How Russia Could Escalate Its War on Europe

This article examines the conditions and operational logic under which Russia could escalate military aggression against European NATO member states. Drawing on the SahaidachnyiSecurity Center’s Denied War research and the Everywhere War Tracker, the authors argue that prevailing Western threat assessments, based on quantitative force-generation methodologies and timelines, systematically underestimate the qualitative and strategic dimensions of Russian capabilities and intent, respectively. The analysis demonstrates that Europe is already not in a state of peace: ongoing sub-threshold activities including cyber operations, infrastructure sabotage, airspace violations, and cognitive warfare constitutesequential phases of operational environment preparation consistent with Russian military doctrine. The article further identifies critical asymmetries in new-generation warfare capabilities, particularly in air offense capabilities, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and attrition-based tactics, that render European militaries structurally underprepared relative to the threat. Five geostrategic scenarios are assessed, with the Suwałki Gap seizure identified as the operationally most plausible. The authors conclude that deterrence depends less on aggregate military potential than on perceived Western unity, and that Europe should reorient its preparedness logic toward a strategic environment in which the peace/war boundary is already indistinct.