India and Europe: Partners for a Stable World Order?

When European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attended India's Republic Day parade on 26 January 2026 as chief guests – the first EU leaders to hold that honour – the symbolism was unmistakable. The following day, at the 16th India–EU Summit in New Delhi, the two sides concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) nearly two decades in the making; and a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP). While the FTA dominated the headlines as Von der Leyen called it the “mother of all deals”^[1], the SDP was a historic milestone too. Yet beneath the triumphant rhetoric, a sober truth surfaced: this landmark was born not from a resurgence of faith in globalisation, but from its unravelling. Three converging pressures – US President Trump's tariff offensive, China's growing assertiveness, and Russia's war in Ukraine – had finally forced Brussels and New Delhi to treat each other as meaningful partners beyond platitudes. As the international system enters an era of fragmentation, technological disruption, and institutional dysfunction, Brussels and New Delhi are discovering their convergences in world politics. In less than six months, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 5-day visit to Europe (May 15–20) covering four countries (Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Italy), followed by another tour to France and Slovakia less than a month later (June 14–20) on the side-lines of the G7 Summit, underscored this growing partnership. These reflect the trend of expanding engagement^[2] beyond trade and immigration as defence and strategic issues are emerging as regular themes of cooperation; a veteran observer identified key gains beyond trade in the three sectors namely, “technology, green growth, defence”^[3]. While economic ties had been an enduring driver of the India–EU relation, these novel developments in security deserve closer attention.

Europe and India: History, Policy and Prospect

Europe (represented by EU for reasons of scope in this article) and India have a shared background as great powers with substantial economic, diplomatic, and normative influence, yet neither possesses the comprehensive capabilities associated with superpowers like USA and China; this drives the rationale and the limitations of this emerging EU–India partnership. The growing frictions in relations with USA and declining American interest to act as the ultimate guarantor of the international rules-based order (IRBO), has generated uncertainty for Europe and India. Increasingly difficult relations with Washington over a range of issues – trade, technology governance, industrial policy – combined with differing approaches to China and Russia have induced both actors to diversify their external partnerships. At its core, the contemporary evolution of EU–India relations reflects a broader transformation in the global order, which can be interpreted as the latest manifestation of “middle power convergence”^[4] as middle powers aim for cooperation with like-minded peers in face of instability posed by great power behaviour. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 Davos speech^[5] framed Europe as a strategic “middle power” partner for navigating global instability and popularized this concept: this bears relevance for EU–India relations too, although India and EU are default great powers actors by virtue of their scale, economic weight, and political influence despite limitations of military or geopolitical power projection capabilities of a superpower.

EU and India seek multipolarity rather than bipolar confrontation, acknowledge that the erosion of US power could destabilize the international system and yet are wary of excessive dependence on the latter. Both support the IRBO in principle – differing interpretations of sovereignty and strategic autonomy notwithstanding – and seek reliable partners capable of balancing superpower competition without compelling binary alignments. This convergence is prominent in domains of emerging technology (ET), strategic innovation and climate change. Initiatives like Global AI summits and digital governance forums reveal a growing awareness about ETs, shared standards, and data ecosystems. Here, Europe’s regulatory expertise and India’s digital scale create potential complementarities, while EU seeks trusted technology partners beyond USA and China and India aims to avoid technological dependency. Historically, EU–India cooperation struggled to move beyond declaratory rhetoric and lacked urgency on both sides. For Europe, India was viewed primarily through economic or developmental lenses rather than as a key geopolitical partner. For India, the EU appeared fragmented, overly normative, and secondary compared to ties with major states such as the US and Russia, despite certain bilateral synergies with major European states (e.g. France and Germany). The challenge hitherto had been in translating shared interests, into coordinated action points and policies. EU’s consensus-driven multilevel governance and emphasis on human rights, sustainability, and regulatory standards clashed with India’s centralized foreign policymaking and priorities of development and sovereignty. The reversal of globalization, weaponization of economic interdependence, and intensifying US–China competition are collectively restricting the geopolitical space for middle and great powers alike; leading to the logic for deeper EU–India cooperation despite obstacles and institutional asymmetries.

The security and defence partnership: light at the end of the tunnel?

While neither Europe nor India can shape the transforming international order individually, harnessing their complementarities facilitates this emerging synergy. If Europe contributes capital, technological capability, institutional governance, and market access then India offers demographic scale, geopolitical reach, military capacity, and political legitimacy across the Global South. Accordingly, New Delhi and Brussels need to uphold the principle of issue-based diversification of partnerships as a strategic necessity and patiently preserve certain aspects of the existing IRBO while adapting it to reflect new realities; and recognize that the partnership can go beyond trade agreements and diplomatic symbolism to successfully navigate a new pathway beyond the binaries imposed by a truculent US or a recalcitrant China. Considering this, the SDP, signed by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar acquires significance. The first overarching EU–India security framework, this encompasses cooperation across maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, counterterrorism, space security, defence industry and technology, and artificial intelligence. It also institutionalizes an annual ministerial-level EU–India Security and Defence Dialogue and creates thematic working streams to give the relationship operational continuity beyond summit rhetoric. The SDP therefore marks a significant expansion of cooperation beyond traditional vertices. While the exact implementation mechanisms remain under negotiation and many aspects will evolve gradually, the agreement contains several strategically important dimensions that cannot be underestimated. It is pivotal on three core frameworks facilitating intelligence sharing, defence industrial alignment and maritime security respectively. These assume significance, since barely a decade back, convergences^[6] in the security domain were unthinkable despite limited cooperation in some strategic sectors.

The Security of Information Agreement (SoIA) establishes a legally binding classified intelligence-sharing framework, effectively a formal trust certification unlocking threat assessments, tech transfer, and intelligence cooperation. This provides the legal framework for official exchanges and signals an embryonic but meaningful institutionalization of strategic trust covering cyber threats, counterterrorism, hybrid warfare, and critical infrastructure. Likewise, maritime security forms a distinctive feature of the partnership, driven by converging interests in the crucial geopolitical theatre of the Indo-Pacific. The EU seeks to safeguard the Indo-Pacific sea lanes underpinning its prosperity and to institutionalize a regional security presence through a credible regional partner: like India. Meanwhile India leverages European naval engagement as a supplementary counterweight to China’s expanding maritime ambitions. The practical architecture – joint exercises, port visits, intelligence sharing, and anti-piracy coordination – deepens cooperation by building on established frameworks and existing practices in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Critically, India’s Indian Ocean geography makes it an indispensable fulcrum in any credible European Indo-Pacific strategy, rendering this not merely a bilateral naval arrangement but a structural anchor for Europe's broader global role. Additionally, the defence industrial dimension of the partnership reflects a calculated convergence of complementary imperatives; Europe's drive to reduce supply chain dependencies dovetails with India's Make in India agenda for augmenting its techno-industrial base. The India–EU Defence Industry Forum shifts India toward genuine co-development, aligns with India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (“Self-reliant India”), and facilitates Indian eligibility for the EU’s €150bn SAFE defence financing instrument. By combining European technological prowess with India’s scale, the partnership creates conditions for crucial joint ventures and technology transfer that could potentially restructure supplier relationships. The significance extends beyond bilateral gains as expanding cooperation can reduce dependence on external suppliers – US and Russia respectively – and reorient the geometry of global arms trade in the long term.

Equally significant is the explicit incorporation of AI governance and technological security, reflecting a shared recognition that geopolitical competition has fundamentally expanded beyond conventional military domains into digital infrastructure, semiconductor supply chains, data governance, and the standard-setting contests surrounding emerging technologies. Both parties understand that normative influence over AI and critical technology frameworks will be a defining axis of future power, making this dimension not merely a technical addendum but a forward-looking strategic bet – positioning the partnership at the intersection of hard security and the emerging contest for technological sovereignty. Additionally, the partnership also has a broader political objective: institutionalizing strategic dialogue between Brussels and New Delhi. This entails regular consultations on regional crises, Indo-Pacific security, global governance reform, and resilience against economic coercion. These underline the growing synergy and mutual understanding among both the parties and their interest in elevating and sustaining this relation; despite crucial differences and diverging priorities pertaining to terms of trade and the role of Russia and China. This transformed strategic landscape has not emerged overnight in a vacuum. Driven by external shocks – Covid-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions, weaponized energy and trade, and rising tensions with China – alongside fears of a volatile US alliance, the European Union is pursuing strategic autonomy and diversifying its global partnerships to enhance its resilience, despite the centrality of the transatlantic relationship to European security^[7].

Accordingly, India’s appeal to Europe rests on a rare combination – a fast-growing democratic economy with considerable military power backed by nuclear weapons, robust influence in the Global South – and crucially, an absence of the systemic rivalry that defines Europe’s posture toward China and Russia. This makes India a credible partner in the drive towards a multipolar order. For India, the partnership serves its enduring formulation of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Europe serves as an additional but crucial pillar alongside cooperation with the US in the Indo-Pacific, residual defence ties with Russia, and Global South leadership. Europe delivers tangible strategic value through access to advanced technology, investment, market, and regulatory partnership essential to India’s ambition of becoming a leading global actor. A less quantifiable but equally significant dividend is legitimacy; closer institutional ties with major European partners reinforces New Delhi’s drive for recognition not merely as a regional heavyweight in Asia, but as global power shaping norms and practices beyond its immediate neighbourhood. This directly contributes to the Indian position that “a multipolar world, which the EU prefers, is feasible only by a multipolar Asia”^[8], in contrast to the Chinese aim of a unipolar Asia and a bipolar world. The SDP endorses this status, generates “a logic of co-strategic autonomy”^[9] and represents a meaningful insurance against dependence on any single superpower. Accordingly, beyond questions of economics and immigration, the relation is transcending to sensitive domains of defence cooperation, intelligence exchanges, dual-use strategic technologies amongst multiple European countries and India. This represents a qualitative shift in EU–India relations and marks a new watershed, the impact of which is still unfolding and cannot be preordained.

Diverging strategic cultures, implementation risks and mutual (mis)perceptions

The EU–India partnership increasingly rests on a foundation of shared interests despite starkly divergent worldviews, strategic cultures and historical contexts. For Brussels, India addresses a structural vulnerability that can no longer be deferred; excessive dependence on China across critical supply chains (rare earths, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors) at a moment of weaponized interdependence and geopolitical risks. India’s scale, democracy, and manufacturing ambitions make it uniquely positioned as a partner. Economically, the FTA delivers preferential access across nearly the entirety of bilateral trade value and targets a doubling of goods trade by 2032; strategically, it gives Europe a credible Indo-Pacific anchor that is neither a client nor rival but provides “the middle ground”^[10] between U.S. unpredictability and Chinese assertiveness. For New Delhi, punitive tariffs and American willingness to instrumentalize trade as geopolitical leverage have exposed the costs of insufficient diversification, making preferential EU market access economically and strategically imperative. The security partnership adds a further layer through accelerated access to European defence technology and co-production arrangements; and dovetails with Indian efforts to reduce its historical dependence on Russian military hardware while bolstering its existing relationships (for e.g. with France on Rafale jets, Scorpène submarine). Yet as the European Policy Centre^[11] has noted, “one of the partnership’s key challenges will be the EU’s expectation that India distance itself from Moscow.” Russia’s consistent backing of India on Kashmir at the UN Security Council over five decades remains a strategic asset New Delhi is unwilling to surrender for European approbation. Both sides managed to navigate these differences through careful language in a joint statement that emphasized “rules-based international order with the UN at its core,” and launch “Towards 2030: India–EU Joint Comprehensive Strategic Agenda” for further deepening of ties^[12].

Europe approaches geopolitics through a distinct historical and institutional lens shaped by the European integration, multilateralism, and the preservation of a rules-based order. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered these assumptions, transforming hard security calculations from a peripheral activity into a central priority. The war is not a regional conflict but a direct challenge to the principles of territorial sovereignty, political independence, and the post-1945 European security architecture; these have forced Europe to acknowledge its status as an economic superpower with persistent limitations as a security actor. Consequently, the EU has placed increasing emphasis on deterrence, resilience, defence industrial capacity, and security cooperation among member states: with mixed results. The conflict has exposed a fundamental contradiction; although the EU possesses considerable economic weight, regulatory influence, and diplomatic reach, its response to the war has highlighted its deep reliance on USA for credible hard-security guarantees. This has generated an uncomfortable realization that despite ambitions of being a key global actor, Europe lacks the military capabilities and decision-making structures necessary to operate autonomously. Concurrently, India's multi-alignment posture is effectively the 21^st-century successor to non-alignment; it isn’t rhetorical posturing but a deeply held conviction, hardened by the post-war exclusion of the Global South and repeatedly reaffirmed when “rules-based” frameworks are selectively enforced by great powers. Significantly, issue-based mini-lateral frameworks and summit diplomacy may initiate pathways for tangible partnerships, as demonstrated by the 3^rd India-Nordic Summit (May 19, 2026) which generated agreements on maritime security, defence cooperation, AI and outer space, despite diametrically differing perceptions of Russia between Nordic states and India^[13].

Beneath these obvious tactical convergences, lies a deeper structural symmetry: both EU and India occupy analogous positions in the emerging global hierarchy – major powers of enormous weight and potential, yet short of superpower dominance, and facing structurally similar (but not identical) challenges. EU and India’s shared predicament is the foundation of a natural strategic affinity, reinforced by genuine complementarity of interests and assets; uncomfortable with Sino-US bipolarity, they advocate multipolarity, while carefully preserving their relationship with Washington and aiming to salvage the IRBO. Europe brings technology, capital, institutional depth, and regulatory capacity while India contributes demographic scale, hard power, Indo-Pacific reach, and unmatched influence across the Global South. Layered over this is a shared, if imperfect, democratic identity – two pluralist systems attempting to reconcile sovereignty and external engagement in a fragmenting global order with great power competition, technological disruption, and economic coercion. The future of EU–India relations then depend on transcending from transactional engagements towards genuine strategic collaborations; and the more instructive question is whether depth requires alignment. The institutional architecture under construction – the Defence Industry Forum, the SoIA framework, annual dialogue mechanisms – generates self-sustaining institutional and political momentum. This novel form of “modular partnership” concentrates cooperation on domains of genuine convergence (maritime security, critical minerals, cyber, defence industry) while managing divergences (Russia and China) and works “not from denying misalignment, but from engineering the partnership to function where interests overlap and to remain viable where they do not.”^[14] Arguably, this can be a viable template for tangible partnerships, beyond conventional alliance politics, among great powers exercising strategic autonomy.

Concluding remarks: enacting stability through managed friction

Within a month of the EU-India FTA and SDP, New Delhi hosted successive visits by German Chancellor Merz (January 12–13), French President Macron (February 17–19), and Slovak President Pellegrini (February 17–20), that resulted in a slew of notable bilateral advances in economy, technology and strategic issues. It’s evident that these are not isolated trends, as the engagement continues to expand with the latest development being a “Comprehensive Partnership” (June 15) between Slovakia and India that covers cooperation in defence, ETs and the civilian nuclear sector^[15]. An artefact of the unfolding global (dis)order, the growing EU-India partnership represents an evolving experiment in pragmatic multipolar cooperation. This is a flexible partnership between two radically dissimilar actors endorsing their mutual aspirations and capabilities in an era of power transition and great power competition. Hence, the significance of this moment lies more in the agreement itself than traditional international relations postulates might suggest. Neither the dawn of an unwavering alliance, nor mundane diplomatic symbolism, this is more interesting historically. Two large, complex, multi-cultural, democratic polities, shaped by very different histories and threat environments, are choosing structured engagement over comfortable distance precisely because the world has become too unpredictable for either to manage alone. The evolution of this partnership despite contrasting institutional and historical legacies (transatlantic cooperation and the genesis of the EU versus the Non-Aligned Movement), and absence of shared threat perceptions (European anxiety over Russian subversion in Europe and Indian concern over Chinese transgressions in Himalayas and Indian Ocean) warrants attention. This is perhaps a harder, slower, and more demanding form of convergence than a conventional alliance. Yet in this unfolding multipolar world, characterized by more of disruption and less of conviction, New Delhi and Brussels may also be embarking on a path which is refreshingly honest and potentially, more resilient.