European Army – Realities and Chimeras

Hans-Georg Ehrhart begins his essay by highlighting a “crisis of trust and purpose” in transatlantic relations since U.S. President Trump came to office. This has amplified calls within the EU for strategic autonomy. Supporters of development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toward the formation of a European Army promise defense budget savings as well as integration and security advantages.

Next, Ehrhart offers a brief historical overview. The failure of the European DefenceCommunity project between 1950 and 1954 was followed in the 1980s by an attempt to revitalize the Western European Union (WEU). In 1999, feeling the ramifications of the Balkan conflicts, the EU decided to develop the CSDP. The author divides this process into three phases. First, the creation of the legal bases and institutions for the implementation of crisis management operations. Second, the operational phase with civilian and military missions, based on the first European Security Strategy (ESS) that was adopted in 2003. And finally the EU Global Strategy of 2016, which led to the initiation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

In light of individual EU Member States’ deficiencies in particular military capabilities, for example, Ehrhart believes there is no reason to oppose greater European security and defense policy cooperation. But in his view there is no reason either for this slow but steadily advancing process to necessarily lead to a European Army. Nor does this follow from the Lisbon Treaty. What’s more, there is no way that it can be realized, he argues. Creating a European Army would first of all require the EU to be federal in nature. Yet the political will for this is lacking (not only in Germany). Different security cultures and anticipated national opposition to the loss of competences – e.g. from the military or national defense industries – also stand in the way of this happening. Finally, according to Ehrhart, the existence of joint armed forces might sooner or later encourage conventional great power politics, particularly since it is still completely unclear how the necessary parliamentary control over such a European Army would be implemented. Thus a European Army is definitely not the right way to achieve the desired strengthening of Europe as a power for peace.