Controversies in Military Ethics & Security Policy
Reconciliation ‒ a rational act of prudence on the path to justice
There are conflicts between individuals, groups, peoples and nations that are emerging, already exist or have allegedly been resolved, which have become so complex that they can no longer be untangled by applying strict considerations of justice in order to be fully resolved “fairly”. This is because a solution to the conflict could only be called just if it was assessed and accepted by all parties involved as fair, balanced, transparent, respectful, sustainable and appropriate, without one side feeling unduly advantaged or disadvantaged. However, due to both the complexity of the incident and the obviously culpable actions of all parties involved, a rational offsetting of mutual claims is often no longer possible. If the parties to the conflict in this situation were nevertheless to continue to insist on strict compliance with the fulfillment of justice claims, then the battle waged with reference to justice would have to continue for the sake of justice. For the sake of justice, one could say, the parties to the conflict deliberately accept an escalation of the conflict with further injustices, because the end of the conflict is not foreseeable and the damage cannot be contained. The price of insisting on conflict resolution solely from the perspective of justice is therefore high. For the sake of justice that has not been done in the past, justice is also foregone in the future.
1. Reconciliation as a wise path to justice
If one does not simply want to surrender to the perpetuation of the conflict situation and accept the state of unjust conditions in the long term, then a different strategy for conflict resolution is required. This strategy must prove its reasonableness insofar as it is comprehensible, based on sensible criteria, goal-oriented and with a realistic prospect of implementation, sustainable, and ethically fair. Furthermore, such a strategy must follow a different logic than that of a strictly fair offsetting of mutual claims, which has proven to be unhelpful and ultimately counterproductive in the given situation by intensifying the conflict. Therefore, it cannot aim at the dissolution of inextricable claims to justice, but it derives its moral justification from the fact that in this situation it offers the only, i.e. morally necessary, way to enable a new beginning of just coexistence directed towards the future.
One such strategy is that of reconciliation between the conflict parties. It is always indispensable where conflicts can no longer be resolved solely with reference to considerations of justice due to a very complicated conflict history, but where it is in the interests of all parties involved to strive for a common future in just conditions despite an inextricable conflict. For there can only be a just future if it is preceded by an act of reconciliation. In such cases, reconciliation is a prerequisite for restoring a just coexistence; as such, they differ from the usual ones where justice is the basis for reconciliation.[1]
In such a situation, reconciliation must be interpreted as a rational act of prudence, insofar as a willingness to reconcile is not based on unilateral renunciation or giving in, for example in the sense of the proverb “The wiser party gives in!“[2] , or on one-sided forgiveness, pardon, forbearance, leniency and mercy, but is based on the joint reasonable assessment and consideration of all parties to the conflict that further damage can only be averted and a state of justice restored if a new beginning to the relationship is desired in the interests of both parties. Such a new beginning is therefore not unconditional, but the reconciliation process on which it is based must be guided by reason, i.e. its implementation must be orderly and rule-based.
In order to clarify these considerations, it is important to focus on the specific type of reconciliation that underlies a mutual reconciliation process that is not based on offsetting (2.) and to clarify under which conditions reconciliation can unfold (3.). Such conditions apply in particular to the reconciliation process in the context of those conflicts that have been perpetuated by long-lasting, mutually culpable behavior on the part of the conflict parties and can only be ended by an act of reconciliation. The Israel-Palestine conflict, which can no longer be rationally disentangled according to considerations of justice in its mutual apportionment of blame, is a paradigmatic example. The situation is different with conflicts that have a one-sided beginning, for example through a war of aggression in violation of international law, as is the case with Russia′s unjustifiable military invasion of Ukraine. In this case, the conflict cannot be settled by reconciliation; instead, once it has been settled, the aggressor must ask for forgiveness, which must be accompanied by appropriate reparations. This is because the aggressor no longer has a moral claim to reconciliation. Rather, forgiveness must be granted generously and undeservedly by the victims of the aggression for the sake of a possible common future in the sense of reconciliation out of mercy. For this is an undeserved act of mercy, which the former aggressor must prove worthy of, so that a late reconciliation can take place in the course of the following years, as was the case with the reconciliation between the Germans and the French or the Poles after the Second World War. Nevertheless, reconciliation is not a strictly downstream act that can only begin after the formal end of hostilities. Rather, in peace and conflict research, it is understood as a processual event that can run through the entire conflict cycle ‒ from prevention through the active phase of violence to the post-war period and the establishment of sustainable peace. However, the actual “conclusion” of reconciliation ‒ understood as a lasting, positive reshaping of relationships and healing of wounds ‒ is usually a lengthy process that can often only be fully effectful after the end of open violence.
2. Distinctions: objective and subjective reconciliation - nomos and agape reconciliation
In order for the idea of reconciliation to take shape, a few conceptual distinctions need to be made. In the history of ideas[3], reconciliation is understood in both an objective and a subjective sense. The idea of objective reconciliation is present in the cultures and religions of all times. It deals with the reconciliation of opposites, of metaphysical dualisms and antagonisms, opposites that cannot be brought to unity by human beings, but require an agent that is itself beyond the opposites, such as God or history (as in Hegel[4] and Marx). Opposites to be reconciled in this way can be identified as those between freedom and necessity, finitude and infinity, spirit and matter, man and nature, God and man, life and death, good and evil, and so on. It is easy to see that the successful reconciliation of metaphysical opposites always requires a metaphysical absolute that brings about the reconciliation of opposites in an objective, no longer fragile way.
In contrast, we must speak of subjective reconciliation when the will to reconcile comes from the people in conflict with each other themselves. The idea first emerged ‒ at least in the thinking of the Christian world ‒ in Protestantism. In the 16th century, Martin Luther (1483-1546) transferred the idea of reconciliation, which is worked between God and man by God himself in the person of Christ, to the relationships between people and to social differences. The process of reconciliation is therefore solely due to the will of human beings and lies entirely in their hands. Those subjects who participate in the conflict are also the agents of reconciliation. They do not need any higher authority for mediation. Consequently, the object of reconciliation can only be that which has been de facto separated by human subjects, even though at its core it belongs together and is the same. In this sense, one can speak of the reconciliation of the sexes, peoples, nations, friends, enemies, cultures, religions, etc. The original is the unity, the humanly caused problem is the separation of what originally belonged together. However, while the objective reconciliation effected by an absolute comes to an actual conclusion, this subjective reconciliation in the areas mentioned remains a permanent task for the subjects involved. Subjective reconciliation is therefore not a metaphysical state, but a permanent task that is fundamentally unfinishable and does not come to any final stability.
The idea of subjective reconciliation is not first discussed by Luther, but already appears in the writings of the church fathers of the fourth century with important distinctions. Augustine (354-430) distinguishes between two types of reconciliation in the context of God′s reconciliation with mankind[5]: nomos reconciliation and agape reconciliation. The Greek term nomos means a lawful reconciliation. A nomos reconciliation is therefore a reconciliation that focuses on the idea of compensation and reciprocity of claims. It aims to achieve just reparation and the reconciliation of claims. Augustine, however, recognizes that there may be situations which, as a result of complicated conflicts, can no longer be resolved in these terms. Justice can no longer be achieved. If reconciliation between the conflicting parties is still to be possible, then a different type of reconciliation is necessary. He calls this agape reconciliation. The Greek term agape can literally be translated as “love”, but in our (primarily non-theological) context it is best translated as (unblamed) goodwill. Agape reconciliation is therefore to be understood as a reconciliation that does not have mutual compensation as its primary goal and which comes about because justice has already been achieved, but which draws a line under the existing conflict, which establishes an act of forgiveness with the aim of allowing justice to prevail again in the future despite all past condemnations. Agape reconciliation therefore presupposes an act of indulgent and benevolent recognition as a means to settle the conflict, which can no longer be resolved from the point of view of justice and can be called tragic, and envisage a common future in which justice will once again prevail.
3. Seven conditions for a successful reconciliation process
Horizontal[6]-subjective agape reconciliation is not a static, but a processual event. This process is permanently fragile. It has no state of completion. The idea of completed reconciliation is therefore a regulative idea, i.e. an idea that we know we cannot fully make a reality, but of which we know just as surely that we cannot do without it if the damage is not to be enormous. Under the conditions of spatio-temporal finiteness, attempts to enforce subjective reconciliation according to the pattern of objective reconciliation in order to bring history to an end always lead to dictatorship and ideologies . They also fail because they cannot live up to this claim. In short, we must come to terms with the fact that although a reconciliation process can bring about peace and freedom from conflict, they are permanently at risk and therefore require constant maintenance. This applies equally to reconciliation processes at both personal and intergovernmental level.
For subjective reconciliation in the sense of agape reconciliation to succeed at all, it must fulfill seven conditions, which can also be represented as successive steps of reconciliation. [7]
3.1 First condition: Existence of an original unit
A first condition is the existence of an original unity or identifiable common ground before the conflict, which was broken in the conflict. This is reflected in the term “re-conciliatio”, reconciliation/reunification. The process of reconciliation aims to return to this formerly common starting point, albeit now under different conditions. This common starting point can be a historical, cultural, religious or even merely spatial commonality, a common history, a unity of essence, a natural unity, or everything that once united the broken opposites. The mere memory of a once common peaceful coexistence is sufficient reason to refer to such a commonality to be restored.
3.2 Second condition: Culpable destruction of the original unity through a continuing conflict that can no longer be resolved from the point of view of strict justice
A second condition for being able to speak of reconciliation at all is that the original unity has been destroyed by a conflict whose cause persists. The causes of the conflict can be arbitrary: it can be a unilateral or bilateral cause. The conflict can be self-induced or externally induced. What is important is the fact that an original unity has been dissolved and the resulting destruction of a previously existing relationship, which has led to an existential state of alienation.
The destruction of the original unity must also have been caused by culpable behavior or an offense that triggered the conflict. This guilt or transgression remains permanently present during the conflict and is not resolved. This is because the essence of guilt is that the original unity has been dissolved, that what actually belongs together has been separated or remains separated.
If we speak of guilt, which is the starting point of the conflict, then it becomes clear that it cannot be a fateful, unavoidable conflict. For only moral subjects, who could also act differently, can incur guilt. Only moral subjects can take responsibility and be held accountable. The conflict is therefore fundamentally resolvable. There is a way out, admittedly not as a fateful event, but through the active efforts of the conflicting parties.
The difficulty in resolving the original conflict lies in the fact that the conflict itself has had multiple consequences: it has generated new injustices and further conflicts, leading to further questions of justice and increasing, but no longer clearly attributable guilt on both sides. In retrospect, it is no longer possible to determine which of the parties to the conflict accumulated more guilt during the course of the conflict. In the long history of escalation, the original conflict increasingly becomes a metaphor. Even if it could be resolved, the warring parties would not be satisfied due to the multitude of problems and the amount of guilt. We can speak of a conflict spiral that no longer allows for a fair solution. The pre-conflict status cannot be restored or re-established in any way, ever. Therefore, whoever wants to resolve the conflict in the spirit of justice and fairness will fail dramatically.
3.3 Third condition: the necessary failure of traditional methods of conflict management and conflict resolution
In view of the escalating conflict, the confusion of blame and the increasingly irrational behavior of the conflict parties, a third constitutive condition of reconciliation is that the conventional means of conflict resolution aimed at just compensation fail. The existing conflict situation can no longer be resolved in terms of justice. The old situation before the conflict cannot simply be restored, except by one of the conflicting parties incurring further guilt. In the course of the conflict, guilt has multiplied. It is no longer clear who is the perpetrator and who is the victim. The conflict situations become increasingly complex, even hyper-complex, as has the attribution of guilt. It is no longer clear which of the parties to the conflict is more to blame. The conflict spiral continues to turn. All means of traditional conflict resolution therefore fail: the conflict cannot be resolved in terms of justice. Reconciliation in the sense of a nomos reconciliation, which includes just compensation for the injustice suffered, is no longer possible. Guilt can no longer be atoned for solely through punishment or retribution. None of the parties to the conflict will emerge as the winner or loser. If the conflict is not ended, there will only be losers. Any compromise that brings peace for a short time is doomed to fail.
The path of rational conflict resolution through justice also remains blocked because the actions of the conflict parties are increasingly determined by irrationality and dominated by morally relevant feelings such as hatred, envy, anger and rage, which lead to calls for revenge and retribution. The irrationality of the conflict leads to the irrationality of conflict management strategies and to further culpable behavior.
3.4 Fourth condition: Insight into the insolubility of the conflict and the will to intelligently shape a future in justice
To end the conflict, a fourth condition must be met, which comprises two aspects: Firstly, the realization that the conflict cannot be resolved, and secondly, the will to live together under conditions of justice, at least for the future, by reflecting on the original unity.
The parties involved must become aware of the tragedy of the conflict spiral combined with the insight that the continuation of the conflict aggravates the problem of justice. This insight presupposes the predominance of prudence and rationality, which implies that all parties abandon a purely emotional perspective. The insight that justice cannot be restored by means of conflict can be called prudent. This is because the intellectual virtue of prudence (phronesis) is classically defined by Aristotle (384-322 BC) in Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics as the ability to choose the right means to achieve a goal.[8]
Focusing on the common origin and the common unity that once existed helps to overcome a purely emotional perspective on the conflict. As this view of the original unity constitutes a symbiosis of emotionality and rationality it becomes the moving force of reconciliation, knowing full well that the former peaceful state cannot be restored in the same way. For the new unity must not simply obliterate what has happened, but must integrate the historical experiences of the conflict at a higher level. The new unity is unity on a higher level: the conflict and the mutual points of view are suspended in it in a threefold sense (according to Hegel[9]):
in the sense of preservation (conservare): the conflict is not simply forgotten; instead, it becomes a reminder and a driving force for ongoing reconciliation.
in the sense of negating (negare): the conflict is actually over in the new state of reconciliation. It is no longer carried out by means of physical or psychological violence.
in the sense of elevationto a higher level (elevare): the factual issues remain, but the conflict is now carried out by other, namely peace-preserving means: rationality, negotiation, contract, compensation, shared memory, etc.
On the one hand, the will to reconcile presupposes a high degree of rationality in the sense of prudence. On the other hand, it also requires the insight that the future is more important than the past. In reality, justice can no longer be achieved with a view to the past. What has happened, has happened. What man still has under control is the establishment of justice with a view to the future. So if the injustice of the past is not to become the injustice of the future, an interruption of the time continuum in the transition from the past to the future is necessary, a real historical caesura, such as is produced by an act of reconciliation. This caesura, which is also a real act of freedom, breaks the dominance of the past and thus opens up a future of self-designed freedom. The present and the future are thus freed from being determined by the past. Those for whom the future in justice is more important than the injustice of the past will have to make such a break. Reconciliation therefore does not abolish the orientation towards justice, but happens exclusively for the sake of justice, which should be the determining factor in future coexistence. Reconciliation does not come about because a wiser person gives in to a less wise person, but only if all parties involved prove to be wise.
The willingness to reconcile is therefore the result of a highly rational insight. But the will to reconcile itself must grow. It does not come to you, although there is a kairos of reconciliation that cannot be planned and can only be seized when it is present. Reconciliation is not an event that can be forcibly created or produced. What must be present, however, is the mutual willingness to reconcile, the will to repent or to make a historical break. In the history of the monotheistic religions, it was the prophets who called for this repentance. On a personal level, it is the conscience that calls for reconciliation. In the political arena, it is organizations, activists and protagonists of peace and reconciliation that have taken on this function today and whose most important task is to promote the rationality and insight called for above as a prerequisite for the willingness to reconcile. This rationality also includes the fact that reconciliation is not unconditional: the willingness to reconcile must be accompanied by the fulfillment of certain preconditions which is necessary in the sense of surrogate compensation because they replace the demand for justice that can no longer be met.
3.5 Fifth condition: The will to reconciliation and the willingness to repent and forgive
The serious will to repentance, to the historical caesura and reconciliation is shown in the willingness to develop a certain habitus of reconciliation, in which the following aspects must manifest themselves:
The parties to the conflict must have sufficient rationality, be free in their decisions (also free in the face of history) and capable of genuine repentance. This type of rationality must not be limited to rationality of purpose, i.e. a rationality that is used only to seek one's own advantage or merely to repair the damage. Rather, what is required is a rationality that is oriented towards sensible common goals and is also prepared to accept temporary disadvantages for the sake of the future advantage of reconciliation in order to restore the destroyed relationship.
The goal of reconciliation cannot be the restoration of an old state that existed before the conflict. Rather, the establishment of the original unity and common ground must take place on a higher historical level that does not simply negate the history of the conflict, but integrates it into the new unity. Only fundamentalists want to preserve the status quo of the past in an unhistorical and rigid way. For them, the future is merely a reflection of the past in the sense of historical determinism, not the place where history can be freely shaped. Those who adhere to the religious belief that it is not man but God alone who acts in history will neither want to shape the future themselves and will therefore be incapable of reconciliation.
The focus on future justice must be more important for joint action than the focus on past injustice. Of course, the conflict and the injustice inflicted on both sides must not be forgotten. It is not a question of forgetting history, but of accepting and acknowledging history without allowing future actions to be completely determined by the past.
The willingness to reconcile must manifest itself in the knowledge that all parties to the conflict have become guilty, in the recognition of one′s own guilt and in the willingness to admit this publicly. The willingness to reconcile must therefore not primarily aim to exonerate the parties from their own guilt.
The willingness to reconcile must be accompanied by a desire for truth and honesty. Nothing in this shared history should be taboo. The history of the conflict and the guilt of all must be revealed and acknowledged relentlessly and without reservation.
There must be a willingness to forgive each other for the injustice suffered, albeit without wanting to forget this injustice in the future. While it is necessary to keep the injustice suffered in memory, forgiving neutralizes its effect on our future actions, so to speak.
The habitus of reconciliation requires reciprocity: the willingness to reconcile must come from all parties involved in the conflict in the same or at least a very similar way.
If all these prerequisites are met, then the virtue of reconciliation prevails in everyone. Like all virtues, it does not fall from the sky, but must be practiced over a long period of time and trained again and again so that it becomes second nature to those involved. Because reconciliation can only be achieved through acts of forgiveness[10] and reconciliation, which must also manifest themselves in some concrete way. The ability to reconcile was already understood by Aristotle as an expression of wisdom, justice, moderation and magnanimity. The “magnanimous” (megalopsychos), for example, overlooks injustice and avoids retaliating, which can certainly be seen as a sign of moral superiority.[11]
3.6 Sixth condition: Existence of manifestations of the will to reconcile
The mutual desire for reconciliation must not just remain lip service, it must manifest itself so that mutual trust grows. Such manifestations are tests of reciprocity, reliability, the willingness and the ability to reconcile. They generate the trust that needs to be rebuilt, that the will to reconcile is permanent and not just short-term. Such manifestations are part of catharsis, the cleansing of guilt, and can consist, for example, of a joint reappraisal of the common history of conflict under conditions of truth (establishment of a “truth commission” as in South Africa[12]), mutual compensation for what can still be compensated, such as the punishment of the perpetrators, reparation for the victims, the restitution of property, etc. and thus the establishment of justice in the sense of nomos reconciliation as far as possible. At the same time, there must be agreement on what cannot be compensated directly and what must therefore be compensated “indirectly” and how this can be achieved. The relevant dialogue between the former opposing parties must be institutionalized, also in order to find agreements and create contracts that are actually adhered to. Furthermore, there is a need to create places and times (commemorative days) of shared remembrance, which on the one hand do not allow the conflict to be forgotten, but on the other hand also manifest the will for reconciliation. Furthermore, the orientation towards a common future must manifest itself in the creation of common institutions of education and exchange, which are to the advantage of all and whose disintegration would also be to the disadvantage of all.
3.7 Seventh condition: The solemn act of reconciliation as an affirmation of a realistic hope
The step from the will to reconcile to the implementation of reconciliation manifests itself in a joint, solemn and public act of reconciliation. The remembrance of this act must generally be ritualized for the sake of the permanence of reconciliation, i.e. this act of reconciliation is commemorated at fixed intervals, for example by means of an annual holiday, a regular celebration, etc. The regularity of remembrance manifests the realistic hope that reconciliation will become a permanent state.
However, the act of reconciliation does not end with the one-off act of reconciliation. Reconciliation remains a permanent task afterwards. For the will to reconcile is still required, as the burden of history continues to weigh heavily on the former parties to the conflict, so that there is a permanent danger that the focus on the past will once again dominate the will to shape a common future in justice. For it is really difficult to forgive without being allowed to forget. This difficulty may also be compounded by the fact that the fruit of reconciliation is not the identical restoration of the original unity or the original state, but the regaining of a higher unity in diversity, the added value of which consists in a new friendship that is aware of both the burden of history and the advantage of the newly acquired peace. For the goal of reconciliation is always the establishment of a new order in justice.
Reconciliation remains a permanent task. The will to reconcile is therefore a basic condition of human coexistence, especially as there is a permanent danger that the orientation towards the past will once again dominate over the will to shape a common future in reconciled justice. Reconciliation deconstructs the logic of the "other as enemy" by readjusting relationships.
Forgiveness and remembrance must therefore be properly balanced if reconciliation is to be lasting. In his encyclical Fratelli tutti of 2020[13], Pope Francis reflects on this connection in detail when he makes the “value and meaning of forgiveness” (no. 237-245) and the special role of memory (no. 246-254) the subject of the encyclical. The result is: “Forgiveness does not mean forgetting” (no. 250) the victims, the violence and the suffering, even if “it is [...] no easy task to overcome the bitter legacy of injustices, hostility and mistrust left by conflict” (no. 243). For even after reconciliation, “authentic reconciliation does not flee from conflict, but is achieved in conflict” (no. 244, emphasis in the original). Even the historically uncomfortable truth must not be avoided. Francis refers by way of example to the healing and reconciliation-oriented remembrance of the Shoah (no. 247) and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (no. 248). However, remembrance must also positively refer to the memory of “all those who, with gestures small or large, chose the part of solidarity, forgiveness and fraternity” (no. 249). “We can never move forward without remembering the past; we do not progress without an honest and unclouded memory” (no. 249).
Remembrance-based reconciliation leads to justice, firstly because it restores the dignity of all those involved and regards both victims and perpetrators as people with potential for development; secondly because it enables participatory processes that involve all those affected in finding solutions and thus realize democratic principles of self-determination; thirdly because it creates sustainable solutions that are not only retaliatory, but also address the causes of conflicts and prevent their repetition. It is not the logic of retribution, but the logic of reconciliation that opens up a path to lasting peace in justice.
[1] On this topic, see also Schaub, J. (2009): Gerechtigkeit als Versöhnung: John Rawls’ politischer Liberalismus. Frankfurt/Main.
[2] The saying goes back to Ovid′s (43 BC-17/18 AD) “Ars Amatoria” (The Art of Loving, Book II, 197) and reads in the original version: “Cede repugnanti; cedendo victor abibis.” ("Give in to the one who resists! In yielding you will emerge victorious!")
[3] For the history of the term, see Alpers, H. and Loock, R. (2001): Versöhnung. In: Ritter, J., Gründer, K. and Gabriel, G. (eds.): Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Basel, pp. 891-904; as well as Schenker, A. et al. (2003): Versöhnung. I. Altes Testament II. Neues Testament III. Theologisch-historisch und Dogmatisch IV. Ethisch, in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie Bd. 35. Berlin, pp. 16-43.
[4] Rózsa, E. (2005): Versöhnung und System: Zu Grundmotiven von Hegels praktischer Philosophie. Munich.
[5] Augustine: De trin. XIII, 13, 17 MPL 42, 1026 f.
[6] Horizontal reconciliation refers to the mutual reconciliation of humans as described above (whereas vertical reconciliation means reconciling man with God). In the following, reconciliation is always used in the first meaning. With regard to a systematization of the idea of reconciliation in Pope Francis′ encyclical Fratelli tutti, see Wildfeuer, A. G. (2021): Zerbrochene Geschwisterlichkeit und die Logik horizontaler Versöhnung. In: Nothelle-Wildfeuer, U. und Schmitt, L. (eds.): Unter Geschwistern? Die Sozialenzyklika Fratelli tutti: Perspektiven – Konsequenzen – Kontroversen. Freiburg i. Br., pp. 86-104.
[7] See Wildfeuer, A. G.: Justice and Reconciliation, in: Adwan, S. and Wildfeuer, A. G. (eds.): Participation and Reconciliation: Preconditions of Justice. Opladen, Farmington Hills, pp. 119-132. A process system that differs from the following proposal (in the steps Apologies – Memorials – Truth Telling – Amnesties – Trials and Punishment – Lustration – Reparations – Forgiveness – Participation in Deliberative Processes) is offered, for example, by Radzik, L. und Murphey, C. (2023): Reconciliation. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/reconciliation/ (accessed June 2, 2006).
[8] On the virtue of prudence, see Müller, J. (2013): Tugend. In: Kolmer, P. and Wildfeuer, A. G. (eds): Neues Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe. Darmstadt, vol. 3, pp. 2244-2258.
[9] See Hegel, G.W.F.: Die objektive Logik (1812/13; 1. A. 1831), in: Jaeschke, W. (ed.): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 11, Hamburg, pp. 57 f.
[10] Research differentiates between forgiveness and reconciliation: forgiveness is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for reconciliation. This means that sustainable reconciliation is hardly conceivable without at least a partial willingness to forgive, but forgiveness alone does not guarantee reconciliation, as this requires reciprocal processes and often also structural changes.
[11] Herzberg, S. (2014): Verzeihen ist besser als Vergelten. Über den Umgang mit moralischen Verfehlungen in der antiken Ethik. In: Brachtendorf, J. und Herzberg, S. (eds.): Vergebung. Philosophische Perspektiven auf ein Problemfeld der Ethik. Berlin, pp. 85-114. Cf. also Kodalle, W. (2013): Verzeihung denken. Die verkannte Grundlage humaner Verhältnisse. Munich.
[12] Cf. Tutu, D. (2000): No Future Without Forgiveness. London.
Armin G. Wildfeuer, born in Passau in 1960, studied philosophy, musicology, Christian social ethics and Catholic theology in Rome and Bonn. Since 1997, he has been a professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Applied Sciences NRW in Cologne, specializing in philosophical ethics, philosophical anthropology and social philosophy/social ethics. From 2007 to 2010 he was Dean, and from 2018 to 2021 he was Head of the Master′s degree program “Innovation Management in Social Work”. He has been an expert for the European Research Executive Agency of the EU Commission since 2016 and an advisor to Commission XIII of the German Bishops′ Conference since 2021.
