ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES

CONTROVERSIES IN MILITARY ETHICS AND SECURITY POLICY

ISSUE 01/2022

Women, Peace & Security: The Long Road to Gender Justice

SPECIAL

More Gender Perspective, Please!

zebis

WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY: THE LONG ROAD TO GENDER JUSTICE

EDITORIAL

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine. Although preparations for this edition of "Ethics and Armed Forces" had already reached an advanced stage, the question arose of whether the "war in Europe" might not be a more pressing topic. An understandable, but also treacherous urge, given that gender issues often take second place to supposedly "hard" security questions.

Yet events in Ukraine demonstrate once again, with great clarity, how crises and armed conflicts affect women and men differently. For example, there are mounting reports of sexual violence, especially against women. At the same time, the predominantly female refugees and their children are at serious risk of exploitation and human trafficking. Those who are curious to know how women are violated, enslaved, sold and displaced in conflicts around the world should read Christina Lamb's book "Our Bodies, Their Battlefields".

Adopted in 2000, UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security acknowledged for the first time that women often suffer disproportionately in war and its aftermath, while remaining shamefully marginalized. The text and follow-up resolutions – which have come to be known as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda – formulate demands for the successful participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution, and call for their concerns to be taken into account. In other words, this is about gender equality in security issues.

In an interview with Isadora Quay from CARE International, I asked her about gender aspects and discrimination against women in humanitarian aid. She began by reciting a simple everyday example: For obvious reasons, having the same number of women's and men's toilets will often lead to a line forming in front of the former. So, in order to achieve a more just outcome – i.e. the same waiting time for all genders – shouldn't the number of ladies' toilets be doubled? This led us into an insightful conversation about the vulnerability of women during the COVID-19 pandemic, traditional role assignment and power relations, and crises as an opportunity for change and greater participation.

This edition aims to show that the WPS agenda involves much more than protecting women in war or increasing the number of female uniformed personnel – however important those goals may be. The articles describe the normative content of the Security Council resolutions, and examine the causes, prevention and prosecution of sexual violence as well as the living conditions of children born of war. They assess the policy implementation of the agenda in National Action Plans, and the unethical consequences of a failure to include women in armed forces. The special looks at the state of implementation of the agenda in the German Federal Ministry of Defense and Bundeswehr, and Major Isabel Borkstett, Deputy Gender Advisor in the NATO International Military Staff, explains the relevance of the topic in an extensive interview.

Of course there is not always agreement even among advocates of gender mainstreaming – for example, on what a feminist foreign policy should look like. However, the idea that analyzing gender roles and corresponding power relations should be given much more space – not least in the area of security – should be uncontroversial. "Women, Peace and Security" cannot be dismissed as a "women's issue", because the agenda concerns all people and all institutions.

The editorial team would like to thank everyone who contributed to this edition. We are sure that sticking with the topic was the right decision – and we invite you, our readers, to form your own opinions about it.

!

Rüdiger Frank
Copy Editor

DARE MORE ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS!

THE GLOBAL "WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY" AGENDA

Author: ***Manuela Scheuermann***

Abstract

After Germany introduced resolution 2467 in 2019, UN Secretary-General Guterres referred to the link between a society's propensity for violence against women and the propensity for conflict in that country. Curbing sexual and gender-based violence is a recurring theme in international peacekeeping, and this has been accompanied by increasing efforts on the part of several states to implement feminist policies seeking to strengthen links between local and global stakeholders. Problems such as violence against women in war zones and crisis areas as well as the desire to empower women more in peace operations have led the UN to increasingly engage with this issue.

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted a milestone on the road to a more gender-equitable world of peace and security: resolution 1325 on women in armed conflict. This is regarded as the starting point for the global Women, Peace and Security agenda, and as a successful outcome of civil society and feminist commitment. The underlying idea is that increasing gender equality allows conflicts of all kinds to be resolved more sustainably and therefore more peacefully. Furthermore, the frequent view of women as victims in need of protection must be widened to include the role of women as shaping actors. The United Nations also addressed this issue in several subsequent resolutions on women's rights, under the pillars of participation, protection and gender mainstreaming. The article outlines the genesis of the global agenda, comments critically on the state of implementation, and reflects on current and future challenges of the intersectional project.

The wars of the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia brought new uncertainties back into world politics. They also confronted the global community with the forgotten fact that not only do combatants fall in wars, but all armed conflicts also have direct consequences on the civilian population. Women in particular are exposed to often gender-based physical and psychological violence in war and refugee situations. They are forced into the role of victim – the one who is marginalized, in need of protection and forced to flee – and thrown back entirely into the private realm with no opportunity to play any significant role in shaping political life during and after the conflict. This is brought home to us again by the current war in Ukraine, which at least on the face of it seems to be accompanied by a regression into these gender stereotypes. With a general mobilization, male Ukrainians became soldiers, while women and children mostly became displaced persons and refugees.

The UN Security Council is the United Nations body charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace. In the year 2000, it responded to this human insecurity in violent conflict, to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and to the lack of women's participation in conflict resolution and political reconstruction: It adopted resolution 1325 on women in armed conflict, commonly referred to as "Women, Peace and Security" (WPS). This article outlines the background to the WPS agenda, which was initiated with this resolution in the United Nations. It examines the focuses of the ten resolutions and dozens of national and regional action plans which this project now comprises, and comments critically on its current state of implementation.

The origins of the "Women, Peace and Security" agenda in the United Nations: a feminist project

The disastrous consequences of war on women's rights and protection were an early con-

cern for feminist women's groups. As long ago as the Hague Peace Conference of 1915, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) – still the leading women's rights group for WPS today – pointed out the connection between war and gender-based violence. Following the failure of attempts to enshrine this link in the UN Charter, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) took up the issue in the 1970s. Parallel to the UN, feminist civil society groups constantly engaged with the question of how the consequences of war on women could be mitigated, or how a gender-just and peaceful world could be developed. "Women, peace and security" was and still is an issue supported by activists inside and outside the United Nations. Without the strong commitment of these civil society groups, it would not have arrived on the Security Council's agenda.

At the same time, cooperation between the political and activist levels is an almost feminist kind of governance, since the characteristic feature of all feminist (foreign) policy is the link between the local and global levels of policymaking. Activists made their breakthrough at the UN during the Beijing Women's Conference in 1995, where they exerted a strong influence on the United Nations and the group of so-called "friendly" governments that were open to the subject. In Beijing, it was agreed that gender mainstreaming should be incorporated into all areas of national and international policy.[1]

The Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action (2000) were key outcomes of this conference. The Windhoek Declaration urged UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to do more to address the gender dimension of peace and security.[2] It stated that gender mainstreaming should be implemented at all levels of peace support operations to ensure their effectiveness. Today, the link between the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation and gender equity is still an important argument inside and outside the United Nations for establishing gender programs in the armed forces.[3]

The Windhoek Declaration already goes far beyond the so-called protection component, i.e. it views women not only as victims of gender-based violence in war, but as equal partners in all aspects of the peace process. According to the then widely accepted "women bring peace" theory, women should play an equal role in peace processes – at the global, national and local levels – in order to achieve a gender-equitable and therefore sustainable peace.[4] This is because it was assumed – based on the gender stereotype – that women are intrinsically more peaceful, communicative and friendly, and therefore more likely to bring and build peace.[5] This hypothesis has been strongly criticized and rejected by feminist academics because of its adherence to a long-outdated stereotypical image of women.[6] In the United Nations, however, the argument was consistently used until a few years ago to promote the participation of women in peace missions.

The disastrous consequences of war on women's rights and protection were an early concern for feminist women's groups

Since the Beijing conference, countries such as Namibia and Sweden, together with women's associations such as the WILPF, have engaged in strong advocacy efforts inside and outside the United Nations to put the link between gender-based violence and war on the agenda.[7] The real goal of these initiatives has been to implement gender mainstreaming in all areas of UN peace support operations, in the spirit of the Windhoek Declaration, in order to understand the specific role and situation of women in armed conflicts, to integrate this into policy, and as a result not only protect but also empower women. In July 2000, the government of Namibia submitted the Windhoek Declaration and the Plan of Action on "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" to the UN Security Council (S/2000/693).

It was a favorable time for such an initiative, as during the preceding months the Security Council had deliberated at length on so-called human security and the responsibility to protect, which relate directly to feminist security policy. The UN Secretary-General himself was an advocate, indeed initiator of thinking about individual security and sovereignty. So the window of opportunity was wide open. In October 2000, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325 on "Women in Armed Conflict".

But it was not only the theme of women and unanimity that were unusual in the Security Council. At that time, so-called thematic resolutions such as WPS, which tackle a general security policy problem and not a situation in a specific country, were not part of the Council's standard practice. This is an indication of how urgent this issue was perceived to be. Even though feminist NGOs would have liked to see a more broadly based approach to the topic – focusing on gender, rather than on women – there was great euphoria in the United Nations. Kofi Annan, described as a "champion for women's rights",[8] underlined the importance of the resolution for the United Nations peace regime with the following words: "Only if women play a full and equal part can we build the foundations for enduring peace – development, good governance, human rights and justice."[9] This "gender equality peace hypothesis" remains a strong argument for women's empowerment in peace and security.[10]

Resolution 1325 was intended to mark the end of gender blindness in peace and security

Resolution 1325 was intended to mark the end of gender blindness in peace and security. It initiated "a wealth of research, initiatives and subsequent resolutions",[11] but not without further challenges, risks and dilemmas.

The normative core of resolution 1325 and the follow-up resolutions

After this first step, the UN Security Council adopted another nine resolutions, creating the Women, Peace and Security agenda: S/RES/1820 (2008), S/RES/1888 (2009), S/RES/1889 (2009), S/RES/1960 (2010), S/RES/2106 (2013), S/RES/2122 (2013), S/RES/2242 (2015), S/RES/2467 (2019) and S/RES/2493 (2019). It is clear from this that there have been WPS-"friendly" years, mostly coinciding with WPS anniversaries or particularly WPS-friendly agenda setters on the Security Council – like Sweden or more recently Germany. Each of these resolutions addresses equality norms as well as SGBV, with a focus on protecting and strengthening the peacebuilding role of women. But each sets different thematic priorities and responds to different gender-specific issues in the field.

To systematize the broad agenda, the content of the resolutions is usually divided into three thematic categories: "participation", "protection" and "gender mainstreaming".[12] The goal of female participation is a numerically and qualitatively balanced gender ratio; this is frequently referred to as "meaningful participation" in UN jargon. It refers to the participation of women in all phases of the peace process. Women are needed as soldiers and police officers in UN peacekeeping missions, as mediators in conflict resolution, and in the social and political reconstruction of a country.

The norm of "protection" comprises two aspects. Firstly, the agenda emphasizes the recognition and protection of women's rights as human rights. Secondly, it is about protecting women from sexual and gender-based violence, which is also often used as a "weapon of war" in armed conflicts. The agenda's strong female focus is widened somewhat with "gender mainstreaming", because this category calls for the integration of a gender perspective in all peace and security policy processes. This also includes Security Council resolutions, into which a gender perspective is to be integrated. Under the Swedish non-per-

manent membership of the Security Council, this goal was implemented and all resolutions have consistently incorporated a gender perspective.

The literature also divides the global agenda into other categories that should be mentioned and considered for the sake of completeness. Basu and Confortini differentiate between prevention, protection and participation.[13] The prevention aspect is especially central for feminist activists, as the entire feminist international community aims to prevent war through a feminist transformation of international politics. Prevention here, then, is not aimed at individual prevention of SGBV. Rather it underlines the conflict prevention impetus that implicitly runs through the agenda. The United Nations itself categorizes the agenda into five pillars, namely conflict prevention, participation, protection, peacebuilding and reconstruction.[14]

Resolution 1325 established the Women, Peace and Security agenda. With this resolution, the Security Council focused global attention on the neglected other half of the world's population: women. It affirmed the necessity of gender mainstreaming in all phases of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and of combating violence against women. Women are "active agents of change" as this historic resolution puts it. Resolution 2122 (2013) had a similar broad political impetus. It introduced the integrated approach as a central instrument of the WPS agenda, which seeks to establish close collaboration between all UN institutions both at the New York headquarters and in the field. Above all, integration is a signal to the UN system to network more effectively. The resolution also emphasized that the situation of women will only be improved in the long term by targeting the roots of conflict. Here the idea of prevention appears again.

Many of the follow-up resolutions focused on sexual and gender-based violence against women. This gave the impression that the agenda was too victim-centered, that women were being cast too much in the stereotypical role of the weak protection-seeker.[15] However, despite all the justified criticism of the agenda's tendency to reproduce stereotypes, it should be kept in mind that sexual and gender-based violence is an expression of militarized masculinity rituals, a weapon of war and a real threat to women in war. One in five displaced or refugee women has experienced violence, and more than fifty parties to conflict worldwide are suspected of having perpetrated SGBV.[16] So the problem is by no means marginal.

Resolution 1820 (2008) condemned the use of SGBV as a weapon and tactic of war. The resolution condemned SGBV as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and a constitutive act with respect to genocide, which could also provide a basis for sending perpetrators to the International Criminal Court under international criminal law. Resolution 1888 (2009) reiterated that this kind of violence exacerbates armed conflict, and resolution 1960 (2010) called for an end to SGBV in all conflicts.

Despite all the justified criticism of the agenda, it should be kept in mind that sexual and gender-based violence is an expression of militarized masculinity rituals, a weapon of war and a real threat to women in war

Resolution 2467 (2019), introduced by Germany, was a particularly important step in the fight against SGBV. It placed SGBV on a continuum of societally tolerated violence against women, and underlined the point that a society which does not prosecute those who commit violence against women is more prone to conflict than a society that condemns such violence. UN Secretary-General Guterres also emphasized the link between the extent of violence against women in a society and that country's propensity to conflict, in his recent reform recommendations report, "Our Common Agenda". To lift women out of the victim role, resolution 2467 (2019) also establishes the "survivor-centered approach". This sees women as active, contributing, equal members of society, who use their skills and experience to benefit the future of the country. In

addition – and this is important – it ensures that women have the opportunity to recover from the physical and psychological consequences of violence.

This approach calls on conflict countries, out of a sense of national responsibility, to prosecute perpetrators of SGBV, to recognize women as survivors, and to empower them. Ultimately, the goal of such a resolution is to create all the conditions for a "healed" society that can shape a lasting and sustainable peace. In the original draft resolution, Germany had prominently included the right of women to reproductive health (care). This proposal failed, however, due to a threatened veto by Russia and the United States (under the Trump administration).

The so-called "grass roots level" is an integral part of the overall agenda, in both normative and practical policy areas

Only resolution 1889 (2009) explicitly focused on women's participation in all stages of peace processes. The resolution cites the central role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, social reconstruction and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence as a central argument for increasing the quality and quantity of female participation. S/RES/2538, from 2020, is not genuinely one of the thematic WPS resolutions, as it deals with UN peacekeeping. But it strongly urges the "full, effective and meaningful participation" (paragraph 1) of "uniformed women" in peacekeeping operations at all levels and in all positions, including senior leadership positions.

The ten resolutions also include three resolutions calling for the operationalization and implementation of the agenda (S/RES/2106 (2013), S/RES/2242 (2015), S/RES/2493 (2019)). One implementation measure, cited here by way of example, was established by resolution 2242 (2015): The UN Secretary-General was called upon, in collaboration with member states, to launch an initiative to double the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations by 2020. With almost six percent female uniformed personnel in 2020, the UN has achieved this – albeit very modest! – goal, at least in quantitative terms.

State of implementation

These resolutions represent only broad targets of the global agenda. They are adapted and implemented in national and regional action plans (NAPs/RAPs) by countries and regional organizations such as the EU and African Union in line with local needs. Denmark presented the first action plan in 2005; 98 countries and eleven regional organizations have now launched one or more NAPs/RAPs. 72 percent of the NAPs recognize the essential role of civil society in implementing the agenda at all political and social levels.

The so-called "grass roots level" is an integral part of the overall agenda, in both normative and practical policy areas. This is seen in the NAP drafting processes, for example in Germany and Sweden, where civil society networks such as "Netzwerk 1325" were explicitly invited to help shape the process through their own input and expert operational discussions. Ministries such as the German Foreign Office recognize that NGOs such as medica mondiale, UN Women Deutschland or the International Red Cross are able to put the agenda to the test in practice, through their close relationship with populations in war zones. They can continuously draw lessons learned, reflect experiences back to the political levels, and contribute to the national NAP

The Author

Photo: FFPeters

Prof. Dr. Manuela Scheuermann is currently Deputy Chair of International Relations and European Studies at the Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. Her research focuses on the United Nations, the global "Women, Peace and Security" agenda, and relations between the EU and UN in peacekeeping. She is the author of "Die Vereinten Nationen. Eine Einführung" and co-editor of "Gender Roles in Peace and Security". Professor Scheuermann is a member of the Board of Directors of the United Nations Association of Germany, and of its research circle.

process. However, the national action plans of the so-called global North in particular are still too outward-looking and lack a critical inner perspective. This becomes problematic precisely when any form of violence is understood as potentially destabilizing and conflict-inducing. This applies to the German National Action Plans too, which lack an inner perspective as well as any WPS-related budgeting.

But Germany is not alone here – on the contrary. Only 35 percent of all action plans have a budget for program implementation. And just 32 percent of action plans mention a core concern of feminist foreign policy, namely disarmament, which has found its way into the new German action plan, for example. In view of the worldwide regression into undemocratic and patriarchal structures, a critical internal perspective, a closer examination of structures of militarized masculinity, and a long-term financial and structural institutionalization of the WPS agenda at national level would be in order.

Critical reflection with a world in crisis

This criticism directed at the NAPs needs to be applied to the entire project and extended in the case of the global agenda. If one reflects not only on the agenda's general, chronic and systematic lack of resources, but also takes into consideration the current global political situation, there is no escaping the fact that all ethically oriented policymaking – and here the WPS agenda should be included – must brace itself for more hard years ahead in the face of a global relapse into authoritarianism, militarism, nationalism, indeed conventional war.

We live in an international order in which the political system most able and willing to make gender equality a reality is in deep crisis, and in the minority: liberal democracy. Instead, we are witnessing the rise of patriarchal systems of power that stand as a block against the few countries that are committed to a feminist foreign policy. There is no need to remind ourselves that these same autocracies rarely outlaw violence against women. In recent years, these hardened ethically normative fronts have also been increasingly evident in the Security Council, as countries such as Russia and China began to use the threat of vetoes to dilute or scupper resolutions. This regression to patriarchal interpretations of a global world order is gaining ground at the global political level as a contest between great powers, and is also creating divisions within societies. Lines of conflict are deepening between patriarchal social structures and feminist activist groups, as seen in the discrimination and persecution of LGBTQI+ in Poland and Hungary. The pandemic has further catalyzed this global trend. It has led to a reversion to traditional gender stereotypes even in welfare democracies like Germany, along with growing inequality, an increase in domestic violence and a destabilization of societies.[17] The war in Ukraine has brought the consequences of militarized masculinity to the attention of western observers – via a patriarchal macho despot, fleeing mothers, and the barbaric crimes of Russian soldiers.

The "Women, Peace and Security" agenda was and is merely the lowest common denominator of UN gender policy in the area of peace and security

Nevertheless, the agenda must not stand still. It must be pursued and developed, especially in these troubled times. Beyond implementing the resolutions already adopted, steps should be taken to broaden the agenda, away from victimhood and toward the role of shaper; away from a focus on women and toward consideration of gender in general; and overall even more explicitly toward intersectionality.

The "Women, Peace and Security" agenda was and is merely the lowest common denominator of UN gender policy in the area of peace and security. The agenda needs to find its way out of a polarizing binarism and

ill-advised gender stereotyping, so that it can turn its back on the notion of women as "women in need of masculine protection".[18] Since the gender concept encompasses more perspectives than the agenda addresses, gender should also be explicitly included in the WPS agenda. While it remains important to protect and empower women, the role of other genders in violent conflicts should not be ignored. Issues such as violence against boys and men, or against LGBTQI+, or even women perpetrators should feature more prominently in the discourse. The intersectional approach has implicitly resonated in the resolutions for a number of years and is explicitly implemented in UN Women. It should become the linchpin of the agenda. Intersectionality widens the focus from just gender to consider equally important aspects of discrimination, namely the social, ethnic or also religious context. Especially in a violent conflict situation, these are crucial criteria to take into account for conflict resolution adapted to the needs of the respective society.

Since the gender concept encompasses more perspectives than the agenda addresses, gender should also be explicitly included in the WPS agenda

Why must there be no standstill? Not just for the sake of human or women's security, but because of the great transformative potential of the women, peace and security agenda. As a growing number of countries commit to a feminist foreign policy, an important connection is revealed between the thematically focused WPS agenda and a general choice of foreign policy direction: The ethical impetus for a country to commit to the concept of feminist foreign policy stems from its engagement with the global women, peace and security agenda.[19] In 2014, Sweden became the first country to adopt a feminist foreign policy. Margot Wallström chose this course based on her involvement with Agenda 1325. Canada followed in 2017 with a feminist development policy, and in 2019 France, Mexico and Luxembourg declared their intent to develop a feminist foreign policy. Spain and most recently Germany followed suit. However, the approach to this new kind of foreign policy depends on each country's context. In its report on Germany's feminist foreign policy, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy proposed the following definition, which distills the essence of such a policy: It focuses on "feminist peace, gender equality, climate justice, and the eradication of inequalities [...]. It would disrupt [...] patriarchal [...] power structures."[20] That alone should be reason enough to advocate for the advancement of this agenda. Especially now.

1 Steans, Jill (2013): Gender & International Relations. 3rd ed. Cambridge, p. 1.
2 https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/windhoek_declaration.pdf (accessed April 21, 2022).
3 Bridges, Donna and Horsfall, Debbie (2009): Increasing operational effectiveness in UN peacekeeping: Toward a gender-balanced force. In: Armed Forces & Society, 1, pp. 120-130.
4 Maoz, Ifat (2011): Women and Peace Hypothesis. Hoboken.
5 Aharoni, Sarai B. (2017): Who needs the Women and Peace Hypothesis? Rethinking modes of inquiry on gender and conflict in Israel/Palestine. In: International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19, pp. 311-326.
6 Davies, Sara E. and True, Jacqui (eds.) (2019): The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security. Oxford.
7 Hudson, Natalie F. (2010): Gender, human security and the United Nations. Security language as a political framework for women. Milton Park.
8 Powell, Catherine (2018). Kofi Annan. Champion for women's rights, council on foreign relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/kofi-annan-champion-womens-rights (accessed April 21, 2022).
9 United Nations (2002): Women, peace and Security: study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325. New York, p. ix.
10 Wood, Reed and Ramirez, Mark D. (2018): Exploring the micro foundations of the gender equality peace hypothesis. In: International Studies Review, 20, pp. 345-367.
11 Duncanson, Claire (2016): Gender and peacebuilding. Cambridge, p. 9.
12 Gizelis, Theodor-Ismene and Olsson, Louise (2015): Gender, peace and security. Implementing UN Security Resolution 1325. Milton Park, pp. 4-15.
13 Basu, Soumita and Confortini, Catia C. (2017): Weakest "P" in the 1325 pod? Realizing Conflict Prevention through UN Security Council Resolution 1325. International Studies Perspectives, 18, pp. 43-63.
14 UN Women (2015): Trends and Projections for Gender Parity. DPKO. New York, p. 13.
15 Zürn, Anja (2020): From Sex and Gender to Intersectional Approaches? UN-Written Identities of Local Women in Participation and Protection Discourse. In: Scheuermann, Manuela and Zürn, A. (eds.): Gender Roles in Peace and Security. Prevent, Protect, Participate. Cham, pp. 11-34.
16 DGVN (2019): Eine-Welt-Presse "Frauen, Frieden, Sicherheit". https://dgvn.de/publications/PDFs/Eine_Welt_Presse/EWP-Frauen-Frieden-Sicherheit-web.pdf (accessed April 21, 2022).
17 Scheuermann, Manuela (2020): "Frauen, Frieden, Sicherheit" unter den Bedingungen der COVID 19-Pandemie. Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 9, pp. 321-335.
18 Shepherd, Laura (2011): Sex, security and superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and beyond. In: International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13, pp. 504-521.
19 Aggestam, Karin (2019): Theorizing Feminist Foreign Policy. In: International Relations, 33, pp. 23-39.
20 Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (2021): Make Foreign Policy Feminist. A Feminist Foreign Policy Manifesto for Germany. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/61432508e0c62f33f0a54cea/1631790357163/CFFP-Manifesto-EN-Final4.pdf (accessed May 13, 2022).

THERE IS STILL A CHOICE

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Author: ***Eunice Otuko Apio***

Abstract

The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative sees sexual violence in conflicts not only as a crime committed by individuals, but as a problem of far greater magnitude. It is a cheap weapon of biological and psychological warfare. Studying the dynamics of militarized masculinity, using the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we see that the abuse of power over women or rape can destroy entire social structures and put new ones in their place. The spread of disease by means of sexual assault also plays a role. The goal of these war methods is not simply to harm individuals physically and emotionally, but also to tear apart the social fabric in the long term. A "successful" use of violence demonstrates the defenselessness of the community under attack, while also engendering a sense of humiliation among the families affected. Even in peacetime, signs of how armed conflicts will be conducted can be seen in social interactions. Influencing factors within groups of men include exaggerated harshness, the use of violence, and a thirst for conquest. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the behavioral development of all individuals in such social structures. There is room for maneuver, in which men decide for or against particular actions and so shape the moral character of warfare. The key to the successful prevention of sexual violence therefore lies in a well-founded ethical training for soldiers; there should also be suitable institutions to document, study and devise legislation against such acts, and ensure their consistent prosecution.

Sexual violence is a "…cheap weapon of war… cheap because it is cost free. Very effective, because it does not only affect the victim, it affects whole families, the communities. It is biological warfare. It is psychological warfare", declared Pramila Patten, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.[1] World leaders echoed her words recently when they commented on claims of rape of Ukrainian women, girls, boys and men by Russian soldiers during the ongoing conflict. Within Ukraine itself, Iryna Venediktora, the Ukraine Prosecutor General declared rape was being used "as a tactic in its {Russian} brutal invasion {of Ukraine}."[2] The story is not any different in other parts of the world. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been referred to as the "rape capital of the world"[3] because of the untold levels and different forms of sexual violence associated with the intractable conflicts in the east of the country. In Rwanda, rape was widely linked to genocide – labelled a weapon of genocide, and of war for that matter. Similarly, in Middle Eastern countries like Iraq and Syria, rape and forced marriage targeting communities linked to opposing groups (e.g. Yazidis of Syria and Turkey) have also been judged as weapons of war.[4] Perpetrators continually reimagine and repurpose sexual violence to target civilians, and to add to a most horrible chapter in human history. For example, in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, a perpetrator did not only rape a child, but went on to video record the act and share it for social media 'likes'.[5] Perpetrators make sure sexual violence continues to be a part of armed conflict across time and space, passed down generations of fighters and non-fighters associated with both state and non-state conflicts, regular military formations and irregular militias, regional armies and UN missions. The perpetrators have almost always been men; the victims are disproportionately women, boys and girls who are either randomly or systematically targeted, with many falling victim to both.

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) amounts to a serious breach of bodily integrity by another and entails a continuum of harms

including, "rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict."[6] Irrespective of the forms in which these acts manifest – whether committed as a random act or systematically engineered – Pramila Patten's declaration of CRSV transforming wars into biological, psychological warfare underscores the urgent need to find measures that can sustainably prevent the violence and address its legacies.

A weapon of war deployed randomly or systematically may not just target the victim at which the weapon is aimed, but can have implications on communities the victims associate with, leading to lifelong consequences for both the individual (if she/he survives), family and communities. Understanding the patterns of behaviour and the rationale of individuals and groups for targeting civilians with such harm is essential for any attempt to develop policies to stop such abuse.

One may, for example, ask: why is sexual violence happening during the Ukraine-Russia conflict? Why has it continued to characterize most of the African-based conflicts? Why was it rampant in Europe during WWII? Why do well-trained combatants such as those that go on UN military missions commit sexual violence on populations they are charged with protecting? In other words, why would a combatant take time in the midst of a violent conflict to sexually harm civilians? What could be triggering or encouraging perpetrators?

Documented evidence across conflict zones suggests that acts of sexual violence happen in multiple subcontexts nuanced by different actors and factors at play – including personal and interpersonal factors as well as sociocultural contexts. Evidence further indicates that the violence can be spontaneous or organized, institutionalized or even acceptable within the membership of the offending group.[7] There are reports of individuals violated by lone perpetrators and those violated by groups, publicly or privately or both. These subcontexts can be critical in determining agency and in understanding why some individuals engage in perpetrating sexual violence while others may choose not to do so.

In northern Uganda, a woman who was abducted in her early teens in 2004 by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – a rebel group that operated between 1987 and 2008 in northern Uganda[8] – recounted how one 'sympathetic' LRA soldier who had witnessed random soldiers take turns to abuse her instead used an opportune moment to help her escape. As the rest of them had done, she explained, the man ordered her to follow him to a nearby bush. However, when she arrived, he told her he would not abuse her, but instead escape with her because he disagreed with what the other men were doing to her. Days later, they arrived in her home district in northern Uganda, and surrendered to government soldiers. "The man never ever touched me, and yet he had all the means to. I had long given up [fighting] after weeks of abuse", she added. As widely documented, to escape or aid a captive's escape was a death sentence in the LRA.[9] Her rescuer, no doubt, had 'a code of honour' as quoted in Christina Lambs book, and risked his life standing by it. By choosing not to harm the girl, he contested long-held ideas of military masculinities, which associate and normalize toughness, violence and conquering as part of war-time behaviour.[10]

A weapon of war deployed randomly or systematically may not just target the victim at which the weapon is aimed, but can have implications on communities the victims associate with

In the same conflict, another woman, abducted at the age of 13 from her school in 1997 writes in her memoir how she was given as a wife to an elderly LRA commander eventually giving birth to two children.[11] These two stories illustrate how CRSV takes place in different subcontexts within a single conflict. One that is spontaneous, and the other systematic or institutionalized. There is the con-

duct of the individual man in situations where sexual violence is not ordered but tolerated or encouraged by the military command, or where it is committed without the knowledge of the military leadership. Until not long ago, this latter 'spoils of war' and 'men will be men' approach was the dominant understanding of why sexual violence in and after conflict was pervasive almost everywhere; towards the end of the 20th century this thinking, not least due to the changing nature of warfare, was replaced by the 'weapon of war' theories; and in the early 21st century, this was further analysed by taking into account of military masculinities.

Spontaneous or systematic: And, is there a choice?

Many conflicts contain situations where CRSV is not ordered but individuals choose to commit CRSV without the knowledge of the military leadership. In many other cases, perpetrators are tolerated or encouraged by the military command such as happened in the 1990s civil war in Sierra Leone, West Africa.[12] In such cases, soldiers are left to their own devices to make choices about 'right and wrong'. Often victims are seen and treated as spoils of war, left at the discretion of an individual soldier to treat as he (perpetrators disproportionately tend to be males) desires; feeding the old narrative of 'men will be men', as seen in the example of the rescued girl above. In most cases, therefore, the violence is taken for granted; it is taken as "an unavoidable consequence of warfare"[13], a part of what is to be expected during conflict and a justified 'reward' for soldiers' 'risks and sacrifices'.[14]

In nearly all cases related to 'spontaneous' violence, actors have the option to choose to do right

In nearly all cases related to 'spontaneous' violence, actors have the option to choose to do right. As the LRA rescuer above did, an individual soldier can reach into the depth of his personal resources (e.g. spirituality, respect for non-combatants, kindness, sense of fairness, empathy), invoke his conscience to protect the would-be victim and contribute to ending the circle of CRSV, not only by refusing to take part in the violence, but further by influencing other combatants to restrain themselves. An individual soldier's effort to end CRSV embodies 'respect for humanity', which is a constant that can only be regulated by common sense and the ideals that make a good soldier; to make judgement calls about right and wrong, especially in cases where there are no direct orders that are directly linked to the fighting.

In other cases, military commands of conflicting parties have ordered and systematically used rape and other forms of sexual violence on victim communities[15] as experienced by the second girl who was abducted and forced to be 'wife'. Many use CRSV to 'defeat the enemy' militarily (as a weapon of war) for example; by raping women and children to demoralize the men, and dominate and exercise power and authority over women, children and civilian communities associated with the opposing fighting groups.[16] Perpetrators often commit CRSV in some form of public – where family members may be forced to watch or take part in the actual act of violence on the pain of death.[17] Such acts aim at humiliating, not just the victim, but also their kinship groups and local communities as well, aiming at the disintegration of that community. This is the damage Pramila Patten speaks about – the damage done to the extended self; the desecration of both the self and the extended self.

In contexts where conflicting parties share similar understanding of norms and values the significance of rape and sexual violence to the 'extended self' can be huge, and may directly and indirectly bear upon the entire sociocultural fabric of the victim group. We have seen this in the case of the 1995 Rwanda genocide[18], Bosnia-Herzegovina[19] and in northern Uganda during the war orchestrated by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that thrived on abduction of thousands of children, women and youth to incorporate and institutionalize rape through forced wife practices during its

20-year conflict (1987-2008).[20] In such contexts, the targeting may be underpinned by what the aggressors know about the meanings victim communities associate with the norms, beliefs and practices defining sex and sexuality.

In many respects, therefore the rape bears other 'non-conventional' meanings, which the aggressor may exploit. For example, in northern Uganda targeted local ethnic groups generally saw sexual violence as amounting to the "transgression of the moral order".[21] The transgression was believed to contribute to collective trauma and to harm social relationships within families and communities that ordinarily lived in harmony, threatening the reproduction of community. In the northern Uganda case and indeed many other cases with comparable norms and practices across African societies, conflict-related sexual violence meant the aggressor group directly targeted the means by which such groups built and expanded their sense of collectivity.

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) case pushes the discourse further because its leadership institutionalized forced marriage primarily to enforce reproduction in order to create a new 'Acholi' (the local ethnic group from which LRA's leadership hailed). The LRA leadership used abduction to recruit thousands of children and women, and then systematically affiliated the female recruits like Acan (cited above) as 'wives'. They reasoned that their newborns would be socialized to form the new Acholi. In the words of elders in northern Uganda whose daughters were forced into 'marriage' by the LRA, the sexual violence amounted to a "hijack of wombs."[22] Both the LRA, which actually developed its own moral codes to regulate the forced marriage practice, and their former elders in northern Uganda understood the meaning and implication of this 'hijack of wombs'. The violence amounted to a desecration of one, and a reproduction of the other; to a defeat of one, and a victory for the other. For the elders, the rape of a daughter during the war did not only amount to a 'military defeat' on the victim community, but targeted their way of life with varying implications on their economic, cultural, social and political life. Sexual violence can therefore be seen as a weapon of rupturing and disrupting the processes associated with targeted communities. Moreover, there are long-term, even transgenerational physical and psychosocial consequences that victims and their communities continue to bear such as infection with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, fistulas, birth of children and mental illnesses. This, and more, is the extent of damage that weaponized sexual violence could bear upon a victim community.

In many respects, rape bears other 'non-conventional' meanings, which the aggressor may exploit

Of boundaries and discipline

Important to note is that sexual violence remains rampant in post-conflict communities – perpetrated by strangers, intimate partners, fathers, brothers and other people who may be known to victims. In peacetime, it is assumed that established societal norms, values and structures can help to create and regulate boundaries for bodily integrity, and that once caught, perpetrators are liable to be held to account by customary or other legal systems.

Societies at war also operate through a system or rules; there are international laws of war; and many countries, in many conflicts abide by them; there are rules about combatants, non-combatants, prisoners of war (PoWs); how to treat civilians, press, medical and humanitarian actors, etc. Increasingly the laws of war are no longer applied; neither the jus ante bellum (i.e. the laws guiding which wars are permissible self defence; but not the aggressive wars of annexation to alter internationally recognized borders) and the (often humanitarian) jus in bello (law in war which binds the parties to a conflict to international rules that they have signed up to).

But in whatever form, coerced or not, one may ask: do humans have the agency, the choice to not cross the line? To prevent their

complicity or involvement in CRSV? At what point would this be possible? On his part, the LRA rescuer honoured himself by creating boundaries and projecting them to protect the abused girl. In other words, he refused to join other fighters in using this girl's body as a site of contestation for what his supposed manliness entailed – and by aiding her to escape he denied others the opportunity to continue doing that. Men like him demonstrate how CRSV is constantly being contested even within groups associated with CRSV. There are individuals, who will not hesitate to harm civilians, and there are those like the LRA rescuer who will not wish to associate with the vice.

Shaping the moral character of a conflict does not begin when a soldier is at the battlefield, and should not be left to chance

They won't because to them sexual violence remains a 'wrong' irrespective of the spaces in which it is committed. These individuals will not fault mere changes in environment for their own choices. Instead, through their actions they demonstrate that soldiers themselves can (re)define contexts, and that combatants can actually shape the moral character of a conflict, either individually or systemically. Shaping the moral character of a conflict does not begin when a soldier is at the battlefield, and should not be left to chance. It doesn't have to be merely spontaneous. Rather, it has to be deliberate and a soldier prepared for it in his (or her) formative years, during and after a conflict. Soldiers come from different backgrounds; have different upbringings, and therefore different perceptions about life, and living for that matter. These are issues that can be openly clarified as part of military trainings and mentorship to provide combatants with necessary tools and support networks to make the right choices and adapt to difficult situations during conflict.

To more comprehensively and sustainably address CRSV, local, national and international bodies having the mandates to regulate how warfare is conducted, including authorities directly in-charge of military groups need to enforce certain measures in both peace and wartime. These can include institutionalizing mechanisms for monitoring and reporting cases of CRSV, data collection and analysis on the conduct of soldiers; gender-sensitive and inclusive transitional justice mechanisms, and determined prosecution of perpetrators of CRSV. Moreover, military instruction should consider more stringent trainings of troops (including commanders) about the rights and wrongs.

The Author

Dr Eunice Otuko Apio *is a Ugandan-based anthropologist, novelist and human rights activist. Her interests are on gender, conflict, children born of CRSV and post-conflict societies. Eunice is currently working as a research fellow at the University of Birmingham (UK) with Prof. Janine N. Clark on a five-year comparative study of resilience in people associated with CRSV, funded by the European Research Council (September 2017-August 2022).*

1 Jewers, Chris (2022): Russian Soldiers are raping Ukranian men and boys as well as women, says UN war crimes investigator. Mailonline, 4 May. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10781397/Russian-soldiers-raping-Ukrainian-men-boys-women-says-war-crimes-investigator.html (accessed 25 May 2022).
2 Ibid.
3 BBC News (2010): UN official calls DR Congo 'rape capital of the world.' 28 April. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm (accessed 13 June 2022). On CRSV in the DRC, see also: Kristof, Nicholas D., and WuDunn, Sheryl (2009): Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into Opportunity for Women Worldwide. New York.Isis: the long walk of the Yazidi Women. The Guardian, 25 July. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/25/slaves-of-isis-the-long-walk-of-the-yazidi-women (accessed 25 May 2022).
5 Varga, John (2002): Russian Soldier 'raped baby in sick video' then 'shared clips of his vile child sex abuse'. Express, 1 April. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1594069/russia-news-troop-raped-baby-sick-video-shared-clips (accessed 25 May 2022).
6 Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 2019. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-united-nations-secretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf (accessed 9 June 2022).
7 Wood, Elisabeth J. (2014): Conflict-related sexual violence and the policy implications of recent research. In: International Review of the Red Cross 96 (894), pp. 457-478. https://doi:10.1017/S1816383115000077 (accessed 25 May 2022); Eriksson Baaz, Maria and Stern, Maria (2013): Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescription, Problems in the Congo and Beyond. London; Kirby, Paul (2013): How is Rape a Weapon of War? Feminist International Relations, Modes of Critical Explanation and the Study of Wartime Sexual Violence. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 797-821.
8 E.g. Carlson, Khristopher and Mazurana, Dyan (2008): Forced Marriage within the Lord's Resistance Army, Uganda. Tufts University Feinstein International Center, May.
9 Acan, Grace (2018): Not Yet Sunset: A Story of Survival and Perseverance in LRA Captivity. Kampala; Carlson, Khristopher and Mazurana, Dyan (2008).
10 E.g. Eriksson Baaz, Maria and Stern, Maria (2009): Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC). In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 495-518.
11 Acan, Grace (2018).
12 Wood, Elisabeth J. (2014); Eriksson Baaz, Maria and Stern, Maria (2010): The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Working Paper, The Nordic Africa Institute, Sida, May.
13 ICRC (2016): Q & A: sexual violence in armed conflict. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/sexual-violence-armed-conflict-questions-and-answers (accessed 25 May 2022).
14 Wood, Elisabeth J. (2014).
15 E.g. Baines, Erin (2014): Forced Marriage as a political project: sexual rules and relations in the LRA. In: Journal of Peace Research 51 (3), pp. 405-417.
16 Card, Claudia (1996): Rape as a Weapon of War. In: Hypatia 11 (4), pp. 5–18. https://doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb01031 (accessed 25 May 2022); Stop Rape Now: UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/wps/StopRapeNow_Brochure.pdf (accessed 25 May 2022).
17 PLoS Medicine Editors (2009): Rape in war is common, devastating, and too often ignored. In: PLoS medicine, 6 (1), e21. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000021 (accessed 25 May 2022).
18 Card, Claudia (1996); Human Rights Watch (1996): Shattered lives: Sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm (accessed 26 May 2022).
19 See: Notes. In: Heineman, Elizabeth D. (ed.) (2011): Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: From the Ancient World to the Era of Human Rights. Philadelphia, pp. 257-320. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812204346.257 (accessed: 26 May 2022);
20 See: Baines, Erin (2014): Forced Marriage as a Political Project: Sexual Rules and Relations in the Lords's Resistance Army. In: Journal of Peace Research 51(3), pp. 405-417. www.jstor.org/stable/24557488 (accessed 11 May 2022); Owiny, Tobbias Jolly. (2021): Ongwen appeals conviction. The Monitor, 18 June. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ongwen-appeals-conviction-3441748 (accessed 30 April 2022).
21 See: Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Gulu District NGO Forum. (2007): 'Abomination': Local belief systems and International Justice. Field Notes, 5 September.
22 See: Apio, Eunice Otuko (2016): Children born of war in northern Uganda: kinship, marriage, and the politics of post-conflict reintegration in Lango society. Diss. University of Birmingham.

CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY

Authors: ***Kai Ambos/Susann Aboueldahab***

Abstract

The past few decades brought an increased global attention and commitment to ensure accountability for conflict-related sexual violence. Accordingly, both at the level of international criminal law and international policy there is marked progress to hold responsible individuals to account. Backed by the United Nations, the ad-hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, as well as the two hybrid Tribunals in Cambodia and Sierra Leone were instrumental in advancing judicial practice related to sexual violence in conflict. Despite this positive development, the remaining high levels of impunity in many conflict-affected settings raise questions as to possible causes. This contribution explores some of the problems in ensuring accountability for conflict-related sexual violence. It does so by examining the existing legal framework and the related practice of international and domestic criminal tribunals. We argue that while the normative framework has significantly improved, shortcomings remain especially at the level of investigation and prosecution and also when it comes to the legal interpretation and application of the relevant norms. We conclude by pointing to possible venues for improvement in closing accountability gaps and, at the same time, shed light on the potential that more holistic, restorative approaches to criminal justice offer.

Introduction

Few weeks after the start of the war in Ukraine, numerous reports emerged reporting rape at the hands of Russian forces, even suggesting that these acts may have been widespread.[1] Should investigations prove these reports true, the events in Ukraine will join a long history of armed conflict involving sexual violence. While the scope and form of conflict-related sexual violence varies across the globe depending on the respective conflict dynamics, the social context and the characteristics of the armed group or military organization involved, the demand for criminal justice responses to these atrocities – often unmet – looms large. While the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as other international criminal tribunals have, clearly, been and continue to be important actors in enhancing accountability for conflict-related sexual violence, the domestic level has gained increasing relevance in recent years. Nevertheless, challenges in the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence remain at both levels. In addition, alternatives to traditional criminal justice approaches emerge that may offer a more holistic response to armed conflicts' violent past.

Conflict-related sexual violence and international criminal justice

For a long time, conflict-related sexual violence has received little attention in international criminal law and was, instead, condoned as collateral damage or unavoidable byproduct of armed conflict. Hence, the warranted critique of impunity became a buzzword to address the systemic problems underlying this historical inaction. The post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals failed to adequately prosecute conflict-related sexual violence. In the 1990s, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) slowly started to build an important body of international juris-

prudence, recognizing rape and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.[2] These two ad-hoc Tribunals were the first to consider sexual violence in the ambit of international criminal justice. They were followed by the permanent ICC, established in 2002, that has jurisdiction over a wide range of sexual crimes as acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – namely rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization as well as any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.[3] Importantly, these crimes are formulated in a gender-neutral way, thus criminalizing the respective acts independently of the victim's or the perpetrator's gender. With that, for the first time in history, a comprehensive codification of conduct related to sexual violence has been adopted. Based on the precedents established by the ICTY and ICTR, but also the later established Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) as well as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the ICC can resort to a rich body of jurisprudence and prosecutorial experience when dealing with conflict-related sexual violence. Importantly, the SCSL and ECCC were pivotal in prosecuting sexual slavery and forced marriage, that underline the often gendered nature of sexual violence.[4] This growing judicial practice has shown that sexual violence can be linked to an armed conflict in various forms, following different patterns and driving factors. It can be committed by way of individual attacks but also as part of a large-scale campaign by conflict actors, even being used as a weapon of war.

The awareness for conflict-related sexual violence in international criminal law has been accompanied by an increasing attention at the international policy level. Starting with the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda has repeatedly emphasized that wartime sexual violence is a threat to international peace and security. Importantly, the Agenda has recognized the often strategic use of conflict-related sexual violence and dispelled the myth that sexual violence is only committed against women.[5] As part of the Agenda, the UN Security Council created a Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2009 to enhance criminal accountability and end impunity. And yet, despite this remarkable evolution that has successfully placed conflict-related sexual violence at the center of international attention within few decades, shortcomings remain in ensuring accountability of these crimes.

The International Criminal Court

As with any other international crime, it is indispensable to prosecute sexual violence from the very beginning as what it is, namely outrageous criminal behavior, in order to understand the violent context in which it occurs and to fully recognize the harm it causes. This warrants first and foremost the proper application of the available legal provisions.

As with any other international crime, it is indispensable to prosecute sexual violence from the very beginning as what it is, namely outrageous criminal behavior

When looking at the early years of the ICC's practice, it becomes evident that the Court has not paid as much attention to sexual violence as one might have expected in light of the previous developments mentioned above.[6] This situation was owed in particular to a lack of prosecutorial prioritization and suitable charging strategies. For instance, in the Lubanga case, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) led by first Chief Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo has faced criticism for not including sexual violence in the charges against the former Congolese militia leader – despite evidence that child soldiers had been subjected to sexual slavery and rape. Hence, despite the ICC's progressive legal regime explicitly covering sexual violence, ensuring accountability for these crimes was, apparently, not a priority. In more recent years, after second Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda took office, the approach of the OTP has started to change. In 2014, it

published a Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes which set the strategic goal of holding perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence to account.[7] Accordingly, the OTP has started to charge these crimes with greater vigor – in particular rape (including against men) and sexual slavery (in the Ntaganda case), as well as forced marriage and forced pregnancy (in the Ongwen case). This changed the ICC's initially weak track record and rendered then Chief Prosecutor Bensouda's efforts to increase accountability for sexual and gender-based crimes fairly successful.

While this strategic shift has clearly helped to translate the law in the books to a greater degree into legal practice, remaining accountability gaps raise questions as to further shortcomings in countering impunity. Some of these can be traced to problems at the investigative level. As investigators often lack forensic evidence for sexual violence at the time they belatedly approach crime scenes, these acts might not be apparent at first glance – especially when compared to, for example, mass graves or looted villages. While it should not be denied that investigations concerning conflict-related sexual violence can be particularly challenging, increasing awareness for the varying forms and underlying logics of conflict-related sexual violence, as well as the rapid development of gender-sensitive and tailored investigative methods dispel the persistent and widespread myth that these crimes are "too hard" to prove.[8] The bulk of the problems at the level of evidence gathering can be encountered by appropriate means, such as a high degree of sensitivity for gender and other (including intersectional) forms of discrimination and a departure from practices – e.g. victim blaming, lack of protection and trust – that have proven to deter victims from coming forward and telling their stories.

The mere fact of having a progressive normative framework does not lead, without further ado, to a respective practice

Another problem that explains persistent accountability gaps lies in unsolved questions as to the scope and nature of crimes related to sexual violence at the stage of adjudication. For instance, there is no well-established definition of what constitutes an act of a sexual nature.[9] In the Kenyatta case, the Prosecution charged forcible circumcision and penile amputation as a form of sexual violence. The Judges, however, did not consider these acts to be of a sexual nature and, instead, interpreted them as other inhumane acts.[10] While such varying understandings of sexual violence might seem to be a minor detail, they have major implications for recognition of the specific harm caused. This is not only true concerning the judicial determination of the truth. It can also set the course for the design of reparation in response to these crimes.

Another, yet related problem at the conceptual level is the rather underexplored interrelation between the concepts of sexual and gender-based violence. While both sexual and gender-based violence share the misfortune of being frequently overlooked by the international criminal justice system, an appropriate adjudication of these crimes requires delineating sexual violence from non-sexual manifestations of gender-based violence. Generally speaking, sexual violence refers to crimes with a sexual component (such as rape or sexual slavery), while gender-based violence describes crimes which are inflicted on persons because of their gender (such as gender-based persecution). In many cases, the two categories overlap, for instance in cases of forced marriage or forced pregnancy. And yet, both categories criminalize very different conduct and imply harm of distinct kinds. The lack of clear theoretical conceptualizations leads to problems when interpreting the legal rules. This shows, again, that the mere fact of having a progressive normative framework does not lead, without further ado, to a respective practice.

Last but not least, the fact that the ICC does not have jurisdiction to investigate all crimes committed worldwide is another reason for the remaining impunity gaps. This rather formal cause which is not limited to conflict-re-

lated sexual violence explains why, especially in recent years, the attention has shifted from the ICC towards other, domestic criminal justice avenues to close impunity gaps.

Domestic responses

While international criminal justice is often primarily associated with international courts and tribunals, it is, in fact, the primary responsibility of national criminal justice systems to prosecute international crimes that fall within their jurisdiction. Indeed, they are an important part of the international criminal justice system.[11] Hence, following the idea of international criminal law's foundational principle of complementarity, international criminal justice mechanisms only come into play when the competent national justice system fails to adequately prosecute international crimes. Only such a situation activates the international level's gap-filling or closing function.[12] This system is based on the idea that, ideally, international crimes should be prosecuted where they occurred. Domestic legal systems are often best prepared to understand local customs and are more accessible for victims when compared to the often geographically removed locations of international criminal courts and tribunals, which, in addition, only possess limited capacities.

A good example illustrating the interplay between national and international criminal justice is the Colombian situation. After decades of unsatisfactory domestic endeavors in investigating and prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity (including sexual violence) in the context of the Colombian armed conflict, in 2004 the ICC's OTP opened a preliminary examination to monitor the genuineness of Colombian proceedings in relation to these crimes. Following renewed national efforts to ensure accountability – especially after the Peace Agreement in 2016 and its implementation which led, amongst others, to the establishment of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (*Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz,* JEP)[13] – the OTP's current Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan decided to terminate the preliminary examination in October 2021 (without a res judicata effect however).[14] In exchange he convinced the Colombian government to sign a cooperation agreement with the OTP where several guarantees for the domestic accountability process, especially favouring the JEP, have been given while at the same time leaving it in the hands of Colombia to conduct criminal prosecutions.[15] This return of 'positive complementarity'[16] is of great interest with a view to accountability not only of sexual violence but also of reproductive violence, as the JEP might be the first criminal tribunal in history to try forced contraception and forced abortion (which female members of the FARC-guerrilla were subjected to) as an international crime. It already established a significant precedent concerning the gender-based persecution of LGBTIQ persons as a crime against humanity.[17] This example shows that domestic criminal courts can indeed play an important role in the further development of international criminal law.[18]

Domestic legal systems are often best prepared to understand local customs and are more accessible for victims when compared to the often geographically removed locations of international criminal courts and tribunals

In some situations, however, neither the State in which the crimes occurred is able or willing to investigate and prosecute grave crimes, nor does an international criminal justice mechanism with jurisdiction exist – for example in the case of Syria. With no other legal venues available in such a case, third States' national jurisdictions come into play. Based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, they can try international crimes even in the absence of a connection with the prosecuting State as last resort to ensure accountability for especially serious crimes which must not remain without consequence.[19] In recent years, there has been a broader turn towards universal jurisdiction trials as a more robust domestic enforcement of international criminal law, with Germany playing a pioneering role.[20]

With the adoption of the ICC Statute, many member States incorporated universal jurisdiction in their national legislation (albeit not provided for by the ICC Statute). Germany made headlines for bringing international criminal trials before its domestic courts, especially concerning crimes committed in Syria and against the Yezidi population in Iraq and Syria. These proceedings hold many positive learnings for accountability of conflict-related sexual violence at the domestic level: German authorities, the General Federal Prosecutor and the respectively competent courts have made remarkable joint (cross-border) efforts in order to conduct complex international criminal trials. And yet, a lack of awareness of and focus on sexual violence can be observed, especially when looking at the General Federal Prosecutor's charging strategy. For example, in the Al-Khatib trial on torture in Syria before the Koblenz Higher Regional Court, the indictment initially did not address sexual assault and rape as a crime against humanity. Instead, the Prosecutor classified these acts as detached and isolated from the systematic attack against the civilian population – contrary to international findings. Only at the request of joint plaintiffs did the court deal with sexual violence as a crime under international law, thereby remedying the initially selective charging.[21]

When looking at the early work of international tribunals, it is, among other problems, precisely the inaccurate assessment of sexual violence crimes at the charging level that led these crimes to remain in the shadows

While this example may seem to be a rather technical detail, it goes to the core of the decades-long disregard for sexual violence in international criminal law. When looking at the early work of international tribunals (as outlined above for the ICC), it is, among other problems, precisely the inaccurate assessment of sexual violence crimes at the charging level that led these crimes to remain in the shadows. Interestingly, rape and sexual assault were the only crimes in the Al-Khatib case that were charged as isolated criminal (domestic) acts not qualifying as international crimes.[22] With this bias towards sexual violence, the Al-Khatib case demonstrates the bitter irony of history repeating itself at the domestic level – both regarding inaccurate charging strategies and concerning the lag of the practice when compared to the existing legal framework to the detriment of victims of sexual violence. It is an instructive example of how even a well-established criminal justice system with the respective provisions is no guarantee for adequate criminal prosecutions.[23] Again, this is not a new phenomenon but fits well into the unfortunate pattern of how sexual violence has historically been understood and treated in international criminal law. The Al-Khatib trial but also other cases show that the German practice is, apparently, not exempt from this systemic grievance – by either charging sexual violence as domestic instead of international crimes or mischaracterizing and simply excluding them from the charges.[24] A good example of the latter is the arrest warrant the German Federal Court issued against Jamil A.-H., the former head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service. Despite acknowledging the systematic use of sexual violence as a method of torture, it was not charged as a form of sexual violence but as torture, thus concealing the sexual nature of the crime.[25]

In light of the foregoing it is fair to say that German universal jurisdiction cases display an unfortunate lack of attention to sexual violence. While it remains to be seen whether future cases will be more careful to implement a gender-sensitive approach to the investigative and prosecutorial work, it is worth

The Author



***Susann Aboueldahab** is Research Fellow and PhD Candidate at the Law Faculty of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany and at the Study Center for Latin American Criminal and Criminal Procedural Law (CEDPAL).*

noting that the General Federal Prosecutor's Office has acknowledged a lack of experience with the investigation of sexual crimes.[26] The example of Germany shows that it is not necessarily the absence of resources or determination on the part of the prosecutorial authorities, but often a lack of expertise and tailored prosecutorial strategies that hamper accountability for sexual crimes. In addition, national legislators have to make sure that domestic legal frameworks actually comply with international rules, which too often is not the case.[27]

Beyond retributive justice

While joint efforts to ensure accountability for conflict-related sexual violence both at the domestic and the international level have clearly yielded results, the remaining flaws as well as the international criminal justice system's sole focus on retributive criminal responses have understandably received criticism. Especially when considering that criminal justice has often overlooked sexual violence and negated victims' agency, but also when considering the often structural, discriminatory aspects that underlie sexual violence (even beyond settings of armed conflict), more holistic responses raise increasing awareness. Unlike traditional (retributive) criminal justice, new avenues are hoped to better address and redress the harm caused and to ensure a more victim-centered approach, for example by prioritizing reparation.[28] At the same time, traditional criminal justice responses are deemed important as a crucial instrument for countering impunity.

Here, again, the Colombian JEP is a particularly interesting example of how these seemingly contradictory demands can be reconciled in practice. The JEP constitutes a rare legal approach that deals with international crimes (including conflict-related sexual violence) going beyond mere retribution and giving preeminence to restorative justice. Several elements reflect the JEP's mixed or dual nature. One example is the design of an alternative (i.e. non-adversarial) procedure established to promote truth-telling. In this so-called dialogic process, victims and perpetrators are encouraged to engage in a moderated dialogue. Its objective is to understand why a person engaged in the violent acts in question in the first place, to encourage that person to tell the truth and apologize to the victims, and to create a space for both sides to listen and to engage in a meaningful, respectful dialogue.[29] Another example are alternative sanctions. Those perpetrators who confess, tell the truth, and participate in activities aimed at reparation and non-repetition will receive mitigated sanctions whose enforcement will normally take place outside the ordinary prison system.[30] In cases of sexual and gender-based violence, these activities aim at eradicating gender-based prejudices and stereotypes in order to transform the situation of gender inequality. While sanctions under this framework might still entail the deprivation of liberty (i.e. a sanction of a retributive nature), such measures are a last resort if the main objective of restorative justice has not been achieved at all or only insufficiently. Hence, the JEP tries to reconcile the interests of a transitional justice (TJ) process (revealing the truth, guaranteeing the centrality of the victims in the administration of justice, and contributing to the construction of a lasting peace) with the aspiration of accountability for those most

Unlike traditional (retributive) criminal justice, new avenues are hoped to better address and redress the harm caused and to ensure a more victim-centered approach, for example by prioritizing reparation

The Author

Kai Ambos holds the Chair for Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law, International Criminal Law and Public International Law at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany. He is also Judge at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, The Hague as well as Director of CEDPAL..

responsible for serious crimes.[31] Put in simple terms, the JEP's restorative justice approach is built on a thin line between the criminal prosecution of grave crimes and the broader purposes of TJ, which makes the JEP a unique mechanism – also when it comes to the accountability of conflict-related sexual violence. This example shows that it is possible to create a model that pursues accountability of international crimes beyond the traditional forms of retributive justice, without giving rise to impunity.[32]

Concluding remarks

The decades of absolute impunity and disregard for conflict-related sexual violence have fortunately come to an end. International criminal tribunals have successfully started to address this particular form of violence and there is global recognition that remaining impunity gaps have to be closed. The body of respective jurisprudence is constantly growing and modern international criminal law covers a wide array of sexual violence crimes. Beyond the international criminal justice arena, domestic courts also increasingly address conflict-related sexual violence, including taking resort to universal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, problems remain in adequately addressing wartime sexual violence.

The biggest challenges rest in insufficient investigative and prosecutorial strategies as well as ambiguities and misconceptions of the judicial nature of these crimes. Both domestic and international practice have shown that even the most progressive legal framework does not lead to accountability of conflict-related sexual violence when it is not translated into practice. It is to be hoped that these shortcomings will be recognized, addressed and corrective action taken. While national jurisdictions can well be expected to gain growing importance in prosecuting sexual violence in the future, restorative justice approaches are also gaining increasing attention. It remains to be seen to what extent these will complement or even replace traditional retributive justice models in the future – especially in TJ contexts.

1 On sexual violence as a structural problem within the Russian armed forces, see O'Brien, Melanie and Quenivet, Noelle (2022): Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Women in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. In: EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence-against-women-in-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/?utm_source=mailpoet&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ejil-talk-newsletter-post-title_2 (accessed 10 June 2022).
2 Schulz, Philipp and Kreft, Kathrin (2022): Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. In: Oxford Research Encyclopedias of International Studies, p. 7.
3 Art. 7(1)(g), Art. 8 (2)(b)(xxii) and (e)(VI) ICC Statute.
4 Schulz, Philipp und Kreft, Kathrin (2022), supra note 2, p. 8.
5 United Nations Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000; S/RES/1820, 19 June 2008; S/RES/2106, 24 June 2013.
6 Altunjan, Tanja (2021): The International Criminal Court and Sexual Violence: Between Aspirations and Reality. In: German Law Journal (22), pp. 879, 883-884.
7 ICC OTP (2014): Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf (accessed 9 May 2022).
8 See, for instance, Koenig, Alexa and Egan, Ulic (2021): Power and Privilege: Investigating Sexual Violence with Digital Open Source Information. In: Journal of International Criminal Justice (19:1), pp. 64-76; Aboueldahab, Susann and Freixo, Inês (2021): App-Generated Evidence: A Promising Tool for International Criminal Justice? In: International Criminal Law Review (21), pp. 509, 516, 519.
9 Altunjan, Tanja (2021), supra note 6, p. 891.
10 ICC, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (23 January 2012), paras. 265, 266.
11 On this system with further references Ambos, Kai (2021): Treatise on International Criminal Law. Volume I: Foundations and General Part. Oxford, 2nd ed., pp. 99 ff.
12 See in detail on the principle of complementarity and its consequences Ambos, Kai (2016): Treatise on International Criminal Law. Volume III: International Criminal Procedure. Oxford, pp. 266 ff.
13 Ambos, Kai and Peters, Stefan (eds.) (2022): Transitional Justice in Colombia: The Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Baden-Baden. https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748923534.pdf?download_full_pdf=1
14 Critically Morales, Andrés (2022): The rocky road to peace II: additional challenges at the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia. In: EJIL:Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-rocky-road-to-peace-ii-additional-challenges-at-the-special-jurisdiction-for-peace-in-colombia/ (accessed 13 May 2022).
15 ICC OTP (2021): Cooperation Agreement between the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the Government of Colombia. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/20211028-OTP-COL-Cooperation-Agreement-ENG.pdf (accessed 9 May 2022).
16 Ambos, Kai (2021): The return of "positive complementarity". In: EJIL:Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-return-of-positive-complementarity/ (accessed 13 May 2022).
17 Aboueldahab, Susann (2021): Gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity: A milestone for

LGBTI rights before the Colombian Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In: EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/gender-based-persecution-as-a-crime-against-humanity-a-milestone-for-lgbti-rights-before-the-colombian-special-jurisdiction-for-peace/ (accessed 9 May 2022).
18 Additional examples can be found in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, El Salvador and Peru, to name just a few.
19 On the rationale of the principle see Ambos, Kai (2016), supra note 12, pp. 224 ff.
20 Aboueldahab, Susann and Langmack, Fin-Jasper (forthcoming 2022): Universal Jurisdiction Cases in Germany: A closer Look at the Poster Child of International Criminal Justice. In: Minnesota Journal of International Law (Vol. 31, Issue 2), pp. 1-21.
21 Aboueldahab, Susann and Langmack, Fin-Jasper (2022): The End of the Al-Khatib Trial. A Historic Verdict and a Trial of Missed Opportunities. In: Völkerrechtsblog. https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/de/the-end-of-the-al-khatib-trial/ (accessed 9 May 2022).
22 Aboueldahab, Susann and Langmack, Fin-Jasper (2022), supra note 20, p. 14.
23 Studzinsky, Silke and Kather, Alexandra Lily (2021): Will Universal Jurisdiction Advance Accountability for Sexualized and Gender-based Crimes? A View from Within on Progress and Challenges in Germany. In: German Law Journal (22), pp. 911-912.
24 Aboueldahab, Susann and Langmack, Fin-Jasper (forthcoming 2022), supra note 20, p. 14; Studzinsky, Silke and Kather, Alexandra Lily (2021), supra note 23, p. 906.
25 Studzinsky, Silke and Kather, Alexandra Lily (2021), supra note 23, pp. 908-909; Aboueldahab, Susann (2020): Sexualisierte Kriegsgewalt vor deutschen Gerichten. In: Legal Tribune Online, https://www.lto.de/recht/justiz/j/gba-bundesanwaltschaft-syrien-haftbefehl-geheimdienst-sexualisierte-kriegsgewalt-voelkerstrafrecht/ (accessed 9 May 2022).
26 Aboueldahab, Susann and Langmack, Fin-Jasper (forthcoming 2022), supra note 20, p. 15.
27 Altunjan, Tanja and Steinl, Leonie (2021): Zum Schutz der sexuellen und reproduktiven Selbstbestimmung – Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Reformbedarf im Völkerstrafgesetzbuch. In: Rechtswissenschaft (3/21), pp. 351-355.
28 Schulz, Philipp and Kreft, Kathrin (2022), supra note 2, pp. 13, 18.
29 Parra-Vera, Oscar (2022): The Special Jurisdiction for Peace and Restorative Justice: First Steps. In: Ambos, Kai and Peters, Stefan (eds.) (2022), supra note 13, p. 140.
30 Ambos, Kai and Aboueldahab, Susann (2022): The Special Jurisdiction for Peace and Impunity: Myths, Misperceptions and Realities. In: Ambos, Kai and Peters, Stefan (eds.) (2022), supra note 13, pp. 43-45.
31 Ambos, Kai and Aboueldahab, Susann (2018): The Colombian Peace Process and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In: Diritto Penale Contemporaneo. Rivista Trimestrale 4/2018. Bologna, pp. 255-263; Ibid. (2022), supra note 30, pp. 37 et seq.
32 Ambos, Kai and Aboueldahab, Susann (2022), supra note 30, pp. 37 et seq.

FORGOTTEN: CHILDREN BORN OF WAR[1]

Authors: ***Sabine Lee/Heide Glaesmer***

Abstract

(Mass) rape and other atrocities, often committed systematically against the civilian population, are now receiving increasing attention when investigating the social consequences of armed conflict. As a result of brutal warfare in the present and recent past, and the landmark Security Council resolution 1325, there has also been a legal reassessment of these phenomena. Conversely, the fate of Children Born of War (CBOW) has long been overlooked. These children are conceived by foreign or enemy soldiers and born to local mothers in a range of consensual and non-consensual sexual encounters. However different the circumstances of their conception may be, or the relationships between their parents, these children often experience similar multiple disadvantages in their family and social environment. Many grow up with single, marginalized mothers in precarious conditions, are discriminated against and/or stigmatized as descendants of the wartime enemy or occupier, and are therefore also at greater risk of experiences of abuse and neglect during childhood. Identity issues stemming from the absence of their fathers, deliberate concealment of their origins, changes of caregivers, as well as a more or less open hostility and exclusion in their immediate and wider environment are matters of particular concern for these children. The article illustrates the multi-layered, also intergenerational consequences using the example of German CBOW of the Second World War, who even as adults are significantly more likely to report mental health problems. To increase the chances of a lasting peace, the needs of CBOW must be taken into account when supporting survivors of sexual violence, but also in transitional justice processes. Appropriate measures include better education and preventive training for the armed forces, as well as assured financial and psychosocial support.

The recent invasion of Ukraine, but also the ongoing atrocities in Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria to name but a few, have demonstrated forcefully that 20th and 21st century wars are no longer only or primarily encounters of armed forces over territorial gains, but conflicts that play out in less clearly regulated circumstances that no longer occur within the confines of international laws of war.[2] Those armed conflicts have seen atrocities against civilians, including large-scale attacks of civilian targets, but also the use of other terrorising strategies and tactics including sexualised violence against women and men, used with a level of brutality, callousness and disregard to internationally agreed laws of war in a manner rarely seen in the past. Boundaries between combatants and non-combatants have become increasingly blurred.[3]

Since the final quarter of the 20th century regular and irregular forces have, more and more systematically, resorted to rape as a weapon of warfare.[4] Following the mass rapes of the Balkan Wars, the Rwandan genocide and numerous African and Asian conflicts,[5] it has become all too evident that the premises of the international laws of war are no longer adequate to deal with contemporary warfare – both in terms of conceptualising the actual acts of warfare, but also in terms of creating the legal frameworks to hold to account perpetrators of atrocities. The systematic and directed use of rape came to be seen no longer as a by-product of war but as an act of war itself, which led to a reconsideration of conflict-related sexual violence in legal terms. While war rape had already been outlawed by the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention as one of the 'outrages upon human dignity',[6] the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) revised our understanding of these war crimes and began formalising the recognition of rape as a war crime in their prosecutions of Crimes against Humanity which included sexual violence. In addition, under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) grave acts

of sexual violence such as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution and forced pregnancy as well as enforced sterilisation have now been identified as war crimes and crimes against humanity.[7]

In the three decades since the wars in former Yugoslavia the topic of conflict-related sexualised violence (CRSV) against women (and more recently also against men[8]) has received increased attention in the media, but also in academia and among policy makers. Genuine progress has been made since the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and the subsequent nine resolutions on WPS-related issues that form an international policy framework aimed at promoting and protecting the rights of women in conflict and post-conflict situations. In stark contrast, the fate of tens of thousands of children fathered by foreign soldiers and born to local mothers, often conceived in CRSV, but also in a range of non-violent relationships, partially consensual and partially exploitative and abusive, have received relatively scarce attention. Similarly, efforts to reintegrate such Children Born of War (CBOW) and to include them in transitional justice processes have been limited.[9] Not until UNSCR 2467 in June 2019 did the UN acknowledge CBOW as rights-holders who endure both related and distinct harms from women and girls impregnated in acts of sexual violence. Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, the UK Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, referred to this as an 'invisible crisis'. He explicitly endorsed recommendations of the to date only detailed policy brief on CBOW[10] which calls for global, gender-sensitive studies on CBOW as well as on women who become pregnant as a result of CRSV, pointing out that meaningful peace, reconciliation and justice can only be achieved if all groups, including vulnerable women and their children, are included in the process without stigma and discrimination.

CBOW, in currently broadly accepted research and policy terminology, comprise children fathered by enemy soldiers in armed conflicts, children fathered by occupation soldiers in post-conflict occupations, children of (often sexually enslaved female) child soldiers, and children of UN peacekeepers. Provenance of CBOW from such a variety of conflict- and post-conflict scenarios and the categorisation that has arisen out of those varying contexts implicitly point to a broad spectrum of military-civilian relationships into which (or out of which) these children are born. Great variations characterise military-civilian relations during and after armed conflicts with regard to nature, intensity, frequency and longevity of contacts between local populations and foreign soldiers.

Children Born of War are connected with the conflict and the (former) enemy or occupier in a unique way that makes them vulnerable to a range of adversities

Children may be conceived of wartime rape, of exploitative or abusive relations, out of forced prostitution or transactional sex under circumstances that severely constrain a woman's ability to withhold consent, out of survival sex or out of short- or long-term consensual and on occasion love relationships.[11]

While the circumstances of conception vary significantly, the experiences of CBOW – often independent of the nature of the parental relationship – show remarkable similarities. The children are connected with the conflict and the (former) enemy or occupier in a unique way that makes them vulnerable to a range of adversities. Their provenance as children of (enemy, rebel or occupation) soldier fathers sets them apart from the local communities; they are often raised by mothers who – through association with the enemy and through prejudicial stereotyping – suffer the multiple stigma as victim-survivors of sexual violence and as single mothers. They have to raise their children outside the rigid family norms of frequently patriarchal societies and they are frequently expe-

riencing prolonged and extreme poverty, ill health, educational, economic and social exclusion.

For CBOW this double adversity frequently means that their rights and needs are challenged in ways that few other war-affected groups experience. Yet, very significant human rights issues pertaining to children born of war have been met with a comprehensive silence until recently and specifically with regard to children born of conflict-related sexual violence a recent report speaks of a 'critical policy and protection gap'. Since the initial work by International Relations scholars in the early 2000s,[12] research with different disciplinary and geopolitical foci has amassed a significant evidence base to demonstrate a range of disadvantages, risks and harms that include infanticide, abandonment at birth, childhood adversities including physical and emotional abuse/neglect, dehumanising naming practices within local communities, stigmatisation and discrimination, poverty and food insecurity, reduced access to education, homelessness, to name but a few. In combination such adversities put CBOW at significantly increased risk of poor physical and mental health and, with regard to post-conflict community and state fragility, make them vulnerable to radicalisation and (re-)recruitment into armed groups.[13]

Issues revolving around identity are amongst the most fundamental challenges Children Born of War face

The Author



Prof. Dr. Sabine Lee graduated from the University of Düsseldorf with a degree in mathematics, history and philosophy. She completed an M.Phil in International Relations and a PhD in Modern History at the University of Cambridge. In 1993, she took up a lectureship in European history at the University of Hull before joining the Department of Modern History at the University of Birmingham 1994.

Psychological, social and economic burdens in CBOW[14]

CBOW across different geopolitical and historical settings share specific experiences and their upbringing is often characterised by a particular set of individual, social and societal conditions. These have been explored from a psychological perspective in a model that identifies three interrelated factors of particular salience for an understanding of the well-being of CBOW: (1) experiences of discrimination and stigmatisation, (2) child maltreatment, and (3) identity development.[15]

Issues revolving around identity are amongst the most fundamental challenges CBOW face. CBOWs' mothers and other relatives have frequently been known to conceal the identity of their children's fathers because of the societal taboo around extra-marital intimate relations as well as their own feelings of shame and their desire to minimise the stigmatisation and/or discrimination that might be directed at the child and their family. Although most CBOW eventually gain knowledge about their paternal origins directly from their mothers or close relatives during childhood and adolescence, some end up learning the truth either by accident or deliberately from members of their broader social environment, while others only become aware of their origins upon becoming the target of invectives directed at them by their local community.

Many CBOW who only learn of their origins in adulthood report having had a diffuse sense of unease or having struggled with the taboo of their ancestry. Unresolved questions of identity leave many CBOW with an impaired sense of belonging. Almost all CBOW grow up without any knowledge or narratives about their fathers; not only have their fathers been physically absent from their lives, they are also actively excluded from any memorialisation of the past.

Today more or less overt discrimination/stigmatisation is recognised to be a formative experience that CBOW share across almost all post-conflict societies. In fact, most

carry multiple burdens, among them: being 'the offspring of the enemy/foreigner,' having an interethnic background, and being 'born out of wedlock.' Invectives directed at CBOW by their communities such as *bui doi* (Dust of Life), *Amibankert* (American bastard), *Russenbalg* (Russian brat), *enfants indésirés* (unwanted children), to name but a few, illustrate the kinds of negative societal attitudes they encounter. A substantial proportion of CBOW is subject to open hostility, violence, and social exclusion in their schools, neighbourhoods, and families. CBOWs' childhood living conditions are often characterised by familial and societal areas of conflicts that centre around their integration and rejection. Concealment, financial hardships, and public and familial rejection often play a role. Considering the negative attitudes families and communities harbour against these children and their mothers, it is unsurprising that CBOW are at an increased risk of child maltreatment.

The individual experiences described above are determined by the particular primary caregivers, families, and communities the CBOW live in. Due to the specific conditions in which these children were born, many were raised by single mothers, frequently in difficult economic circumstances, while others were given up for adoption, raised in children's homes, or by grandparents or close relatives, repeatedly having to adapt to new primary attachment figures. The stigma and discrimination those CBOW experienced reflect the commonly negative and hostile attitudes their nearer and wider communities had towards them, and, in cases where their mothers entered new romantic alliances, those new family constellations sometimes raised the children's risk of being discriminated against within their reconfigured families. Moreover, in instances where CBOW are singled out for community or governmental support, or benefit from formal faith-based or NGO aid programs, this can have the negative side-effect of generating animosity and jealousies within their local communities, especially when these support structures are not incorporated into effective transitional justice mechanisms. For example, the blanket amnesty granted to former members of the LRA in Northern Uganda singled out child soldiers for state support upon their post-conflict reintegration into local communities, while many other victims of LRA atrocities did not receive similar support, leading to tensions between returnees and community members who had not been abducted. Similarly, NGO scholarships awarded to formerly abducted enslaved women and their children were not matched by similar support for other war-affected children and thus created further division.[16] In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the multi-layered adversities encountered by CBOW, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive and coherent model that analyses the interactions of structural discrimination and social marginalisation and exclusion more systematically than has been done hitherto.

Considering the negative attitudes families and communities harbour against Children Born of War and their mothers, it is unsurprising that they are at an increased risk of child maltreatment

From an intergenerational perspective, it is useful to consider how the mother-child relationship dyad affects CBOWs' development and understanding of the conflation of multiple adversities that are common experiences of CBOW from different historical and geopolitical settings. Research on CBOW

The Author

Prof. Dr. Heide Glaesmer has graduated from University of Leipzig with a diploma in psychology. She completed her PhD in Public Health at Technical University of Berlin and is a licensed psychotherapist in cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy. She is the deputy head of the Department of Medical Psychology and Medical Sociology at University of Leipzig where she leads the Psychotraumatology and Migration research lab.

has long been focused primarily on children conceived by CRSV. Yet, evidence on CBOW suggests that the circumstances under which these children are conceived do not significantly determine the adversities they encounter in childhood. To illustrate the complex and intergenerational consequences of sexual encounters and conflict-related sexual violence on mothers of CBOW and their children the case of Occupation Children of WWII in Germany is described in more detail.

While it is undisputed that the final stages of WWII saw extreme levels of CRSV, exact figures and official statistics are missing; that said, it is estimated that 1.9 million German women were raped by Soviet soldiers, and thousands of rapes are believed to have been committed by American, British, and French Allied soldiers at the end of WWII and in the post-war period.[17] A corollary of the lack of exact data on CRSV in the final phases of the Second World War and the early post-war period is that the exact number of CBOW conceived under those circumstances is also unknown. It is however estimated that up to 400,000 children were born of war as a result of sexual encounters between local women and occupation soldiers. Among these children were those conceived in conflict-related sexual violence and also in intimate relations of more or less consensual nature ranging from the so-called business arrangements to love relationships, and a considerable number of those are assumed to have been born as a consequence of rape.[18] Social stigma, shame, and fear led to silence surrounding sexual violence committed by occupation forces, irrespective of their nationality. Female CRSV survivors from this period showed high prevalence rates of different mental disorders – even decades later.[19] In 2013, the first empirical study on psychosocial aspects of growing up as a CBOW in Germany after WWII was conducted. As previously mentioned, CBOW's childhoods were often characterised by burdensome financial, social, and familial living conditions. Only 1.4% (n = 2) of the participants grew up with their biological father, and more than half experienced at least one change of primary attachment figure due to being relocated (e.g. from their mother to their grandmother). A large proportion experienced different kinds of maltreatment during childhood and adolescence: more than half of the participants (57%) reported emotional abuse, 44% emotional neglect, 41% physical abuse, and about one-quarter reported sexual abuse. This exposure is alarming since it is five to ten times higher than in the general population of the same generation.[20] Moreover, many experienced stigmatisation and discrimination.[21] These difficult childhood developmental conditions faced by CBOW in post-WWII-Germany have been associated with the fact that CBOW are more likely to suffer from mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, or somatization even decades later.[22] If one considers the psychological consequences of CRSV for the mothers and the often difficult conditions of single mothers of illegitimate children in post-war Germany, it becomes clear what risks existed for a positive mother-child relationship. Even in later adulthood, CBOW report a greater prevalence of insecure attachment patterns in their current relationships. For instance, these CBOW feel less comfortable with closeness and intimacy and are less able to depend on others.[23] The findings from the study highlight the long-term impact of developmental conditions on a person's attachment style, mental health, and wellbeing across their lifespan. From an intergenerational perspective, the loving bond between mother and child can be complicated by the violence committed in rape and, by extension the mother-child relationship can be characterised by difficulties such as lack of closeness and ambivalence. On the other hand, positive mother-child relationships

It is estimated that 1.9 million German women were raped by Soviet soldiers, and thousands of rapes are believed to have been committed by American, British, and French Allied soldiers at the end of WWII and in the post-war period

can develop if mothers establish a loving bond with their CBOW, a phenomenon that has been described in other contexts of extreme maternal interpersonal trauma, e.g. in Rwanda or Uganda.[24]

As indicated above, current programming aimed at supporting CRSV survivors does not address the specific needs of CBOW; nor do transitional justice processes involve CBOW, whether conceived in violent or non-violent relationships. This not only neglects the needs of a significant number of extremely vulnerable groups in post-conflict societies; it leads to the marginalisation and exclusion of the very people on whom sustainable peace could rest and adds to the fragility of post-conflict societies.

Recommendations

CBOW are a particularly vulnerable war-affected population. Yet, they often remain unnoticed and their needs are widely neglected. Programming needs to include a range of measures:

1) Ethical training in the military not only needs to be gender-sensitive and address the non-permissibility of CRSV; it also needs to enhance soldiers' understanding of power dynamics that severely constrains women's ability to consent freely to intimate relations with soldiers.
2) Moreover, soldiers need to be trained more effectively in the consequences of fathering children both for the children and their mothers.
3) Impunity around CRSV and conflict- and peacekeeping-related sexual exploitation and abuse needs to be addressed, and clearer support structures to establish paternity and secure alimony for CBOW need to be developed.
4) At societal level, CBOW and their mothers who cannot obtain financial assistance from the soldier fathers need to be supported in their home community. Post-conflict justice processes need to include the creation of safe, non-discriminatory spaces for CBOW to be visible, and public education needs to address stigmas and taboos relating to CBOW and their mothers.
5) Where required access to appropriate psychosocial support services for CBOW and their mothers ought to be available for this particularly vulnerable war-affected group.[25]

In recent years, CBOW of different generations in different geopolitical contexts, including CBOW of WWII and the post-war occupations, now in their seventies and eighties at one end of the spectrum, to CBOW conceived in the wars in former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan Genocide or the Ugandan conflicts of the 1990 and 2000s at the other end of the spectrum, have been engaged in different activities that addressed their stigma and discrimination. These included the publications of autobiographies,[26] the co-creation of documentary dance performances,[27] and the co-creation of documentary films[28] that served the dual purpose of awareness raising about the challenges faced by CBOW and contributed to destigmatising and de-tabooing being born a child born of war. These examples, many of which were based on sustained and successful collaborations between research and the affected groups themselves, demonstrate powerfully the significance of intersectoral co-operation for the benefit of war-affected populations.

1 Children born of war (CBOW) have been described as being forgotten in the transitional justice pro-cesses (e.g. Carpenter, R. Charli (2010): Forgetting Children Born of War: Setting the Human Rights Agenda in Bosnia and Beyond. New York. Similarly, some of the self-help organisations, in their chosen names reflect this sentiment. E.g. the Bosnian organisation of CBOW is Zaboravljena Djeca Rata (Forgotten Children of War)..
2 Newman, Edward (2004): The "New Wars" debate: A historical perspective is needed. In: Security Dialogue 35 (2), pp. 173-189.
3 Stern, Orly (2018): The Principle of Distinction. In: Stern, Orly (ed): Gender, Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law. Abingdon, pp. 15-40; Tadros, Victor (2018): The Moral Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants: Vulnerable and Defenceless. In: Law and Philosophy 37, pp. 289-312.
4 Crawford, Kerry F. (2017): Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to Condemnation of a Weapon of War. Washington D.C.
5 Loken, Meredith (2017): Rethinking rape: The role of women in wartime violence. In: Security Studies 26 (1), pp. 60-92; Cohen, Dara Kay (2016): Rape during Civil War. Ithaca.
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-additional-geneva-conventions-12-august-1949-and-0 (accessed May 20, 2022).
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf (accessed May 20, 2022); Jeleel, Rana (2013): Weapons of sex, weapons of war: Feminism, ethnic conflict and sexual violence in public international law during the 1990s. In: Cultural Studies 27, pp. 115-135.
8 Zalewski, Marysia et al. (eds) (2018): Sexual Violence against Men in Global Politics. Abingdon.
9 Rohwerder, Brigitte (2019): Reintegration of children born of wartime rape. K4D Helpdesk Report 628. Institute of Development Studies. Brighton.
10 Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (2017): Foreword. In: Neenan, J.: Closing the protection gap for children born of war. https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2018/LSE-WPS-Children-Born-of-War.pdf (accessed May 20, 2022).
11 Lee, Sabine and Glaesmer, Heide (2022): Children born of war: a critical appraisal of the terminology. In: Lee, Sabine, Glaesmer, Heide and Stelzl-Marx, Barbara (eds.): Children Born of War – Past, Present, Future. Abingdon, pp. 12-34, pp. 24-26.
12 Carpenter, R. Charli. (ed.) (2007): Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones. Bloomfield CT; Carpenter, R. Charli (2010).
13 Lee, Sabine (2017): Children Born of War in the 20th Century. Manchester; Rohwerder, Brigitte (2019).
14 Parts of this section have been explored in more detail in Lee, Sabine and Glaesmer, Heide (2022), on which this exposition is based.
15 Glaesmer, Heide et al. (2012): Die Kinder des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Deutschland. Ein Rahmenmodell für die psychosoziale Forschung. In: Trauma und Gewalt – Forschung und Praxisfelder, 6(4), pp. 318-328.
16 Apio, Eunice Otuko (2016): Children born of war in Northern Uganda: Kinship, marriage and the politics of post-war reintegration in Lango society (unpublished PhD thesis, Birmingham), p. 199.
17 Gebhardt, Miriam (2015): Als die Soldaten kamen. Munich; Grossmann, Atina (1995): A Question of Silence: The rape of German women by occupation soldiers. In: October 72, pp. 42-63; Sander, Helke and Johr, Barbara (eds.) (2008): BeFreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder. 3. Aufl., Frankfurt a. Main.
18 Stelzl-Marx, Barbara and Satjukow, Silke (2015): Besatzungskinder – Nachkommen alliierter Soldaten in Österreich und Deutschland (Occupation Children – Offspring of Allied Soliders in Austria and Germany). Wien, Köln, Weimar, p. 11.
19 Kuwert, Philipp et al. (2010): Trauma and current posttraumatic stress symptoms in elderly German women who experienced wartime rapes in 1945. In: The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 198(6), pp. 450-451.
20 Glaesmer, Heide et al. (2017): Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders. In: International Psychogeriatrics 29(7), pp. 1147-1156.
21 Aßmann, Anna-Lena et al. (2015): Stigmatisierungserfahrungen deutscher Besatzungskinder des Zweiten Weltkrieges. In: Trauma und Gewalt – Forschung und Praxisfelder, 9(4), pp. 294-303.
22 Kaiser, Marie et al. (2015): Depression, Somatization, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorders in children born of occupation after WWII in comparison with the general population. In: The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 203(10), pp. 742-748.
23 Kaiser, Marie et al. (2018): Long-term effects on adult attachment in German occupation children after WWII in comparison with a birth-cohort matched representative sample of the German general population. In: Aging & Mental Health 22(2), pp. 197-207.
24 Kiconco, Allen (2015): Understanding former 'Girl Soldiers' central themes in the lives of formerly abducted girls in post-conflict Northern Uganda (unpublished PhD thesis, Birmingham).
25 Anderson, Kimberley (2022): Addressing the needs of mothers and their children born of conflict-related sexual violence: a framework for support in psychosocial settings. In: Lee, Sabine, Glaesmer, Heide and Stelzl-Marx, Barbara (eds.): Abingdon, pp. 136-151.
26 Baur-Timmerbrink, Ute (2015): Wir Besatzungskinder. Söhne und Töchter alliierter Soldaten erzählen. Berlin; Behlau, Winfried. (ed.) (2015): Distelblüten. Russenkinder in Deutschland. Ganderkesee.
27 For instance: In the Name of the Father: docu-dance theatre collaboration between alphagroup, Graz and University of Birmingham; https://www.the-alpha-group.org/current-production/.
28 For instance: Akolkar, Dheeraj (director) (2018): Wars don't end. https://limonerofilms.com/portfolio_page/wars-dont-end; Akolkar, Dheeraj (director) (2021): The Wound is where the light enters. https://vimeo.com/606439654 (accessed June 7, 2022).

"WOMEN AND GIRLS ARE OFTEN EXCLUDED FROM THE DESIGN AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND HUMANITARIAN WORK"

We must not assume that natural disasters, refugee crises, or armed conflict affect everyone in the same way, says Isadora Quay from CARE. On the contrary, it is not only imperative to gain an understanding of structural inequalities and discrimination against women, but also to assess genderspecific vulnerabilities in humanitarian emergencies from the very beginning. In this interview with "Ethics and Armed Forces", she provides many explanations and examples, from the COVID pandemic to gender-specific programming and women leadership in Africa.

Mrs Quay, first of all, could you give us a brief description of your job?

My job is the Global Lead on Gender in Emergencies. CARE is a very large federation with more than a hundred countries. I coordinate amongst all those different countries with different management structures. My responsibility is to set strategic direction on what we are going to do on gender in emergencies. I also make sure that there are structures for that work and they have their appropriate technical teams.

What is the difference between a gender advisor's and your tasks?

Gender advisors make sure that people understand gender issues that are coming up during a crisis and are able to respond to them. We have a variety of skills, tools, and approaches which we can use to identify those issues and how to respond. They may manage specific programs on gender-based violence, "women, peace and security", women's voices, or economic empowerment.

When did gender aspects start to play a role in humanitarian action and in CARE's work?

Around the mid-90s, after the Beijing Conference, the United Nations agencies were the first to make a commitment on gender and humanitarian action. These top-level commitments slowly started to be translated into practice. CARE has had a gender in emergencies coordinator and strategy since 2009. We have one of the largest teams on gender and humanitarian action compared to any of the agencies in similar size. I've been working in similar positions since 2013, and we have spent a lot of our time over the last decade focusing on how to put into practice these aspirations which are incredibly popular but sometimes also challenging.

CARE's „Women and Girls in Emergencies"report[1] which was published some years ago states that „the specific needs of women and girls continue to be poorly addressed in humanitarian funding and response". Has there any progress been made in the meantime?

The first strategy on gender in emergencies was set up in 2009. At that time, we had only one gender in emergencies specialist in the whole organization. Now we have more than 44 senior staff working on the topic, and they may have their own teams, which does have implications for funding. The tool kit that we've developed and used now since 2013/2014 has been really instrumental in exploring the different needs of men, women, girls and boys during a crisis and understanding them. We've also seen a lot more action in terms of gender analysis, for example. In 2020, we did more than 50 rapid gender analyses. This is a very helpful tool, often supplemented with insights from interviews, which allows us to identify the gender-specific aspects of a crisis and the society in which it shows. We're seeing similar numbers coming up every year not only from CARE, but many other agencies that use the same methodology. That means that there has been a huge increase in the availability of gender analysis to inform humanitarian response although some of the practice is still challenging and certainly not the measure that we would like to see.

Let's dive a bit deeper into the subject of your work. Can you explain why it is so important to integrate gender issues into humanitarian assistance?

The first reason is because humanitarian action is about people. Gender and humanitarian action work is not just about women and girls, it's about women, girls, men, boys, people with disabilities, older people, younger children. People have different needs at different points in their lives depending on what's happening with them. And those differences matter. We should not be blind to some of the issues that we know are true in society and those issues are just as true during a crisis and often magnified. That is the commonsense approach.

But there's also a principled approach. If the considerations around humanitarian action are made only by men and only with the idea of the male form in mind, then that's not fair. We saw that even most recently with some COVID protective clothing. It doesn't fit women's bodies properly because it was made from men's bodies – even something as simple as that! If you design protective clothing that doesn't fit women, and women are the majority of health workers around the world, then you are making women less safe. Women and girls are often excluded from the design and the rationale behind humanitarian work even though the world is 51% female.

The pandemic is said to have deteriorated the situation of women in many other aspects. The rise in checkpoints in many countries to enforce lockdowns and curfews, for instance, exposed women to a higher risk of sexual harassment and abuse by policemen and male soldiers …

That's true. We see similar things at water points during humanitarian crises. If those who manage toilets or taps distributing water in a refugee camp are all men and lots of women are queuing, it will increase the risk and the incidence of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Data show that particularly in crisis and armed conflict gender-based violence and sexual violence increases. How would you explain that?

It is true we observe gender-based violence in all kinds of crises, not just during conflict where there's more military and militarization of society, but also during the COVID pandemic or in natural disasters where different kinds of violence and trafficking increase. In times of great stress, harmful practices, one of which is consistently gender-based violence, seem to bloom. All of the data shows that. But I cannot tell you the ultimate reason why that happens as this is not my area of expertise. I wonder if even experts have an ultimate answer on it …

… which is definitely worrying …

… but there is a great bulk of research that shows that gender-based violence is one of the first kinds of inequality that people can learn in the home and that it replicates itself. Valerie Hudson's work is very interesting on that. She looks at all forms of gender inequality and her empirical research, based on numbers and data, shows that countries with higher degrees of gender inequality in the home – and they are all around the world – are more likely to suffer conflict. The family household structure is the determining factor in it. She argues that if you learn in the home to oppress another, most of the time along age or gender lines, then you replicate that behavior in your own family, in your community and society. That leads to actual acts of oppression such as conflict itself.

Looking at women's or more broadly speaking gender-specific needs in times of crisis: How do you proceed to provide gender-specific assistance? Safe spaces for women in refugee camps, for instance, might not be enough.

First and foremost, you need to understand how a crisis is affecting men, women, girls and boys and anybody inbetween and how it is evolving from different people's perspectives. Of course, you can't wait to have the perfect analysis because you have at the same time immediate compelling needs. That's why rapid gender analysis is designed to be an "imperfect" tool. We publish it within 24 or 48 hours of the onset of a crisis, in the first two weeks and in the first six to eight weeks. We can start programming and keep making changes and improvements as we get more information, and that flexibility is important.

Profile



***Isadora Quay** works as Global Lead on Gender in Emergencies at CARE, an international organization for humanitarian action.*

As I have mentioned before, we know that some actions around gender-based violence will be required because this always happens, and it always gets worse. Evidence also shows that women's participation tends to go down during crises although there are new opportunities for women's voices to be heard. If we do not keep paying attention to that, their voices won't be heard either in assessments and consultations nor in the work that we do. These are the foundation pins of our gender and humanitarian action work at CARE.

Evidence shows that women's participation tends to go down during crises although there are new opportunities for women's voices to be heard

What could participation look like in times when you must meet the most basic needs? Does it not risk being treated as a secondary issue due to the urgency of the situation?

Even in an emergency, asking people what they really need and having the flexibility to respond can be very important. In a camp in Iraq in the Kurdish autonomous region, I once asked the Iraqi WASH engineer *(editor's note: WASH is an acronym for water, sanitation, hygiene),* an incredibly well-educated gentleman like all the other team members, if he had already thought about the kitchens. He told me that he had put them in the community discussions that day. I said, "Oh that's fantastic, and who's at a community discussion?" He answered: "The leaders." So I asked, "Hm, and those leaders do a lot of cooking …?" He immediately promised to go and ask some of the women who actually do the cooking in this camp about *their* preferences.

As you have already mentioned, taking gender into account does not mean to look only at women and girls. Why and when should we also consider the situation of boys and men?

Of course there are crises where men and boys are particularly affected, and it's not always easy for the humanitarian community to see when male vulnerability shows up. I can tell you about refugee camps in Kenya entirely populated by young men who didn't know how to cook. Boys are also much more likely to be forced into recruitment, for example. In the refugee crisis in Greece, more than 70% of the population was male, mainly unaccompanied Afghan and Syrian men with lots of minors. Young boys of eight or twelve on the streets on the island of Lesbos will certainly face other problems than young girls, but their vulnerability matters.

Some agencies concentrate wholly on women and girls and that can be fine for certain issues. For CARE, humanitarian action needs to understand the roles and relations everyone has. Even in our work on women's participation we must consider male participation and male decision-making spaces as well. We may focus on the gap in that case, but we don't ignore men and boys. Crisis makes everybody vulnerable, but vulnerable in different ways, and certain vulnerabilities because of systematic inequality are sometimes hidden.

Structural inequalities in society contribute to women's often disproportionate vulnerability. CARE's approach is to bring about more equality and empowerment. Does this mean that humanitarian action is not neutral?

The principles of neutrality and impartiality are really important values. But they are playing out in societies which are fundamentally unequal on many levels. I would argue, along with Valerie Hudson, that one of the first injustices we learn in the home is gender injustice. Even in Europe women spend far more time on housework and childcare than men. They are much less likely to be seen as suitable for leadership positions. And that is due to prejudice and tradition. I think it's very moral to want to transform and challenge injustice. Humanitarian action can be a moment where we can make some changes happen. Conflict and crises do horrible things to everybody, but they can also provide opportunities to change gender roles in ways that perhaps don't occur during peacetime.

On the other hand, challenging cultural gender norms is often seen as intrusive. What would you reply to that? Did the West try to impose its standards on Afghanistan, for instance?

I think we have a responsibility to try and change inequalities. But I also believe, and I believe many Islamic feminist scholars would agree with me, that inequality is a global phenomenon. How we change it should be very sensitive to the country. I work with many male and female staff who value many things about traditional society and don't want to reject their country or their cultures. At the same time, they want to change things because they don't believe that the current system is fair to everyone. It's a myth to pretend that culture is static. Social anthropology shows that it is constantly evolving and being reinvented. Did you know that some of the oldest texts on women's rights were written in Iran? It almost seems to me more western centric to imagine that we are having this debate only in Western Europe and North America.

The Women, Peace and Security agenda stresses the importance of women's participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Is this also part of your work?

We have a large program called "Women Lead in Emergencies" that our politics and governance people and the gender in emergencies team have been working on now for a number of years. In all different kinds of crises around the world, from Colombia to the Philippines to South Sudan, women come together in solidarity, but these are informal groups. Looking from outside you could get the impression that there are absolutely no women on any of the leadership committees. But then you discover that they have created their own ways to support each other and build on the need to connect. We find these groups and support them to take action. We don't tell them to build this many toilets or to attend this many meetings. They have a budget, and they decide what could make a difference in their community.

I'm eager to know how this looks like in practice.

The Zinder provinces in Niger are very challenging places to work in because of massive displacement. One of the first things the women we supported did was to travel to the mayor's office in the next town to campaign because a refugee camp had become very large and needed a school. And they got a school! The next thing they did was to get back on the bus to the mayor's office because they had to spend so much time getting water. At the mayor's office they were not used to women mobilizing in this way, and only some days later the women had a borehole. Male leaders and local men were impressed to see them achieving this while they had been pushing that issue for ages, like "Wow, these women are strong."

We've also seen South Sudanese women organize peace conferences in their refugee camps and set up the first ever South Sudanese refugee women's association because that's what they wanted to do. These examples show how transformative it can be for the women themselves but also for the community to think about women's leadership and participation as part of humanitarian response.

While we're doing this interview, the devastating war in Ukraine continues. Can you give us a very rapid gender analysis about the main challenges for humanitarian response?

The crisis is already showing strong gender dimensions in terms of who is staying and who is leaving. That is going to have a big impact on what kinds of experience people have: family separation and reunification, trafficking (we see an increased risk for those who have left), child protection, or going through conflict firsthand. We also support smaller, women-led civil society organisations through our program "Women Lead in Emergencies". There is a very strong women's rights movement inside Ukraine which now engages in humanitarian action and needs support. That is one of the things that give me hope.

Dear Mrs. Quay, thank you very much for the interview!

Questions by Rüdiger Frank.

1 https://www.care.de/media/websitedateien/care-allgemeines/publikationen/studien-reports/women-and-girls-in-emergencies.pdf (accessed 11 May 2022).
2 All documents at www.care.de/RGAs.

MORE WOMEN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION AND NATIONAL ACTION PLANS

Author: ***Maureen Macoun***

Abstract

In the year 2000, the UN Security Council explicitly linked peace to women's participation for the first time. The landmark resolution 1325 embraced the idea that the inclusion of women in peace negotiations has a positive impact on the sustainable success of peace agreements. More than twenty years later, however, women are still dramatically under-represented in peace negotiations. Yet peace processes shape the identity of the respective society: New constitutions are drafted and important decisions are made that determine whether a society returns to its pre-conflict status or tackles the root causes of the conflict. Resolution 1325 was followed by numerous other resolutions, which together form the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. One tool the UN uses to address non-implementation is National Action Plans. Each member is supposed to develop a plan to promote women's participation at the national level. This article examines and compares the action plans of Germany, Norway and Ghana, and offers a critical assessment based on selected points. It shows that the plans in some ways perpetuate the weaknesses of the WPS agenda, but they also have a lot of potential to make meaningful participation of women in peace processes a reality.

Introduction

The idea that war is a "man's business" persists even twenty years after the adoption of resolution 1325,[1] which together with its successor resolutions forms the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Accompanying this, the ending of hostilities through peace talks also tends to be seen as a task for men. Women are still heavily outnumbered in peace negotiations. The current negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation are no exception – despite the fact that almost half of Ukrainians (43 percent) support the participation of women in the negotiations, according to a survey by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).[2]

Adopted unanimously in 2000, resolution 1325 was hailed as a major success. It consists of four pillars: participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery.[3] Public attention often focuses on the protection of women and girls against sexual violence. This concern is undoubtedly a top priority. In the war in Ukraine too, reports of sexual violence are piling up. Yet it is forgotten that the resolution also calls for the participation of women, and aims to prevent conflicts.

One instrument intended to advance implementation are the so-called National Action Plans (NAP): Each UN member is supposed to draw up a NAP to implement the WPS agenda. This article focuses on NAPs as an implementation tool, examining their potential for achieving meaningful participation of women in peace processes. It also considers the extent to which the NAPs may perpetuate often-criticized shortcomings of the WPS agenda.

Why women should not be absent from peace negotiations

The background to the WPS agenda is the dual realization that peace processes in which women participate[4] are more sustainable, and furthermore that a society's propensity for conflict increases with growing gender inequality.[5] One possible reason for this is that with higher

gender inequality the acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolution rises, and so the potential for peaceful settlements decreases. Men often feel that their interests were met in the society before the conflict broke out, whereas women perceive the conflict as a continuum, since they experience violence before, during, and after conflict. Under such conditions, a return to how things were before the conflict erupted is not an improvement for women. Consequently, they aim their efforts at setting a course for positive change through peace processes.[6] The lack of representation of marginalized groups in negotiations – such as women or ethnic minorities – in turn has a negative impact on the acceptance of the outcome.[7]

Another argument that is repeatedly brought into play for greater participation of women in peace processes is that by nature they are peaceful and reconciliatory. But caution should be exercised here: The generalizing assumption that women are more peaceful is based on a stereotypical image of women. It ignores the fact that women – like men – also participate in armed conflicts as combatants. Conversely, this assumption also implies that men are naturally aggressive. This ascription of quasi-natural characteristics is problematic because it creates acceptance of certain forms and actors of violence ("that's just the way men are").

For this reason, participation should be seen more as a democratic right for women. Peace negotiations have a significant shaping effect on a society. Women make up at least half of society and therefore have the right to make up half of the people involved in decision-making. Yet in major peace processes between 1992 and 2019, on average only 13 percent of negotiators, 6 percent of mediators and 6 percent of signatories were women, while seven out of ten processes had no women as mediators or signatories.[8] The demand for meaningful participation goes beyond the mere quantitative participation of women, and refers also to the quality of participation: Women should be equally involved and able to exert influence; they should be qualified and know their rights.

Implementation of the WPS agenda at national level

But how can the agenda be implemented? National Action Plans are a valuable tool for implementing the WPS agenda, but they have not received much attention in the literature to date. UN member states develop NAPs for implementation within their own sphere of influence.

A NAP is a document detailing the steps a country is currently taking to achieve the goals outlined in resolution 1325, as well as the initiatives it will undertake within a specified timeframe to meet the commitments set forth in all WPS resolutions.[9] Denmark adopted the first plan in 2005, and has now launched the fourth generation. The first country affected by conflict to develop a NAP was Côte d'Ivoire in 2008.[10] After a slow start, 98 states have now produced NAPs, representing 51 percent of UN member states.[11]

The generalizing assumption that women are more peaceful is based on a stereotypical image of women – and implies that men are naturally aggressive

The plans take different forms and vary according to the initial situation and generation. A rough distinction can be made depending on whether the NAPs are directed at their own country ("inward looking") or at other countries, for example in the case of international missions ("outward looking").[12] The NAPs of countries affected by conflict and/or where violence against women is widespread tend to be inward looking. Countries that have not been affected by armed conflicts for many years tend to have outward-looking plans.[13] Many plans have a focus, but do not exclusively pursue one approach.

As well as advancing local implementation of the WPS agenda as a whole, many NAPs also refer to the participation of women in peace processes. A 2019 review of all NAPs by UN Women found that 61 of 82 plans contained measures for women's participation in

peace processes – including those of Germany, Ghana and Norway.[14]

Comparison of three NAPs: Germany, Ghana and Norway

The potentials and weaknesses of NAPs for facilitating women's participation in peace processes will now be illustrated with the example of these three documents. They are well suited to this purpose because they show different approaches to the agenda.

First of all, it is important for the participation of women that the plans are actually implemented. The criteria for sustained implementation are considered to be: *first* the political will, *second* effective monitoring, and *third* sustained budgeting. A helpful way to assess political will is to look at the body that drew up the plan. This gives an indication of the importance attached to the plan. The plans of Germany and Norway are convincing in this respect. The three plans differ when it comes to effective monitoring and sustained budgeting, although the budget is a weak point in all of them. Nevertheless, the Norwegian NAP does a very good job of involving civil society at many levels of implementation and monitoring, while the Ghanaian NAP stands out for its concrete implementation measures and goals. Finally, this article looks at the extent to which frequently voiced criticisms of the agenda are borne out by the plans – although consideration is limited to the points of orientation (inward/outward), militarization and victimization/infantilization.

It is important that efforts to ensure more security for women should not focus one-sidedly on military aspects, at the expense of conflict prevention

These "weaknesses" stand in the way of meaningful participation by women, in different ways. A one-sided outward orientation is problematic because it means that prevention in one's own country is often neglected. Then there is the point about militarization: The agenda, so the criticism goes, serves to legitimize military operations and armament, instead of achieving greater security through demilitarization and disarmament measures. It is therefore important that efforts to ensure more security for women should not focus one-sidedly on military aspects, at the expense of conflict prevention. The third point of criticism (victimization and infantilization) also stands in the way of meaningful participation. Victimization means that women are primarily portrayed as victims of (sexual) violence, while harmful male stereotypes are ignored. Infantilization is closely linked to this. It is expressed in the fact that women are often mentioned in the same breath as children ("women and children") in UN texts, which places them in the category of persons in need of protection. This is significant because NAPs that victimize and infantilize women tend to perpetuate counter-emancipatory images of dependent, immature women who need to be protected (possibly by military means), but who are not recognized as relevant stakeholders in peace and reconciliation processes.

Germany

Germany ranks 11th in the 2021/22 Global Index for Women, Peace and Security.[15] The current NAP is the country's third plan and is valid from 2021 to 2024. The first NAP was adopted in 2013. The NAP was prepared by an interministerial working group (Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Federal Ministry of Defense, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). The German federal government is generally responsible for funding and implementation. Evaluation and monitoring have been extended compared to the previous version. Consultation with civil society is planned halfway through the action plan. Details are to be provided at a later point in time.

The orientation of the plan is predominantly outward looking, with some inward elements: increased diversity in government, promoting awareness of the WPS agenda in Germany. It

is notable that the German NAP takes all genders into account. It mentions "all genders" and "LGBTI people" in various places. Harmful stereotypes are addressed:

"Discriminatory, binary and gender-based stereotypical roles that encourage violence and conflict are being eradicated in Germany, in crisis regions, fragile settings and in the context of flight, displacement and migration."[16]

The combination "women and girls" appears fifteen times, but so does "women and LGBTI people" three times and "women and youth" five times. The familiar phrase "women and children" does not occur. It is also notable that the plan directly calls for access to safe abortion. The issue is controversial among the states participating in the implementation of the agenda with a NAP. The plan also touches on the topic of arms control and disarmament, but this is not a main focus. In particular, it calls for gender-based analyses to be taken into account in controls of small arms and light firearms, in disarmament, and in arms controls and export controls.

In summary, the plan has several positive aspects. The advantage of having an a interministerial working group to draw up the NAP is that the subject is not assigned to the Ministry of Women / Family Affairs as a "women's issue" and ignored by other ministries. Instead, it is made into a cross-cutting issue. This indicates a strong political will in support of women's participation. The clear commitment to sexual and reproductive rights including safe access to abortion, and the expansion of the agenda to include LGBTI people are also positive signs. Sexual self-determination has always been an important factor for social participation. Expanding the agenda to include queer identities also enables trans women to participate menaingfully, for example. Furthermore it is an expression of an open, pluralistic society that does not adhere to rigid role models. This ultimately benefits all women (and people). Points of criticism, on the other hand, are that the NAP remains vague in some respects about the implementation, does not specify any targets, and certainly has no clear budget. In the NAP, Germany also commits itself to demilitarization and disarmament, and refers to the Arms Trade Treaty adopted in 2013 to regulate the trade in conventional weapons. Despite this, Germany was still the world's fifth-largest arms exporter[17] in 2021, which undermines the efforts of the plan.

Norway

Norway has now launched its fourth NAP (2019-2022). The Scandinavian country was an early supporter of the WPS agenda, producing its first NAP in 2006. Norway has not been involved in an armed conflict since the Second World War, but takes part in international missions. Norway ranks in first place in the WPS index.[18]

The Norwegian plan was also drawn up by an interministerial working group (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, Public Security and Migration, and the Ministry of Children and Equality). Universities, research institutes and civil society provided input.

The NAP makes detailed provisions for implementation: Relevant ministries report on the implementation. The reports are shared with civil society, and information meetings are held. The plan uses quantitative indicators to measure implementation, such as the proportion of women in various positions. However, no specific targets are formulated. The plan devotes a lot of attention to the evaluation of results, but does not contain an allocated budget. Nevertheless, the Norwegian plan is the only one of the three plans compared here which includes some specific funding figures.

The orientation is predominantly outward looking, although there are also inward-looking elements. In contrast to its predecessors, the NAP is more strongly focused on implementing the agenda in its own country. However, some inward targets relate indirectly to an outward context, such as the gender ratio in the Norwegian armed forces. Their composition in international missions is a long way from parity, as the plan self-critically notes: In 2016-2017, only about 35 percent of internationally deployed police and 10 percent of military personnel were female.

A special feature introduced by the third plan is "priority countries". These are countries

on which a particular focus is placed. Four out of six embassies set goals and developed plans to advance the WPS agenda. Countries are selected based either on Norway's involvement in the peace process there, or on the potential for trying out new methods. The budget at country level is 50 million Norwegian crowns (about 5 million euros).

The NAP identifies the genders addressed: "women and men, girls and boys". It discusses the roles of boys/men based on a binary understanding of gender. Overall, the language comes across as sensitized: The phrases "women and children" and "women and girls" each occur only once, while "women and men" appears 28 times, the word "girls" 31 times and "boys" 22 times.

Regarding the accusation of militarization, the plan leaves a mixed picture. It does emphasize the importance of conflict prevention. But on the other hand international missions and operations take up a lot of space, and the plan has a strong focus on increasing the number of women in the military.

In summary, a positive aspect of the plan is its systematic involvement of civil society. However, the plan does not provide more detailed information on the criteria used to select the representatives and the groups they represent. Furthermore, the priority countries approach has the potential to prove effective internationally. It provides a way to prioritize and achieve concrete goals locally. Yet this approach could also be accused of having imperialistic traits. It is one-sidedly directed outward. Norway assumes it is entitled to decide which countries should be particularly targeted or are of interest in terms of the agenda.

Ghana

Ghana gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1957, and is now a stable presidential republic. The country ranks 69th in the WPS index.[19] Although there are occasional violent clashes between various population groups, these do not meet the threshold of armed conflict[20] – the plan itself speaks of "relative peace".[21]

The West African country's NAP runs from 2020 to 2025, and follows the first plan dating from 2012. The Ghanaian NAP was developed by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, but various other ministries are consistently included. Local, regional and international partners were also involved in its development. These include the Women, Peace and Security Institute, founded in 2011, which trains women in mediation and conflict resolution. The NAP states that all other stakeholders who were part of the NAP development processes provided technical and financial support. It is not clear whether foreign donors had any influence on the content of the plan.

The plan begins with a highly critical examination of the security situation for women and girls in Ghana. In terms of implementation, the NAP stands out for its very concrete and measurable targets. The number of women actively working in early warning systems and other peacebuilding activities is to be increased to 30 percent; detailed initiatives are planned, such as training 50 women per district per year to collect information and monitor early warning signals for conflict prevention, or sponsoring 32 women (two from each region) annually to undergo training in mediation skills.

The plan also contains clear specifications for evaluation: A monitoring and evaluation framework sets out precisely scheduled meetings involving numerous ministries and civil society representatives. The plan does not have a fixed budget. One of the lessons learned from the first plan was that the lack of a dedicated budget or fundraising strategy was an obstacle to success. Now the Ministry of Finance is responsible for allocating budget lines for implementation.

The Author

Maureen Macoun *is a research associate at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, where she is currently pursuing a doctorate in international law under Prof. Dr. Sigrid Boysen. Her research centers on the role of women in peace processes, with a special focus on National Action Plans as an implementation strategy of the "Women, Peace, and Security" agenda. She studied law at the University of Hamburg and completed her legal clerkship in Schleswig-Holstein.*

The plan is based on a binary understanding of gender. The phrase "women and girls" occurs 31 times, "women and children" once, while "men and boys" does not appear at all. Thus the gender roles of men and boys tend to be disregarded. At the same time, a lot of responsibility is placed on women and girls. One goal is to "strengthen women and girls' capacity to resist sexual and gender based violence during conflict and ordinary times".[22] The activity by which this is to be achieved is "culturally acceptable sexuality education".[23] It is therefore also (implicitly) assumed here that only women and girls are victims of violence, which originates from men, yet the role of men is not addressed.

In summary, the plan's concrete, measurable goals are compelling. In this way, it has the potential to bring about meaningful participation for women in peace processes, particularly within the country and through international missions. However, there is a risk that the goals will not be achieved due to a lack of funding. Regarding the accusation of militarization, the early warning systems for conflict prevention are a positive feature. Finally, a traditional cultural approach to gender roles and sexuality is evident. At this juncture, however, it is worth pointing out that the author of this article is socialized in Germany and has internalized a rather liberal understanding of women's rights. It should also be noted that the rejection of homosexuality and transsexuality is often a legacy of colonial laws – in this case British laws.[24]

Conclusion

The three plans presented here identify ways in which women can be given the opportunity to participate meaningfully in peace processes: by setting concrete targets, training women to be mediators, and providing the impetus for further development of the agenda such as expansion to include LGBTIQ+ people. At the same time, however, the plans also reveal weaknesses of the agenda or fall short of what could be achieved, especially with regard to vaguely formulated and unbudgeted NAPs. None of the three NAPs has an allocated budget. Only just over one-third of all NAPs (36 countries, around 35 percent) include an allocated budget for implementation.[25] In human rights protection, it is not uncommon for areas that specifically address women's rights to have weaker funding.

The accusation that the agenda legitimizes armament and military operations is partially confirmed. Originally, the WPS agenda was also intended as an agenda for disarmament.[26] Even now, many plans do not sufficiently address conflict prevention; there is a focus on military operations, particularly with greater participation by female soldiers – this at least is suggested by the images used, which do not reflect the current proportion of women among military personnel. Moreover, only 31 NAPs (32 percent) contain references and specific proposals for action on disarmament and demilitarization.[27] The war in Europe is likely to exacerbate this trend.

As soon as countries start implementing their plans outside their own national territory and exporting values, a lot of tact is required to ensure that the agenda is not rejected as a Western initiative

Finally, the plans illustrate different sets of values. That is not negative in itself, but shows that the agenda can be interpreted in different ways and that diverse approaches are possible. Challenges arise as soon as countries start implementing their plans outside their own national territory and exporting values (as Germany and Norway do). A lot of tact is required here to ensure that the agenda is not perceived and rejected as a Western initiative. It should not be forgotten that countries of the global South have been instrumental in advancing the agenda. Representatives of the global South hosted three of the four World Conferences on Women, in Mexico City, Nairobi and Beijing. Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh, former President of the UN Security Council, laid an important foundation for the adoption of resolution 1325 with his famous statement on the link

between women and peace – "peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men".[28] And Namibia held the UN Security Council presidency when resolution 1325 was unanimously adopted.[29]

On the other hand, the three plans also show a lot of potential. Norway's NAP does a particularly good job of involving civil society. Seventy NAPs (72 percent) assign civil society organizations a specific role in implementation.[30] The NGOs themselves can use the plan in their work and base demands on it. The plans provide a way of breaking down a mammoth task into smaller parts. Concrete goals can be set, and therefore success can be measured – as the Ghanaian NAP in particular illustrates.

New efforts can be made on different levels at the same time. Each NAP can make a contribution to improving participation in peace processes. Their limited duration allows plans to be regularly adjusted and evaluated. This means that changes can be taken into account, but also that lessons can be learned from experience. All three plans critically examine their predecessors. Such a "reality check" is useful, since new instruments must demonstrate what they are actually capable of. Despite various shortcomings, National Action Plans have the potential to ensure that there are more women at the negotiating table and facilitate meaningful participation. It is to be hoped that this will continue to be achieved step by step, with positive approaches such as those presented here setting an example and promoting the agenda in its full breadth.

1 Security Council resolution no. 1325 Women and Peace and Security of October 31, 2000 (00-72018 (E)).
2 Nordås, Ragnhild et al. (2022): Ukrainian Women Engage in Resistance and Should Be in the Peace Talks. In: New Survey Evidence, blog post of April 29. https://blogs.prio.org/2022/04/ukrainian-women-engage-in-resistance-and-should-be-in-the-peace-talks-new-survey-evidence/ (accessed May 15, 2022).
3 Ormhaug, Christian (2014): OSCE Study on National Action Plans on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Wien, p. 86.
4 UN Women (2015): Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. New York City, pp. 41 ff.
5 Caprioli, Mary (2005): Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict. In: International Studies Quarterly 49, pp. 161, 163.
6 Boysen, Sigrid (2019): Repräsentation und Repräsentativität. Geschlechterfragen im Internationalen Demokratiediskurs. In: Eckertz-Höfer, Marion and Schuler-Harms, Margarete (eds.): Gleichberechtigung und Demokratie – Gleichberechtigung in der Demokratie. (Rechts-)Wissenschaftliche Annäherungen. Baden-Baden, pp. 85, 97.
7 Saliternik, Michal (2016): Perpetuating Democratic Peace: Procedural Justice in Peace Negotiations. In: European Journal of International Law 27, pp. 617, 618, 628.
8 UN Women/UNDP (2022): Women's Meaningful Participation in Transitional Justice: Advancing Gender Equality and Building Sustainable Peace. https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Research-paper-Womens-meaningful-participation-in-transitional-justice-en.pdf (accessed May 15, 2022).
9 Popovic, Nicola, Lyytikainen, Minna and Barr, Corey (2010): Planning for Action on Women, Peace and Security. New York City, pp. 27 f.
10 Barrow, Amy (2016): Operationalizing Security Council Resolution 1325: The Role of National Action Plans. In: Journal of Conflict and Security Law 21, pp. 247, 248, 258.
11 http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/ (accessed May 15, 2022).
12 Hudson, Heidi (2017): The power of mixed messages: Women, peace, and security language in national action plans from Africa. In: Africa Spectrum 52, pp. 3, 7; Barrow, Amy (2016), pp. 247, 269.
13 Hudson, Heidi (2017), pp. 3, 7.
14 UN Women (2019): Increasing Women's Participation in Mediation Processes: What Roles for the United Nations, Regional Organizations and Member States? Annex 2.
15 https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/WPS-Index-2021.pdf (accessed May 15, 2022): The index was developed in 2017 and relates women's participation and their access to justice to security statistics.
16 All NAPs are available at http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/index.php/nap-overview/ (accessed May 15, 2022).
17 SIPRI (2022): Press release of April 25, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time (accessed April 29, 2022). The plan refers to not only large military equipment but also small arms and light firearms, which can have a serious impact on the situation of women and children in conflicts. On this point, see https://amnesty-frauen.de/unsere-gruppe/themen/kleinwaffen/ (accessed May 18, 2022).

18 See endnote 16.
19 See endnote 16.
20 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, https://ucdp.uu.se/country/452 (accessed May 15, 2022).
21 See endnote 16.
22 See endnote 16.
23 See endnote 16.
24 Brooks, Lewis and Daly, Felicity (2016): The Commonwealth is working to undo the British empire's homophobic legacy. The Guardian, April 24, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/apr/24/criminal-ise-gay-sex-commonwealth-undo-british-empires-homophobic-legacy (accessed May 15, 2022).
25 http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/ (accessed May 15, 2022).
26 For a detailed discussion, see: Otto, Diane: Women, Peace and Security: A Critical Analysis of the Security Council's Vision. In: Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala et al. (eds.) (2018): The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict. Oxford, pp. 105, 111.
27 Ibid.
28 Chowdury, Anwarul Karim (2000): Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality Between Women and Men Says Security Council. International Women's Day Statement, UN Security Council, 2000, Press Release SC/6816. https://www.peacewomen.org/node/98284 (accessed May 15, 2022).
29 Iileka, Nekwaya and Imene-Chanduru, Julia (2020): How Namibia helped birth UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, In: Africa Renewal, October 27. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2020/how-namibia-helped-birth-un-resolution-1325-women-peace-and-security (accessed May 15, 2022).
30 Ibid.

GENDER DIVERSITY & INCLUSION IN ARMED FORCES

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Author: ***Andrea Ellner***

Abstract

Women's integration into armed forces has been a bone of contention for decades. Much of the controversy had focused on their impact on operational effectiveness. Ethical considerations have been taking a back seat. This essay argues that a focus on function is counterproductive and can signify unethical leadership because it may not only undermine women's operational effectiveness, but also increase risks to their lives. Function and ethics cannot be separated. The latter gives the former meaning, but especially in militaries the definition of functional requirements is also gendered. They have been shaped and defined by men as the dominant population. Understanding the function-ethics nexus and addressing its genderedness are necessary prerequisites for the creation of a diverse organisation whose structures and processes enable individuals, especially in leadership positions, to bring about truly inclusive military and service cultures. As long as women's lived experience reinforces their otherness, because they are 'not-male', their position in informal power hierarchies is precarious and they are at risk of being subjected to ethically, including sexually, transgressive behaviour. They will continue to face multiple barriers to career progression. This undermines their potential for becoming role models and the armed forces' ability to signal their commitment to diversity and inclusion at every level including the senior leadership. The essay argues that this matters for the military as an organisation, but also its conduct on operations. NATO and its member states have committed to implementing gender perspectives in and on operations. Service members are unlikely to suddenly be able to do this, if they have not practiced ethical and gender-inclusive behaviours in their daily professional lives.

Introduction

For decades debates on gender integration in the armed forces of key NATO members have revolved around a few contested themes. Pre-eminent among them has been the impact of women's presence in the ranks of armies, air forces and navies on operational effectiveness. Faced with recruitment problems the military and political leadership tended to treat the question primarily as a matter of a functional imperative with ethical perspectives of secondary relevance. Would women be able to perform adequately, physically and psychologically? If women participated in combat, even ground close combat, would their chivalrous impulse drive men to put their own lives at risk in order to protect women?

In countries like Canada, the UK or the US such doubts were revived each time more roles were opened up to women in the long process that led to the complete removal of gender-based exclusions over the past decade. A country like Germany seemed to be spared such repeated debates. After a judgment of the European Court of Justice in 2000 in favour of the plaintiff Tanja Kreil women could apply for all roles in the *Bundeswehr;* they had served in the medical services at officer rank since 1975 and all medical ranks and the music corps since 1988.[1]

By opening up in one fell swoop in 2001 the *Bundeswehr,* however, only delayed controversies around operational effectiveness. When asked as part of a 2014 *Bundeswehr* study about women's aptitude to serve in combat 52 per cent of men claimed that women lacked the physical capabilities[2] and were a risk to operational effectiveness because "men always wanted to protect women in the group and could therefore not concentrate on their operations".[3] In common with female service members in other NATO forces, women in the *Bundeswehr* have experienced bullying, sexism, sexual harassment or even assault; yet their male peers accuse them of being privileged.

So what is going wrong? NATO's armed forces are officially committed to gender integra-

tion. Britain, Canada and the US, but also Germany have been making big strides over the past decades. Yet, there are deep seated obstacles to the full integration of women. This essay argues that a fundamental problem lies in the separation of ethics from functionality. They cannot be separated, because ethics give function meaning beyond the mere exercise of force or application of violence. Indeed, ethical conduct on operations is dependent on ethical behaviour within the armed forces.

In order to explain this, the essay will first explore the link between function and ethics by asking whether failing to adapt organisational processes and cultures signals the opposite of official commitments to Diversity & Inclusion (D&I), that is, exclusion through 'othering' language or processes. It then discusses briefly the linkage between internal practice of ethical conduct and commensurate external behaviour. In the subsequent section it illustrates the manifold unethical consequences of the practice or even only perception of gender-segregated fitness standards. Without addressing the ethical dimensions of apparently functional issues or ensuring that new policies avoid creating them militaries will impair the ability of minority personnel to make the best possible contribution to teams, units, services and the organisation as a whole.

Ethics and Function – The Dangers of *Othering*

It is ethics and function together that shape internal organisational cultures, inter-personal behaviours and processes, as well as external behaviours, that is, how and to what ends militaries apply force. A military that tolerates unethical behaviour in daily interactions cannot be expected to know how to behave ethically on operations where stress and stakes for individuals are much higher.

How an organisation treats its people thus matters. The processes and systems in place to facilitate their work are not neutral. They too communicate immaterial and normative messages. Systems and processes are put in place by people whose perspectives signal who or what is included in or excluded from the design. That this matters a great deal in the area of equality, diversity and inclusion can easily be demonstrated on the example of seemingly small issues.

When Dr Heike Groos, Oberstabsärztin (Medical Staff Officer Surgeon) in the *Bundeswehr*, arrived in Afghanistan she quickly discovered that sanitary pads or tampons were not available in *Bundeswehr* stores. Her luggage allowance was insufficient to take enough for the duration of the tour. So she had to have them sent from Germany.[4] Women in the British Army have experienced the same. It is able to deal with the logistics of providing sun screen and insect repellent, but not sanitary products. If women ran out in theatre, they had to "[turn] to using socks and bits of paper when they [got] their period".[5]

In a male dominated environment underplaying their female attributes can be a survival strategy for women, a way of seeking their male peers' acceptance as a fellow professional

Logistics processes which disregard needs that are specific to women signal a lack of consideration for the *whole* work force and in this case for potential sensitivities surrounding menstruation and indulge its tabooisation. In a male dominated environment underplaying their female attributes can be a survival strategy for women, a way of seeking their male peers' acceptance as a fellow professional. The last thing they want to do is draw attention to their difference. Where being male is the standard of professionalism and its measure, 'outing' oneself as female is an 'admission' of deficiency.

This reduces status in the informal power hierarchy and can create vulnerability. If women have to make a special request for sanitary products or any other gender or sex-specific provision, they are forced to risk being denigrated, especially if they have to ask a man for emergency supply in an organisation where strong taboos surround menstruation and the menopause.[6] If they find a quip unfunny

because it is demeaning, they are likely to be accused of a sense of humour failure, a further alienation.

Indeed in Britain 'Paula Edwards, a mental health therapist with the female veterans charity Salute Her, said: […] "They go to someone of a higher rank to ask for help and they're made to feel like they're stupid and embarrassed about the situation – so they say nothing."' She also stated that "women have reported being bullied over their periods and have been told that they smell. Having to use other kinds of materials instead of sanitary products has also led to infections and health problems, which then go unreported".[7]

The same signal of 'you are different and not part of us' is sent to members of other, such as religious or ethnic, minorities, if they have to ask for provisions that are essential to their lives, but not to those of the majority population. Nariman Hammouti-Reinke had endless difficulties being supplied with food that did not contain pork or during Ramadan.[8] The meal containers were labelled "Muslim" in large letters for all to see that it was a special request. In an organisation that prizes standardisation in line with a strong dominant population, and thus devalues diversity, standing out as a 'mis-match' is highly undesirable for the individual.

In an organisation that prizes standardisation in line with a strong dominant population, and thus devalues diversity, standing out as a 'mis-match' is highly undesirable for the individual

Why does this matter? If decisions on the scope of gender integration fail to appreciate problematic ethical implications, gender integration will remain a bone of contention. Women, or ethnic, religious and other minorities, will not be accepted as equals to their male or white and Christian peers who are treated as a standard measure. They will be seen consciously or unconsciously as a weak link, in the informal power hierarchy at the receiving end of transgressive behaviour and as less trustworthy.

This poses risks to inter-personal relations and the all-important factor of trust horizontally within units and vertically along the chain of command. This harms the organisation and its operational effectiveness and in addition can prevent service members' and especially women's ability to develop their full potential as team members and leaders. Last but not least, a lack of appreciation of ethical implications can lead to trauma or worse unnecessary loss of lives.

It cannot be overemphasised that the issue is not always or only one of individual or even small group behaviour. If the overall system and processes permit discrimination and undermine integration or signal a lack of consideration for the diverse needs of the diverse populations the organisation claims to want and need in order to improve its effectiveness in the operational environment of the 21st century, the most determinedly inclusive individual leader will also be set up to fail.

For example, uniforms which are designed for men and make no provision for women's bodies are a common problem for female service personnel. On operations the problem is even worse. It is one thing to have to make small adjustments of kit that is basically designed around a standard body shape, as men whose physique falls outside the margins of the norm have to do. It is also not unusual for service personnel to have to or choose to make private provisions, but to expect women to develop a tolerance for working with kit that is not designed for them undermines their ability to be operationally effective and may even put their lives at risk. This is not a sign of the procurement system's and military leadership's respect or due care for them.

The 2021 Atherton review by a parliamentary committee into the experience of women in the British armed forces found that because "body armour makes no provision for breasts […] a much larger size has to be worn" and concluded that this can lead to immediate injury, increase further the constraints on physical movement imposed by ill-fitting uniforms

and undermine both the safety and operational effectiveness of women.[9]

Dr Heike Groos experienced virtually the same in Afghanistan. She had to wear body armour that was so big and long that it hurt in the groin and got in the way when she knelt down, a position generally needed when caring for wounded. She had no choice but to get used to it.[10] And women do, but the level of discomfort and risk reported across national militaries should have been deemed unacceptable long ago.

Interdependence of Internal and External Ethical Behaviour

For armed forces that at least aspire to use force to ends and in ways that seek to preserve a modicum of human dignity for themselves and in others and that aim to contribute to creating conditions from which civilians might construct a better peace, both the internal and the external dimensions of the ethics-function nexus are interdependent.

NATO recognised in its 2017 policy on integrating gender perspectives in support of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 of 2000:

"NATO forces must internally and externally uphold and adhere to high moral and human standards. Any form of abuse, exploitation and harassment should never be accepted. A soldier abusing or mistreating colleagues internally, cannot be trusted conducting tasks properly externally. Commanders and forces are obligated to prevent and respond to such conduct within their sanctioned power and authority."[11]

UNSCR 1325 initiated the Women, Peace & Security Agenda, a body of UNSCRs which recognise that gender and gender relations shape causes of, experiences in and conditions for overcoming violent conflict. NATO policy demands that national chains of command punish unethical, e.g. sexually transgressive, behaviour. It also talks about prevention. That is sometimes narrowly viewed as deterring through punishment after offences have already occurred. Though important, too often militaries fail to do this effectively. Indeed prevention starts much earlier.

Effective diversity and inclusion starts with the general work climate. Diversity is relatively easily achieved especially if it is seen as a matter of visible differences, such as gender or ethnicity. Inclusion is an entirely different matter. To be actually inclusive an organisation needs to hear, incorporate in its daily workings, whether they are routine or exceptional, and address the needs of the diverse individuals or groups that make up the staff. That also means that members of minorities with visible or invisible characteristics need to be treated in such a manner that they feel respected for their professionalism, the contributions they make and the perspectives they bring.

This requires treating diversity as an asset, as the official policies claim to do, and a matter of affording each other human dignity, rather than treating representatives of minorities as deviating from the standard and thus a problem. It is then more difficult to establish informal power hierarchies on the basis of characteristics people cannot change. As informal power hierarchies are a major facilitator of unethical behaviour by powerful group members against the weak, removing opportunities to establish them is an important part of preventing it. It means not tolerating sexist or bullying language, which can take the form of 'jokes' that are in fact demeaning group members, as this creates an environment which sexists, or racists, can read as permissive of more serious offences.

As informal power hierarchies are a major facilitator of unethical behaviour by powerful group members against the weak, removing opportunities to establish them is an important part of preventing it

Effective prevention of discrimination and criminal behaviour based on gender, or for that matter other characteristics, depends on the systems, processes and norms that govern inter-personal behaviour horizontally, e.g. within teams, and vertically, i.e. along the

chain of command. For many militaries, which have traditionally prized communality if not standardisation, this kind of adaptation can be a tall order, but it is essential if integration and inclusion are truly aims of the organisation.

The British MoD's Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2018-2030 acknowledges the fundamental importance of this, but it also recognises that success demands dedication, vigilance and long-term, persistent commitment.

"There needs to be a much greater focus on embedding D&I as part of normal business and making it part of the culture and behaviours of the whole organisation.

We need to continue to work to ensure our policies and processes take account of D&I opportunities and impacts.

We need to ensure that inclusion is more firmly embedded in Defence culture and behaviours."[12]

Although it might be regarded as yet another official foray into improving the MoD's performance on D&I, again emphasising the need for a change in military culture, the past decade has seen significant improvements. Well into the 2000s the British military, as for example its US counterpart, denied that there were problems on the ground. The 2009 Andrews-Watts report did flag up misogyny and inappropriate behaviour in the British Army, but the response was that these were problems of the past. Over time it became clear that there is no problem, if one does not ask the right questions or the right people, for example women; in 2014 the *Bundeswehr* was incidentally suspected of applying a similar obfuscating strategy on the matter of sexually transgressive behaviour against women.[13]

Without a systematic approach and consistent scrutiny of the military's effectiveness in improving the practice of D&I and military culture, internal ethical behaviour will always fall short

In Britain, after incidents and informal surveys made denials increasingly impossible, the MoD and armed forces had to take the problems seriously. Evidence on their scale and nature was collated most recently by two MoD commissioned reports, the 2019 Wigston Review on inappropriate behaviours,[14] the Gray Review of 2020[15] on the implementation of Wigston's recommendations and including further recommendations, and the House of Commons Defence Committee's 2021 *Atherton Report*[16].

Each report has noted some progress, but also flagged up much room for improvement. Making D&I effective remains a work in progress, but one must not underestimate the importance of such systematic reviews. Without them organisations cannot identify the problems or learn about asking the right questions. Without such a systematic approach and consistent scrutiny of the military's effectiveness in improving the practice of D&I and military culture, internal ethical behaviour will always fall short. This is likely to have negative consequences for its external behaviour.

Armed forces and the legitimate authorities, that is governments, constitutionally empowered to authorise their use are bound by international law, first and foremost the Law of Armed Conflict or International Humanitarian Law. This includes gender dimensions. Whilst not themselves being international laws UNSCR 1325 and follow-on resolutions link directly to these legal frameworks via the obligation to protect civilians in violent conflict. The link established by NATO's 2017 policy discussed above has thus more general implications for militaries.

The ability of individual service members to live and act in ways that are commensurate with these obligations depends in large parts also on their own military ethos. All of the armed forces referenced here have codes of conduct, expressed in their oath of service as well as service-specific values. These include generally a commitment to the mission, integrity, respect for others, selfless service, loyalty and moral courage. Acting in congruence with these values lies at the heart of a, if not the, key precondition for the operational effectiveness as well as physical and moral sustainability of functioning armed forces: Trust.

Trust is a very precious interpersonal state as well as, and this is sometimes underappreciated, a process. Trust needs to be earned. It is always important for constructive relationships and interactions between people. In the military it is the essence of a functioning organisation both vertically along the chain of command and horizontally within and across teams. This does not preclude rivalries and serious, but ultimately playful competition between units, branches or services, but building and maintaining trust demands that each service member respects the dignity of the other. The following section will examine the close linkage between trust, ethics and operational performance.

The Perils of Two-Tier Systems

In the armed forces of Australia, Canada, the UK and the US women in combat roles has been a hotly contested issue for over a century.[17] In 1941 a Women's Royal Naval Service Officer responsible for gunnery trials had to be accompanied by male officer to give 'fire' or 'cease fire' orders.[18] Similar restrictions applied to women in other NATO militaries. In Germany the prohibition on women serving under arms was enshrined in the Basic Law until the ECJ ruled it illegal in 2000.[19]

Excluding women from combat roles maintained a two-tier system which became increasingly problematic. It underscored a gender-based power hierarchy with women, already in a minority, kept at an inferior status and potentially vulnerable, because by dint of their gender they were prevented from applying for combat roles. Air forces and navies dropped these exclusions well before armies opened up ground close combat roles to women. General Dempsey, then Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged this informal hierarchy and its role in making women vulnerable to military sexual assault when the US Department of Defense announced in 2013 that women would no longer be excluded from ground close combat roles.[20]

There is nothing in women's gender that makes them less capable. There are differences between the average men's and women's physical strength and physiology, but women who are keen to qualify for roles in which extraordinary physical performance is required can overcome them. All applicants, regardless of gender, have to start training and preparing well in advance for especially demanding roles and many men cannot achieve the requisite level of fitness and resilience either.

There is nothing in women's gender that makes them less capable

This is starkly illustrated by the 100 women who have qualified as US Rangers since the first two successfully passed the course in 2015.[21] The course is one of the toughest in the US military with a very high failure rate in the initial Ranger Assessment Phase, which 61 per cent of applicants, the vast majority men, failed in 2016.[22] It appears that diversity has truly arrived, but there is reason to be concerned that it as well as true inclusion are being undermined by a renewed debate about physical performance standards in some militaries.

The US Army is considering re-introducing aspects of gender-specific standards.[23] The *Bundeswehr* makes allowances in evaluating women's performance in the initial aptitude and in-service basic fitness tests,[24] and sporting achievements.[25] Male members of the *Bundeswehr* indeed perceive their female peers as privileged and physically less capable, because they have to achieve higher performance standards for official sports awards than women; in Lieutenant Nathalie Falkowski's view a particular problem for women in combat units.[26]

Gender segregated fitness standards, however, perpetuate or re-introduce a two-tier system with the associated risks to women, teams and the organisation.[27] It is important not to privilege those physiological values that have traditionally been used to measure men's fitness, but to assess the ability to perform the required tasks. Some team members will be able to over-fulfil, others just meet

minimum standards, whether the team is homogenously male or mixed. Individuals have different training routes to required fitness standards. Gender does play a role here. For example British Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Diane Allen has argued that training regimes designed for men may be less effective for, and more likely to lead to injury in women.[28]

The tests and the conditions under which they are taken must be fair. In 2021 the Atherton Report demanded "that fitness tests across all Services have due regard for temporary or arbitrary factors that can hinder performance, including hormonal changes linked to pregnancy and menopause and ill-fitting kit".[29]

Deploying teams that have trained together can be very beneficial for gender integration, but not if the male population carries a lack of trust into theatre

Organisations like the military with a purpose that is as morally complex as it is personally challenging and politically relevant have a duty to enable personnel to perform to the best possible standard, one that must be derived from the requirements of the challenges soldiers will meet and not necessarily regimental tradition or a variation thereof. An example of such function and output orientated fitness standards is the Canadian Force Evaluation model. It distinguishes between standards for basic and specialty trades, but each set of tests and standards applies to all personnel irrespective of gender.[30]

It is essential to recognise the ethical dimensions here, but they are often overlooked. Why are women disadvantaged, if they do not have to perform to the same level as men or their peers have the perception that they do not? First, they are sent into combat or other dangerous situations in which they are likely to face risks to body and life, but may have to assume that they are unlikely to succeed in discharging their responsibilities and protect themselves. Second, perhaps even more importantly in terms of military ethos, they may fear that they will be unable to support their peers adequately and pull them out of danger, a key motivator for military personnel in combat.

As a consequence, third, their peers are unlikely to trust them, because they too fear the female soldier next to them cannot keep them as safe as a male peer, especially if trained performance standards have to be pushed. Fourth, male soldiers are less likely to respect their female peers already in training. Deploying teams that have trained together can be very beneficial for gender integration, but not if the male population carries a lack of trust into theatre. Fifth, if women cannot perform to the mission requirement, this can harm the operational effectiveness of the unit or larger formation; the same would of course apply to men if the performance standards did not match the minimum requirements expected in real life situations.[31]

Sixth, women in command of subordinates will have the same responsibilities for them as men. They will expect themselves and be expected to bring back from operations as many of their people as whole in body and soul as militarily possible for an ethically aware leader. Not being seen to be as physically prepared as men for these roles will again set women up for failure. Their subordinates may lose trust in them and reject them as leaders. There is therefore a risk that, seventh and lastly, their own superiors who are writing their reports will also see them as sub-optimal leaders and that will negatively affect their career prospects.

From an organisational perspective these are extremely undesirable effects. As long as

The Author



Dr Andrea Ellner *lectures in the Defence Studies Department, King's College, London. Her research combines historical with contemporary perspectives on gender, armed forces, war, military ethics & moral injury. She is on the Euro-ISME Board of Directors and a Core Member on Gender of the King's Centre for Military Ethics. She recently published "Gender Stereotypes in the Media: Are Ukrainian women really only helpless victims?" https://www.kcl.ac.uk/gender-stereotypes-in-the-media-are-ukrainian-women-really-only-helpless-victims*

they persist in some form or other, they are symptoms of unethical leadership. It is not commensurate with the aspiration of treating people with dignity or the notion that the organisation and chain of command has a duty of care to its people. It is unfair on men and women. It undermines team spirit and unit cohesion because it undermines trust or prevents it from being developed in the first place and maintained through trying times. Last but not least it subverts any policy whose declared aim is to ensure that women are promoted to higher ranks. They can not only be important role models for other women, but are also an important signal of an organisation's commitment to gender integration.

Conclusions

The analysis has demonstrated that understanding the ethical dimensions of women's inclusion into armed forces is a necessary prerequisite for maintaining and even improving operational effectiveness in a gender-integrated organisation. Armed forces, their civilian masters, i.e. the government, and service members must reflect on the genderedness of underlying assumptions that still shape policies, from procurement systems to fitness standards, and behaviours that shape cultures.

Without this reflection there will be no recognition that what is seen as naturally an aspect of function is, on closer inspection, based on masculine attributes, approaches or requirements. In order to maintain or enhance all aspects of organisational and operational effectiveness, from fitness over cultures to kit, it is necessary to separate these gendered dimensions from output and then adapt the approach to a mixed-gender organisation. That means recognising that a diverse population will accomplish tasks and produce output at least to some degree in non-standardised ways. That is the strength of diverse teams.

For teams and their members to be able to capitalise on their individual and diverse strengths inter-personal relations need to be based on and suited to facilitating trust in a continuous process. For this it is essential that team members respect each other, acknowledge the validity of their diverse experiences and perspectives in their quest for the common purpose and refrain from denigrating each other. This is not to suggest that every decision needs to be subject to a democratic vote, but it is to suggest that organisational systems, processes and policies must support individuals, especially those in leadership positions, in facilitating changes in military culture to bring about truly inclusive culture.

Those designing systems, processes and shaping policies as well as their implementation need to be self-reflective and interrogate their thinking from the perspective of members of minority populations. Othering language, supply chains or standards whether they relate to kit or personnel, must be identified and overcome. Otherwise gender integration will continue to cause controversy. Women will be systematically, if perhaps unintentionally, prevented from maximising their potential. They will continue to have to fight for respect and recognition when they have to fear simultaneously that their lives and their ability and commitment to protect the lives of their peers, male and female, are undermined by the very organisation and people they are there to serve.

A diverse population will accomplish tasks and produce output at least to some degree in non-standardised ways. That is the strength of diverse teams

Ethical leadership means not giving, for decades, such a low priority to adapting uniforms and kit that women who are now serving in roles where their lives and those of their colleagues depend on their ability to perform their professional duties may be prevented from doing so to the same level as their male peers.

The same reasoning applies to fitness standards. They must demand that all members of a team regardless of gender fulfil the minimum requirements for the role they will be expect-

ed to perform in theatre. If they are wrongly perceived as discriminatory on the basis of gender, then the organisation must counter and rectify such perceptions. Anything short of this will not only undermine women's trust in themselves and thus their performance, but also unjustly diminish the trust others, team members and leaders, have in them.

If women are thus at lower levels of the informal power hierarchy, they are furthermore at higher risks of ethically and sexually transgressive behaviour. This then is not only a substantial barrier to a diverse and inclusive military organisation that functions effectively from the smallest unit up to the senior leadership. It is also a serious hindrance to acting on ethical principles and with meaningful regard to gender perspectives on operations as mandated by the UN, NATO and its member states.

1 Behrend, Hans-Günther (Hg.) (2020): Erinnerungsorte der Bundeswehr. Personen, Ereignisse und Institutionen der soldatischen Traditionspflege. Berlin, p. 130.
2 Kümmel, Gerhard (2014) (ed.): Soldatinnen in der Bundeswehr – Integrationsklima und Perspektiven. Potsdam. p. 12.
3 Schnell, Lisa (2014): Soldaten halten Frauen bei der Truppe für untauglich. Der Spiegel, 24 January. https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-studie-zeigt-vorurteile-von-soldaten-gegenueber-frauen-a-945367.html [translation by the author]. (All online sources accessed 25 April 2022.)
4 Groos, Heike (2011): Ein schöner Tag zum Sterben. Als Bundeswehrärztin in Afghanistan. Frankfurt am Main, p. 78.
5 Proctor, Kate (2021): Women Soldiers Forced To Use Socks and Paper As Period Products While On Tour, MPs told. PoliticsHome, 4 March. https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/women-soldiers-socks-and-paper-sanitary-products-period.
6 House of Commons Defence Committee (2021): Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life. Second Report of Session 2021-22. 12 July (hereafter quoted as Atherton Report), pp. 35 ff. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmdfence/154/15402.htm.
7 Proctor, Kate (2021).
8 Hammouti-Reinke, Nariman (2019): Ich Diene Deutschland. Ein Plädoyer für the Bundeswehr und warum sie sich ändern muss. Reinbek, pp. 149-155.
9 Atherton Report, p. 31 ff paras 68-76.
10 Groos, Heike (2011), p. 77.
11 NATO (2017): Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001 (public version) – Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure. SH/SAG/GEN/JC/17-317874/1 TSC-GSL-0010/TT-170733/Ser:0761. 17 October 2017. Annex B, 1. https://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2017/bi-scd_40-1_2rev.pdf.
12 UK Ministry of Defence (2018): A Force for Inclusion- Defence Diversity and Inclusion Strategy, 2018-2030, p. 13. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/907901/20180806-MOD_DI_Plan_A4_v14_Final-U.pdf.
13 Schnell, Lisa (2014): Sexuelle Belästigung in der Truppe – Die Bundeswehr will lieber nicht alles wissen. Der Spiegel, 27 January. https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/frauen-in-der-truppe-bundeswehr-kuerzte-brisante-fragen-in-studie-a-945444.html.
14 Ministry of Defence (2019): Report on Inappropriate Behaviours (Review by Air Chief Marshal Wigston). 15 July. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/817838/20190607_Defence_Report_Inappropriate_Behaviours_Final_ZKL.pdf.
15 Ministry of Defence (2020): Unacceptable Behaviours: progress review 2020 (by Danuta Gray). December. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/941813/20201204-Unacceptable_behaviours-progress_review_2020_Public_for_DDC.pdf.
16 Atherton Report.

17 For example de Groot, Gerard (1997): I Love the Scent of Cordite in your Hair - Gender Dynamics in Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries during the Second World War. History, Vol. 82, no. 256, p. 83.
18 Fletcher, M. H. (1989): The WRNS: A History of the Women's Royal Naval Service. London, p. 35 f.
19 NDR (2020): Tanja Kreil: Pionierin für Frauen in der Truppe, 11 January. https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/chronologie/Tanja-Kreil-Pionierin-fuer-Frauen-in-der-Bundeswehr,bundeswehr2242.html.
20 Harris, Paul (2013): Women in combat: US military officially lifts ban on female soldiers. The Guardian, 24 January. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/24/us-military-lifts-ban-women-combat.
21 Britzky, Haley (2022): 100 women have now graduated from US Army Ranger School. Task & Purpose, 11 March. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/100-women-army-ranger-school/.
22 Spencer, John (2016): The Challenges of Ranger School and how to overcome them. Modern War Institute at West Point. 12 April. https://mwi.usma.edu/challenge-ranger-school-can/.
23 Benyon, Steve (2021): Army Mulls Returning to Gendered Fitness Standards over Complaints of "Lopsided" ACFT. Military.com, 25 May. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/05/25/army-mulls-returning-gendered-fitness-standards-over-complaints-of-lopsided-acft.html.
24 Weigelt, Julia (2021): 20 Jahre Frauen in der Bundeswehr – Noch lange nicht respektiert. Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 12 January. https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/20-jahre-frauen-in-der-bundeswehr-noch-lange-nicht-100.html.
25 The *Bundeswehr* puts it in these terms: "In the *Bundeswehr,* only in the assessment of athletic performance different criteria apply to men and women" (translated from German). Frauen bei der Bundeswehr: Europa machte es möglich. https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/selbstverstaendnis-bundeswehr/chancengerechtigkeit-bundeswehr/frauen-bundeswehr.
26 Falkowski, Nathalie (2014): Ich. Diene. Deutschland. In: Bohnert, Marcel and Reitstetter, Lukas (eds.): Armee im Aufbruch – Zur Gedankenwelt junger Offiziere in den Kampftruppen der Bundeswehr. Norderstedt, p. 98.
27 Ables, Micah (2019): Women aren't the Problem. Standards Are. Modern War Institute at West Point. 5 February. https://mwi.usma.edu/women-arent-problem-standards/.
28 Atherton Report, p. 14, para 21.
29 Atherton Report, p. 15, para 26.
30 Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services: Military Fitness. https://www.cafconnection.ca/National/Programs-Services/For-Military-Personnel/Military-Fitness.aspx.
31 For a US perspective on these points which is largely in line with the arguments and considerations forwarded here see a summary of the argument by Capt. Kristen Griest, the US Army's first female infantry officer, who also graduated from Ranger School. Losey, Stephen (2021): Pioneering Female Ranger School Grad: Lowering Fitness Standards for Women is a Bad Idea. Military News, 25 February, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/02/25/pioneering-female-ranger-school-grad-lowering-fitness-standards-women-bad-idea.html, and original article Griest, Kristen M. (2021): With Equal Opportunity comes Equal Responsibility: Lowering Fitness Standards to Accommodate Women will Hurt the Army - and Women. The Modern War Institute at West Point. 25 February, https://mwi.usma.edu/with-equal-opportunity-comes-equal-responsibility-lowering-fitness-standards-to-accommodate-women-will-hurt-the-army-and-women/.

FOR A BOLD IMPLEMENTATION

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTRY AND ARMED FORCES

Authors: ***Nicola Habersetzer/ Inger-Luise Heilmann***

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted the landmark resolution 1325[1] on women, peace and security. It was the first UNSC resolution to address the importance of women's participation in conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the disproportionately severe impact of armed conflicts on women and girls.

Since then, nine more UNSC resolutions[2] have followed. Together, they form the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda.

The WPS agenda aims at the full, equal and meaningful participation of all genders in peace and security. To achieve this, women should be more strongly represented in all international, national and regional decision-making bodies and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This includes the active participation of women in peace negotiations as well as the increased involvement of women in peace operations.

Agenda 1325 is by no means purely a "women's issue"

Another aspect of the WPS Agenda is that peace and security for all people should be achieved through a concept of security that focuses on human security and respect for human rights, as well as through the integration of a gender perspective.[3] In peace operations, for example, the integration of a gender perspective makes it possible to analyze the different concerns and needs of all genders in violent conflicts or other operational contexts, and address them in a solution-oriented way.[4] This underlines the point that Agenda 1325 is by no means purely a "women's issue".

Agenda 1325 in the work of the German federal government

The WPS Agenda is a relevant topic for the German federal government. It is anchored in strategic documents such as the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr*, the foreign policy guidelines on "Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace" *(Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern)* and the White Paper on Multilateralism. In addition, the federal government's activities relating to the implementation of Agenda 1325 are structured by what is now the third National Action Plan (NAP). National Action Plans are a common implementation tool internationally – 98 UN member states have currently adopted a NAP.[5] With each NAP, the German government commits to concrete actions for a period of four years, to promote increased participation of women in crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding, to advocate for the protection of women and girls against violence in armed conflicts, and to support gender-sensitive conflict analysis.

The current National Action Plan for the period 2021 to 2024 is distinguished by its whole-of-government approach. It is prepared by the interministerial working group on women, peace and security, consisting of the six federal ministries relevant for its implementation, under the leadership of the German Federal Foreign Office.[6] The NAP covers the four pillars of the WPS Agenda: "conflict prevention", "participation", "protection", and "relief and recovery". It also aims to strengthen the WPS Agenda and increase its institutional integration and capacities within the German government. For the first time, the NAP includes a monitoring and evaluation plan as well as indicators to measure goal attainment. The NAP's goals are in alignment with other relevant guidelines of the federal government, to improve policy coherence.[7] The German government's coalition agreement – "Dare More Progress – Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability" – also emphasizes the relevance of Agenda 1325 and the NAP for this legislative period. In the spirit of a feminist foreign policy, the German government is seek-

ing to strengthen the rights, resources and representation of women and girls worldwide, and, in doing so, to also "ambitiously implement and further develop" the NAP.[8]

Women, peace and security in the Defense Ministry's area of responsibility

The German Federal Ministry of Defense (FMoD) plays an integral role in devising and implementing the NAP. It actively participates in the work of the interministerial working group, and engages in regular dialog with German civil society.

With the current third NAP, the FMoD has committed to implementing fifteen measures.[9] These include strengthening the WPS Agenda in cooperation with NATO, and increasing the proportion of women, especially in leadership positions in the Ministry of Defense. Appropriate consideration is to be given to the WPS Agenda, women's rights, and dealing with sexual and gender-based violence in training and deployment preparation for military personnel. The analysis of structural barriers to increasing the proportion of women in European and international peace operations is also part of the NAP.

Since 2001, all military positions within the German armed forces *(Bundeswehr)* have been open to women; from the mid-1970s women were able to pursue an officer's career in the medical service. Today, women occupy 12.90% of all roles in the *Bundeswehr* (45.54% in the medical service and 9.24% of all other career roles), while in 2021, 17% of new applications to join the German armed forces on a fixed-term contract came from women. Women accounted for 8.11% of all personnel on foreign deployments in mid-April 2022. In terms of the proportion of women, the *Bundeswehr* is in the centre field compared to other NATO countries. This is partly due to the fact, mentioned above, that all military positions have only been open to women in Germany for a little over 20 years.[10]

Based on the WPS Agenda, gender mainstreaming has been identified as a cross-sectional task for policymakers. "Mainstreaming" consists of a fundamental, general assessment and consideration of the gender-related consequences of all decisions[11] taken in an organization. The comprehensive implementation of a gender perspective cannot be achieved solely by one institutional department; it relies on the involvement of all people at all levels of an institution. The impacts of decisions on all genders should be taken into account in all project phases, i.e. in the assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programs or activities.[12]

Military operations require the ability to gather information from and about the local population, which in turn calls for a culturally and gender-sensitive approach. Adopting a gender perspective enhances the situational awareness of one's own armed forces in the field. Threats can be analyzed with greater precision, and operations planned more holistically. The impacts of military intervention on different population groups can be assessed more accurately and, in the best case, negative side-effects can be prevented. The needs of local populations can be better understood if the mission is aware of the different social roles and tasks of people of different genders, age groups, ethnicities, etc. Dealing with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence of all genders also requires a gender-sensitive approach. Gender competence can make an important contribution to greater effectiveness and legitimacy of operations and missions. Therefore the topic is also relevant for the German armed forces.

Military operations require the ability to gather information from and about the local population, which in turn calls for a culturally and gender-sensitive approach

Implementation in the UN context

For decades, the United Nations has been pushing for the implementation of Agenda 1325 in the security and defense sector, and also in the context of UN peace operations.

The Authors

Nicola Habersetzer and Inger-Luise Heilmann are advisors in the German Ministry of Defense.

In the year 2000, resolution 1325 explicitly mentioned the integration of a gender perspective in peacekeeping, and the participation of women in UN missions. Today, gender aspects are an integral part of a large number of Security Council mandates authorizing peace operations. In the early 1990s, even before resolution 1325 was adopted, the United Nations was increasingly seeking women peacekeepers for UN missions and women officers for the UN headquarters.[13] In 2014, Kristin Lund, a major general in the Norwegian armed forces, became the first female commander of the military component of a peace operation, when she joined the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UN Secretariat has adopted annually increasing targets for the years 2018 to 2028 for the proportion of women in uniformed components of UN peace operations (known as the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy).[14] The UN website lists the proportion of women for every country that contributes troops and police, and shows whether it is meeting the targets or what increase in the proportion of women would be necessary to achieve them.

Today, gender aspects are an integral part of a large number of Security Council mandates authorizing peace operations

Functionalist arguments have long been used to support increasing the proportion of women in UN missions. For example, women contribute to greater operational effectiveness because their input is essential in gender-sensitive contexts such as dealing with victims of sexual violence or body-searching women; and in some cases they can more easily establish relations with segments of the population. Women peacekeepers can also function as role models and sources of guidance in the country of deployment and in their home country, in terms of professional opportunities and putting gender equality into practice. It is an undisputed fact that more diverse teams can achieve more successful results in every social and professional sphere. However, in the international discourse, the focus has now increasingly moved to the question of equal opportunities, because women should have the same career chances and UN employment opportunities.

Implementing the WPS Agenda was one of the focal points of Germany's non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 2019 and 2020. In April 2019, the German defense minister at the time, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, chaired a meeting of the UNSC on women in peacekeeping, and announced national measures to increase the proportion of women in UN missions. In particular, a study[15] was conducted to identify barriers to the participation of German servicewomen in UN peace operations in the area of responsibility of the German Federal Ministry of Defense. As an Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) champion,[16] Germany has also assumed a leading role in the implementation of measures to increase the proportion of women in peacekeeping, and holds events to raise awareness of the topic and coordinate with other UN troop contributors. To date, Germany has not met the targets set out by the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. For UN staff officers and military observers, the UN calls for a proportion of women of 19%; in February 2022, Germany stood at 6.45%. The UN target for troop contingents is for a proportion of women of 9%; here Germany reached 6.06% in February 2022. Therefore more information should be provided about UN missions, and more servicewomen should be trained as UN military observers or UN staff officers – as the Inspector-General of the German armed forces already called for in his order to the armed forces of August 16, 2019.

Implementation in the EU and NATO

The women, peace and security theme has also gained attention and importance within the EU and NATO in recent years.

NATO adopted its first policy on the topic in 2007; it was most recently revised in 2018. With the appointment of the NATO Secretary-General's Special Representative for

Women, Peace and Security in 2012, the Alliance created a high-level point of contact for the Alliance's work in this area. With the WPS Action Plan for 2021-2025, NATO is seeking to consistently integrate a gender perspective into all its activities.[17] To this end, gender advisors are to be deployed in NATO's military structure and in all missions.[18] Their main task is to advise NATO commanders on integrating the gender perspective into the planning and execution of missions and operations, crisis and conflict analysis, and education and training. Gender advisors are supported by a network of Gender Focal Points (GFPs), who are appointed at the tactical level and whose task is to integrate a gender perspective into the unit's regular tasks. Germany supports NATO's work in the area of women, peace and security, in particular by taking part in the annual conference of the gender perspectives committee and by contributing to the annual NATO gender report. This describes the status of implementation of Agenda 1325 in the member and partner nations. However, the role of an independent gender advisor is not mirrored in the *Bundeswehr*.

Women, peace and security is also firmly established as a topic within the work of the European Union. For example, the EU has regularly adopted a regional action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325, most recently for the period 2019-2024.[19] As part of the *EU Strategic Approach to WPS* from 2018, the EU also seeks to engage men and boys as agents of change, and emphasizes the need to address and transform gender stereotypes and societal exclusion mechanisms.[20] The WPS Agenda is also strengthened by the EU Action Plan for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2021-2025.[21]

How could the WPS agenda be taken forward in the German armed forces?

As set out in the coalition agreement, as a first step the NAP should be implemented ambitiously within the area of responsibility of the German Federal Ministry of Defense. Special priority should be given to taking aspects of the WPS Agenda into account in training and pre-deployment training, and to removing barriers to the participation of women in operations and missions.

Although aspects of the WPS Agenda are an integral part of pre-deployment training, for example for UN missions, the only in-detail consideration of gender perspectives in the Bundeswehr known to the authors is part of the training for Intercultural Mission Advisors. However, one does not become an expert on gender issues so easily. Training for civilian and military personnel – especially those in senior positions – that qualifies them appropriately could help significantly in this regard. Consistent implementation of a gender perspective in all working areas, as is already being done in NATO and the EU, would be another idea for advancing the WPS Agenda in the *Bundeswehr*. In addition, further training on the WPS Agenda for all employees, as envisaged in the EU Action Plan, could also be introduced in the FMoD's area of responsibility.

One does not become an expert on gender issues so easily. Training for civilian and military personnel – especially those in senior positions – that qualifies them appropriately could help significantly

In principle, Germany could coordinate more closely with partner countries in the UN, NATO and the EU in matters of the institutional implementation of the WPS Agenda and appropriate training. In this way, existing and established training content from the UN and NATO could be put to more extensive use.

Other countries are implementing the WPS Agenda beyond the framework of their NAP. Ireland, for example, has adopted its own implementation plan to implement the WPS Agenda in its armed forces. Such an implementation for the *Bundeswehr* could be part of the next German NAP, for example.

In addition, the vast majority of NATO and EU partners already deploy gender advisors in national structures. The United Kingdom, for example, has human security advisors in its

Ministry of Defence and armed forces, as well as human security focal points throughout the defense sector. The assistance chief of defense staff also acts as a Senior Responsible Officer for Human Security. Albania is currently in the process of introducing relevant positions in its general staff and command staffs.

To date, there is no central point of contact for WPS issues in the FMoD at management level, and the relevant responsibilities are spread across various departments. There is a lack of overarching coordination in this area.

A suggestion for the future could therefore be to establish such points of contact or officers in the *Bundeswehr* and in the FMoD to ensure greater policy coherence and a more ambitious implementation of the NAP as well as clearer structures and responsibilities. The topic could then be included and represented in a more integrated way in assignments, the drafting of discussion documents, and the preparation of country or project status reports.

Ambitious implementation of the outlined steps could accelerate the change in culture toward a gender-responsive institution that also displays gender sensitivity in its external activities. With the courage to take appropriate measures, the FMoD's area of responsibility could more strongly support the efforts of the UN, NATO and the EU, and continue to make an active contribution to implementing the goals of the coalition agreement and the NAP.

1 https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000) (all internet references accessed May 3, 2022).
2 UNSC resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467, 2493.
3 "Gender" means attributed gender identity as a social reality made by humans, which determines hierarchies between social actors. (Cf. West, Candace and Zimmerman, Don H. (1987): Doing Gender. In: Gender and Society, vol. 1, no. 2 (June), pp. 125-151.)
4 Kvarving, Lena P. and Grimes, Rachel (2016): Why and how gender is vital in military operations. PfPC SSRWG and EDWG, Handbook on Teaching Gender in the Military. Geneva, pp. 10 ff. https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/english/swedint/engelska/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/dcaf-pfpc-teaching-gender-in-the-military-handbook.pdf.
5 http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/.
6 German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend), Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren), Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz), Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung), Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung).
7 Auswärtiges Amt (2020): Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung zur Agenda Frauen, Frieden und Sicherheit 2021-2024, p. 18. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2443848/3596859eebe39f90fa327e81ede416a3/aktionsplan-zu-wps-iii-data.pdf.
8 Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit. Koalitionsvertrag 2021–2025 zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP, p. 114. https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf.
9 Auswärtiges Amt (2020), pp. 42 ff.
10 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives: Summary of National Reports 2019, p. 23. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132342.htm.
11 UN ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2: "Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels." https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/ECOSOCAC1997.2.PDF.
12 Cf. Bastick, Megan and Valasek, Kristin (eds.) (2008): Gender and SSR Toolkit. Geneva.
13 Beilstein, Janet (1998): The Expanding Role of Women in United Nations Peacekeeping. In: Lorentzen, Louis Ann and Turpin, Jennifer (eds.): The Women & War Reader. New York/London, pp. 143-144.
14 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/uniformed-gender-parity-strategy-2018-2028-full-text.
15 Summary of results available at https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5222254/18438025e01b-ca098258701d26e4b7c4/zusammenfassung-barrier-studie-data.pdf.
16 Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) is the peacekeeping reform initiative launched by UN Secretary-General Guterres. A4P champions take a lead role in implementing the initiative. For more information, see: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p.

17 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187485.htm.
18 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm.
19 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11031-2019-INIT/en/pdf.
20 https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/eu-strategic-approach-to-women-peace-and-security-wps.
21 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2184.

"EVERY MEMBER OF THE MILITARY SHOULD HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF GENDER"

NATO, the world's largest defense alliance, is active in a wide variety of regions around the world, with an extensive military and civilian apparatus. The editorial team at "Ethics and Armed Forces" spoke with Major Isabel Borkstett, Deputy IMS Gender Advisor in Brussels, about how the Women, Peace and Security agenda is being implemented and what importance the topic of gender has for NATO. In the interview, she explains what diversity means and why the gender perspective will determine the success or failure of the Alliance.

Major Borkstett, let's start by defining what a Gender Advisor (GENAD) is. What are his or her responsibilities?

Perhaps I should start by outlining what we are not: The role of the GENAD, especially on the German side, is often equated or confused with that of the military gender equality officer (GleiBMil), but in fact there is very little overlap. While GENADs also deal with issues relating to women in the armed forces, they are concerned less with equalities law than with the practical need for female personnel so that we can fulfill our mission properly. GENADs are part of the advisory group on the commander's special staff; they advise their leadership as well as the staff on all matters surrounding the implementation of a gender perspective in military tasks and activities. They look at social roles and assess what the armed forces need to do in consideration of these roles.

Apart from GENADS there are also so-called Gender Focal Points (GFPs). What do they do?

In a secondary capacity, Gender Focal Points (GFPs) are special points of contact for GENADs in the various areas of a unit or site. They have an awareness of gender aspects and monitor these aspects in the context of their own responsibilities. So each command base area, company, patrol, etc. can appoint a GFP. If the GFP notices something (while on patrol, for example) that the GENAD should know, the two will discuss it afterwards. Here at NATO HQ, we have GFPs in every division; they draw our attention to taskers (sets of task instructions) and documents that need to be double-checked from a gender perspective. The idea is that the GENAD has a network to help them fulfill their role, because obviously with such a small office – our office at NATO HQ, for example, consists of just two posts – we can't be everywhere at the same time.

What hard and soft skills do GENADs need – and do they always have to be women?

As I said, it's about adopting a perspective when looking at real-world scenarios. So a person's gender is not a criterion for the job. There are male and female GENADs in NATO. However, the topic is often mistakenly perceived as a "women's issue" and nations appoint staff accordingly, so the job landscape is very female-dominated. I would like to see more parity.

What else does it take to be a GENAD? I think a background in cultural, social or political science is helpful, and sometimes a thick skin. You deal extensively with subjects that are hard to digest – such as sexual violence as a weapon of war – and unfortunately, you still encounter a lot of misunderstandings and aversions.

NATO is committed to fully implementing the UN Security Council's Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. How is this reflected throughout the NATO organization?

Profile



Major Isabel Borkstett was born in 1983. She studied cultural studies, joined the Bundeswehr in 2007 and has a degree in political science from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. After completing her officer training, she served as a Foreign Area Specialist in the Bundeswehr, where she designed the course "Gender Perspective in Operations". She worked in the German Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg) (department for Innere Führung) before joining the International Military Staff of NATO (current position D/GENAD). She completed training as a NATO-certified Gender Advisor in 2014, and as a UN Military Observer in 2019. In 2017, she was deployed as Foreign Area Specialist to EUNAVFOR MED operation "Sophia" in the Mediterranean Sea.

The topic is important, as reflected in the fact that there is a Secretary General's Special WPS Representative. It really is embedded at the very top of the institution and runs all the way down to the GFPs at the tactical level. The gender community in NATO is extensively networked. As Gender Advisors at HQ, we interact closely with the civilian WPS team, our GFPs, the GENADs in both strategic commands – Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – and their respective substructures, as well as member state and partner nation delegations and external stakeholders such as the EU. There are advisory bodies such as the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives. In addition, NATO has a WPS action plan that has just been updated, as well as various policies and guidelines with a dedicated WPS focus. But we also try to treat the topic in a cross-sectional way and to integrate it into documents that are not specifically about gender.

So it seems gender gets a lot of attention …

Yes, but it's important to point out that "gender" isn't solely the remit of gender-related positions in the armed forces. Every member of the military should have a basic understanding of gender, and under Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001, commanders maintain overall responsibility for effective implementation of a gender perspective. Integrating the gender perspective is also, and above all, a leadership responsibility.

When it comes to training, for example, NATO offers courses and an education and training package on gender issues. What do these courses involve, and are they mandatory?

There is a wide training offering that nations can take advantage of. The "Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations" in Sweden is is NATO's Department Head and as such comparable to a Centre of Excellence, so to speak, and we also support other training institutions such as the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence in Bulgaria, and the NATO School Oberammergau in Germany. NATO's e-learning platform JADL offers gender training courses too.

The E&T package is designed to better integrate gender into national training. Essentially, it teaches the basics of the gender perspective and provides practical examples of its implementation. However there is no obligation to use it, which is why unfortunately it is not very well known.

The courses, for example at the Nordic Centre for Gender, are aimed at all kinds of target groups. There is the NATO-certified training for prospective GENADs – usually ranking from OF-2 to OF-4 – but there are also courses for GFPs or key leader seminars for military leaders above these ranks.

If there is any uncertainty about where to go for training for yourself or your personnel: You can contact us at any time!

Our office acts as an intermediary with the relevant institutions if there is any uncertainty about where to go for training for yourself or your personnel. I would like to do some direct advertising here: You can contact us at any time!

What are your most important tasks as Deputy IMS GENAD?

I mentioned that our team here is a manageable size, so everyone does everything from time to time. As deputy GENAD, I mainly do content-related and administrative work, while my boss tends to define the key priorities and coordinate our general direction of travel with the leadership.

In the International Military Staff (IMS), we are the link between ACO and ACT on the one hand and our superiors on the other; so first of all there is a lot of coordination and consultation involved. But each gender advisor office also has its own responsibilities. ACO GENAD, our counterpart in SHAPE, focuses on NATO operations and provides gender advice to their leadership. ACT, in turn, is focused on training.

The IMS here in Brussels serves as a strategic advisory element of the NATO Military Com-

mittee, so we primarily advise the Director of the IMS (DGIMS) and the divisional leaders on various issues. In addition, the GENAD office provides administrative support to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), which prepares gender-specific recommendations for the Military Committee.

You also prepare an annual report for the NCGP. What's in the report?

It is the annual analysis of the "Summary of the National Reports" – a comparative assessment of the steps that NATO Member and Partner Nations have taken to integrate gender perspective in their armed forces. The IMS GENAD office collects the data, analyzes it, and produces the report, which is then published through the DGIMS. This unique publication identifies the achievements, milestones and challenges in the area of gender.

The injustice that we see in the world today is gender-based to an incredibly large extent, and even more so in conflict or armed conflict

What is happening for example regarding the representation of women in the militaries of NATO Member and Partner Nations? Are there specific targets such as the UN's 15 percent goal?

We follow the UN target as far as personnel for NATO operations are concerned. On average, NATO has not yet achieved the 15 percent mark, but there are large differences between nations – after all, we are talking about 30 member states, each with their own nuances. Some nations have already far surpassed the target, while others are still below it. Germany is in the NATO middle range with approximately 12 percent.

You completed the GENAD training yourself in Sweden in 2014. What did you think of it?

The course in Sweden was very practice-oriented. At the time it was still quite focused on Afghanistan, but of course the content is adapted to requirements over time. I participated with a clear purpose in mind. I was in the Bundeswehr Department of Foreign Area Specialists (Interkulturelle Einsatzberatung, IEB), and my task was to familiarize myself with the subject matter so that I could then integrate it into IEB training. Gender above all is a cultural factor that you have to understand in order to comprehend and navigate the area of operations.

Have you been able to put your knowledge to use?

Actually I was able to use and pass on the knowledge not only theoretically but also in the field – I was deployed to the Mediterranean a Foreign Area Specialist and as such was involved in a sea rescue of almost 1200 people, including many women, expectant mothers, girls and boys. I am also a trained UN Military Observer and will definitely need the gender perspective when there is a UN deployment at some point. Obviously it is a benefit in my current role …

Why is the topic of gender close to your heart?

I believe firmly in the values that we stand for as members of the military, and which we swear to uphold. At the core of this framework of values is the inviolability of human dignity, which must be our top priority to protect and defend. The injustice that we see in the world today is gender-based to an incredibly large extent, and even more so in conflict or armed conflict. Sexual violence is used as a weapon in wars around the world, to humiliate other groups and undermine their social fabric. The absolute majority of refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide are women and children, most of whom have a weak social and legal position at the same time. As an actor in the crisis area – and that is what NATO is – you cannot ignore this; it is part of the situational awareness and must affect your own actions. Taking a gender perspective into account can also be understood as an element of own force protection …

You are touching on the point that gender mainstreaming should also act as a "force multiplier" to increase the effectiveness of missions.

Part of the gender perspective is that you have to work on your own gender bias to become more militarily effective. There are armed groups that have been extremely successful in using female (suicide) assassins because no-one at the checkpoint thought it possible that a 15-year-old girl could be a serious threat. Gender and how to exploit it is something that adversary groups often think about much more than we do. This is often not recognized, either.

So even in such a male-dominated field as the military, it is not only a question of increasing the number of women across all levels and establishing an understanding of their particular concerns? How and where can the gender perspective play an important role for men, too?

First of all, gender perspective is not the same as women's perspective. It is an extremely broad field, and an important integral of NATO's core tasks collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. So it is not enough to focus only on increasing the number of women in the armed forces. It is about analyzing social roles, which means masculinity concepts are also part of it. For example, in many places boys in particular are at high risk of falling victim to mines or explosive devices, because culturally they often have more freedoms than girls and are allowed to play farther away from their parents' homes. If we are committed to human security and include aspects such as "safe and secure environment" in our mandates, then awareness of these critical situations is not tied to a particular gender in the first instance – male colleagues should also be aware of them.

Does the "gender lens" help you to see more, as it were?

Former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana once said very aptly that unless security concepts take people's circumstances into account, they are bound to be ineffective. To be very clear: If we do not make a concerted effort to develop this understanding, we risk failure, or at the very least making ourselves superfluous. What is the point of a security alliance, and for whom, if it does not provide security? And yes, having more women in the military is an important factor; humanity is not homogeneously male and white. So how can we possibly develop responsive approaches that are suitable for the contemporary world if we do not reflect this diversity internally? But that doesn't mean that we can tick gender off the list if we manage to increase the proportion of women from 12% to 13%.

Gender and how to exploit it is something that adversary groups often think about more than we do

But it is surely a complex task to integrate a gender perspective everywhere – from conflict analysis to planning and especially in the field. Are there standards or best practices?

Integration requires a cross-sectional approach. Currently, the gender perspective is often still seen as an "add-on" – for example attaching a gender annex to the operational plan. But gender runs through all topics, from equipping our troops to general logistical issues, information activities, rules of engagement, key leader engagement and threat analysis. This is complex, for sure. But that's the challenge, and exactly why our Gender Focal Points are so enormously important. There are new counter-IED regulations? Let GENAD take a look at them. Artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems? They learn from human bias, which is why NATO wants to take proactive steps in AI-based technology development to minimize unintended bias.

As a human factor, gender affects all our actions, and of course we don't have best practices yet for the entire spectrum. But advice is provided, for example by the GENADs, and our Nordic Centre for Gender offers learning and training materials on its website, not only for course participants.

An important element of the WPS agenda is protection against sexual violence in conflict and crisis zones. What is NATO doing to ensure this?

This is a terrible issue that has a very high priority, as can be seen not least from the fact that NATO has its own policies and military guidelines specifically on this subject. Our forces are committed to protecting vulnerable populations from these atrocities, both preventively and reactively. This begins with raising awareness of the urgency of the issue in training and on exercises and includes appropriate operational plans, as well as developing suitable analytical tools, working with civilian aid organizations on the ground and integration into reporting.

I categorically reject the idea that there are special "female" traits. It is more about the benefits of diversity in general, which strengthens us as a force

It is often argued that women in the military bring essential skills to the table, e.g. for reconnaissance and contact with the local population. What is your opinion on this as a female officer, and also personally: Do female soldiers do things differently, do they have special skills?

First of all, on the point that we need more women in the field – that this is the case becomes clear at every checkpoint. Men search men, women search women. We cannot apply lower standards in the societies where we operate, which are often much more sensitively structured than our own in terms of gender issues, than we do at home. Even here in Europe at the airport, women are patted down by women. That is admittedly a simple example, and I am not saying that we should instrumentalize more diversity purely for practical operational needs.

In this context, however, – and this is my follow-up thought – I categorically reject the idea that there are special "female" traits. That is biologism – always seeking to place what is divisive ahead of what we have in common. As if all female soldiers were per se gentler, more sensitive or whatever than men! As discussed earlier, it is more about the benefits of diversity in general, which strengthens us as a force. The broader our base, the more potential we can draw on, and the more perspectives we gain to help us fulfill our mission.

Certainly by now, with the war in Ukraine, there is a sharper focus on deterrence and Alliance defense. Is this perhaps pushing gender back into the background?

As I mentioned before, the gender perspective is a central element in all of NATO's core tasks. So we do not need to construct a new raison d'être for the gender perspective because of the new focus; it has again shown its urgency in light of the war in Ukraine. We have received countless reports about Ukrainian women who have been raped, and about human traffickers who prey on refugees as soon as they get off the train, attempting to force them into prostitution. Ukrainian males over 18 years of age are not allowed to leave the country – this too includes a gender perspective. Gender is used to deliberately influence the information environment, such as when Mayor Klitschko of Kyiv, wearing body armor, hands out flowers in front of destroyed homes on International Women's Day, and shares this on Instagram. And gender is also massively instrumentalized in the context of fake news. So the issue is not being pushed into the background at all – on the contrary.

Overall, what is your assessment of the state of implementation of the WPS agenda in NATO? Is gender sensitivity really being taken on board everywhere?

The topic has become more and more established in recent years, and I think this trend will continue. The bottom line is that NATO is always a mirror of its member states, of their policies and of developments in civil society and society as a whole. Nations might not always have identical views on gender, but time is still not running backwards. Germany's new government, for example, is now advocating a feminist foreign policy. There is a lot of catching up to do, to put it simply, especially in terms of how the topic is approached – many misperceptions and prejudices still need to be cleared up at the working level. When I say, for example, that gender is an element of hybrid

threats and countering violent extremism, people sometimes look at me with irritation, having assumed that GENAD just wants to enforce gender-inclusive language for political correctness only.

Can you imagine that one day the topic will seem so self-evident that GENADs and similar positions won't be needed anymore?

That would actually be great – but I don't see that happening right now. I do hope, however, that GENAD's value will be increasingly recognized, and that staffing will be increased so that we can broaden our advisory services.

Major Borkstett, thank you very much for the interview!

Questions by Rüdiger Frank.

Glossary

ACO: Allied Command Operations, responsible for the planning and execution of all NATO military operations.

ACT: Allied Command Transformation, one of two Strategic Commands at the head of NATO's military command structure. ACT leads the military adaptation of the Alliance, coordinating national efforts.

IMS: International Military Staff, the executive body of the Military Committee (MC), NATO's senior military authority.

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY: A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE AGENDA

1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

- Most important international agreement for the protection of women and girls
- Prohibits discrimination at all levels and commits to equality
- Signatory states must report every four years

1995 Beijing Conference and the Final Declaration (so-called Beijing Platform)

- 189 UN countries adopt the most comprehensive approach to promoting gender equality and supporting women and girls
- Establishment of gender mainstreaming (taking into account different impacts of policy decisions on men and women)

2000 Windhoek Declaration

- Key outcome of the Beijing Conference calling for stronger links between security and peace and gender justice
- Gender mainstreaming at all levels of peace missions and the perception of women beyond the victim status come into focus

2000 Security Council Resolution 1325

The first resolution of the agenda focuses on expanding the protection of women in conflict regions and calling for greater participation of women in peace and reconstruction processes.

2008 Security Council Resolution 1820

According to the UN Security Council, acts of sexual violence can be considered war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. In addition, member states are urged to prosecute sexual violence in wars and not to grant amnesty to perpetrators.

2009 Security Council Resolution 1888

This resolution emphasizes the special protected status of women and children and calls for an immediate end to sexual violence by parties to conflicts in crisis regions as well as stronger and more consistent persecution of such acts. Establishes the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The fight against sexual violence is considered to be of great importance for the goal of world peace.

2009 Security Council Resolution 1889

The text repeats the underrepresentation of women in peace processes and explicitly emphasizes the promotion of women in decision-making and mediating positions. They play a decisive role in conflict prevention, which is why obstacles of all kinds in the regions and states concerned must be further dismantled. In addition to more protection, member states are requested to do more to empower women.

2010 Security Council Resolution 1960

The resolution calls for the development of data collection and analysis mechanisms on conflict-related sexual violence, establishes Women Protection Advisors for UN missions, and notes the link between women in peacekeeping missions and local women's willingness to report acts of sexual violence. It also urges

member states to deploy more female uniformed personnel in the military and police to provide a broader training base on sexual violence.

2013 Security Council Resolution 2106

This resolution addresses the persistent problem of impunity in cases of conflict-related sexual violence.

2013 Security Council Resolution 2122

The Security Council identifies more effective measures for the inclusion of women in peace processes and tasks the Secretary-General with a report on implementation.

2015 Security Council Resolution 2242

The resolution links Women, Peace and Security with the prevention of extremism and terrorism. It calls for the establishment of an Informal Expert Group as an advisory and information body, for example on the situation in individual countries, which starts working in 2016.

2019 Security Council Resolution 2467

The resolution submitted by Germany highlights the importance of civil society and creates a link between a society's unwillingness to prosecute violence against women and its propensity for conflict. It also calls for a "survivor-centered approach" that sees women less as victims and more as shaping actors. Men and boys are mentioned as previously neglected groups affected by sexualized violence.

2019 Security Council Resolution 2493

The last WPS resolution so far urges member states to fully implement the agenda.

Sources

https://www.un.org/Depts/german/de/sr_1.html (Resolutionen und Beschlüsse des Sicherheitsrats)

www.unwomen.org

www.peacewomen.org

www.auswaertiges-amt.de

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB) (Hg.) (2009): Welttag zur Beseitigung sexueller Gewalt in Konflikten. In: https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/292741/welttag-zur-beseitigung-sexueller-gewalt-in-konflikten/ (accessed 18.5.2022).

Oestreich, Heide (2002): Die Weltsicherheit wird quotiert. In: https://taz.de/Die-Weltsicherheit-wird-quotiert/!1088583/ (accessed 18.5.2022).

Shepherd, Laura J. (2019): WPS and adopted Security Council resolutions. In: Davies, Sara E.and True, Jacqui (eds.): The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security. Oxford.

FULL ISSUES

www.ethicsandarmedforces.com



This issue and all other issues of „Ethics and Armed Forces“ can be found **in German and English** on the homepage of the e-journal.

Full issues of „Ethics and Armed Forces“

2021/1 Innere Führung and Military Ethos
2021/1 Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier
2020/2 Corona Pandemic
2020/1 Nuclear Deterrence
2019/2 Ethics for Soldiers
2019/1 Conflict Zone Cyberspace
2018/2 European Army
2018/1 Strategic foresight
2017 Terror
2016 Innere Führung
2015/2 Hybrid warfare
2015/1 Military medical ethics
2014/2 Cyberwar
2014/1 Drones and LAWS

The next issue on the war in Ukraine will be online on 1 December 2022

IMPRINT

The e-journal “Ethics and Armed Forces” (ISSN 2199-4137) is a free-of-charge, non-commercial, digital publication containing journalistic and editorial content.
It is produced by Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den Streitkräften – zebis, Herrengraben 4, 20459 Hamburg.
Director of zebis: Dr. Veronika Bock

Note: The published articles do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editors and publishers.

Editors
Prof. Dr. Andreas Bock, Dr. Veronika Bock,
Prof. Dr. Thomas Elßner, Prof. Dr. Johannes Frühbauer,
Prof. Dr. Fred van Iersel, Prof. Dr. Alexander Merkl,
Norbert Stäblein

Advisory Board
Lothar Bendel, Heinrich Dierkes, Friederike Frücht,
Dr. Angela Reinders, Cornelius Sturm, Kristina Tonn

Copy Editors
Rüdiger Frank; Marius Wünschel

Person responsible for content pursuant to section 55 (2) of the German Interstate Broadcasting Agreement (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, RStV)
Dr. Veronika Bock, Herrengraben 4, 20459 Hamburg

Contact
Tel.: +49(0)40 - 67 08 59 - 51, Fax 67 08 59 - 3
E-Mail: redaktion@zebis.eu

Service provider as the legal entity of Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den Streitkräften – zebis
Katholische Soldatenseelsorge (KS)

Legal form
Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts

Supervision
Catholic military bishop for the German armed forces (Bundeswehr)
Am Weidendamm 2, 10117 Berlin

Authorized board of directors of KS
Director at KMBA
Msgr. Wolfgang Schilk
Diplom-Kaufmann Wolfgang Wurmb
Am Weidendamm 2
10117 Berlin

Contakt KS
Telefon: +49(0)30 - 20 617 - 500
Telefax: +49(0)30 - 20 617 - 599
Info@Katholische-Soldatenseelsorge.de

Date of Publication: 15 June 2022

ethicsandarmedforces.com

zebis
Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den Streitkräften
Herrengraben 4
20459 Hamburg

Tel. +49 40 67 08 59 - 55
Fax +49 40 67 08 59 - 59

info@zebis.eu
www.zebis.eu