. Otherwise, Russia controls our reflexes – a classic Soviet strategy.

In naval circles, it is sometimes said that national and Alliance defense in the Baltic Sea is not just an emergency scenario, but a daily reality. Is that an exaggeration, or does it accurately describe the situation today?

That depends on our definition of “defense”. Traditionally, we define it in terms of a state of war. From a Western perspective, however, there is no such state with Russia. While we are observing heightened tensions, we remain formally at peace. It’s important to protect our values and principles. We do this through the presence of warships, for example, and by conducting exercises that involve civilian actors and organizations.

We must realize that if we allow ourselves to become panicky, we are falling for Russia’s information warfare tricks. That is why, once again, strategic patience is crucial.

Commander Adrians, thank you very much for the interview.

Questions by Rüdiger Frank.